Carbon markets under the Paris Agreement: how can environmental integrity be ensured? by Schneider, Lambert
Carbon Markets under the Paris Agreement:
How Can Environmental Integrity Be Ensured?
Lambert Schneider
Carbon M
arkets under the Paris Agreem
ent:
How Can Environm
ental Integrity Be Ensured?
Lam
bert Schneider
  
Propositions 
 
1. Ensuring the environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms is 
difficult because environmental integrity can be undermined in many different ways 
and a single loophole can have a large impact. 
(this thesis) 
2. Linking of emissions trading systems poses much less risks for environmental 
integrity than engaging in crediting mechanisms. 
(this thesis) 
3. Regulatory oversight is critical for whether environmental markets foster innovation 
and lower costs or whether they give rise to abuse, fraud and corruption. 
4. The principle that one policy instrument should be used to achieve one goal is not 
well suited to address environmental challenges in complex settings. 
5. Cost-effectiveness is overvalued in climate policy: policy-makers should rather focus 
on long-term environmental effectiveness. 
6. Multilateral agreements are essential to solve global challenges, even in a fragmented 
and polarized world where only the lowest common denominator can be agreed. 
7. Perfectionism is a perfect way to unhappiness. 
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Summary 
The 2015 Paris Agreement allows countries to use international carbon market 
mechanisms to achieve their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Carbon 
markets provide flexibility where and when emissions are reduced and could thereby 
lower the cost of mitigating climate change. This can help countries to enhance the 
ambition of their NDCs. If not designed and implemented robustly, however, carbon 
markets could lead to higher emissions and increase the cost of mitigating climate change. 
Ensuring environmental integrity of carbon market mechanisms is thus an important 
prerequisite for achieving their objectives. 
This thesis assesses how the environmental integrity of international carbon market 
mechanisms can be ensured in the new context of the Paris Agreement in which all 
countries have NDCs. The thesis assesses how environmental integrity could be defined – 
here it is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon 
market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions –, what the risks for 
undermining environmental integrity are, what approaches could be used to address these 
risks, and what this means for the future role of international carbon market mechanisms 
(see Figure S-1). 
 
Figure S-1 Overview of approaches for addressing environmental integrity 
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The thesis identifies four factors that inﬂuence environmental integrity (Chapter 2): 
• The accounting for international transfers of carbon market units;  
• The quality of units generated (i.e. whether the market mechanism ensures that the 
issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country);  
• The ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and  
• Incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives 
for transferring countries to deﬁne future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more 
narrowly in order to sell more units. 
Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diverse 
scope, metrics, types and timeframe of NDC targets is an important challenge, in 
particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for carbon 
markets units is representative for the mitigation efforts by countries over time. The thesis 
identifies three ways in which double counting can occur: through double issuance (e.g. 
by issuing units from the same project under two crediting programs), through double 
claiming of the same emission reductions by the country where the emission reductions 
occur and the entity using the carbon market units, and through double use of carbon 
market units. A key finding is that double counting can also occur in rather indirect ways 
which can be challenging to identify. Effectively avoiding double counting mainly 
requires rules for accounting of unit transfers, appropriate design of carbon market 
mechanisms, and consistent tracking and reporting of units (Chapter 3). 
Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market 
mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring 
unit quality. The thesis assesses an interesting real-world example of how carbon markets 
can create perverse incentives and thereby undermine unit quality. It shows that projects 
abating HFC-23 and SF6 waste gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint 
Implementation mechanism increased waste gas generation to unprecedented levels as a 
means to increase credit revenues. Due to these perverse incentives, about two third of the 
issued credits do not represent actual emission reductions. This case study provides 
important lessons for carbon markets under the Paris Agreement because Joint 
Implementation was implemented in countries that had mitigation targets, and thus in a 
similar context as for countries with NDC targets (Chapter 4). 
Unit quality is also an important matter for the new Carbon Offsetting and Reduction 
Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) adopted by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. The scheme requires airline operators to purchase carbon market units to 
offset the increase in emissions above 2020 levels. It could constitute the single largest 
demand for carbon market units after 2020. The thesis shows that environmental integrity 
would be undermined if the scheme allows the unlimited use of credits from already 
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implemented projects. While additionality and the quantification of emission reductions 
are, in principle, key considerations for unit quality for crediting mechanisms, the 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions impact from using credits from already implemented 
projects is more complex. If the supply of credits considerably exceeds demand, a key 
consideration for the global GHG emissions impact is whether already implemented 
projects would continue to reduce GHG emissions even without credit revenues, or 
whether they are ‘vulnerable’ to discontinuing GHG abatement. A detailed assessment of 
the status and operating conditions of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism, 
and their marginal costs of supplying credits, shows that most projects would continue 
GHG abatement even if they cannot sell credits. If CORSIA allows airline operators the 
unlimited use of offset credits from these projects, this will not only undermine its 
environmental objectives but also lead to continued low carbon prices, and thus neither 
offer incentives for new investments nor lead to any significant revenues for already 
implemented projects. The thesis recommends limiting eligibility under CORSIA to new 
or ‘vulnerable’ projects (Chapter 5). 
Unit quality is also a key consideration when linking emissions trading systems (ETSs). 
As linking of ETSs faces several practical and political challenges and risks, including with 
regard to whether allowances have ‘quality’ and whether linking provides incentives or 
disincentives to enhance the ambition of caps, policy-makers are considering also 
restricted forms of linking ETSs. The thesis uses a simple economic model and three 
criteria – abatement outcome, economic implications, and feasibility – to assess three 
different options for implementing restricted linking of ETSs: quotas, exchange rates, or 
discount rates. The analysis shows that quotas can enhance cost-effectiveness relative to 
no linking and allow policy-makers to retain control on the extent of unit flows. Exchange 
rates could enhance abatement and economic benefits or have unintended adverse 
implications for cost-effectiveness and total abatement, depending on how rates are set. 
Due to information asymmetries between the regulated entities and policy-makers setting 
the exchange rate, and uncertainties about future developments, setting exchange rates in 
a manner that avoids such unintended consequences could prove difficult. Discount rates, 
in contrast, can ensure that both cost-effectiveness and total abatement are enhanced. The 
thesis recommends the consideration of quotas or discount rates, but to refrain from using 
exchange rates, due to the environmental integrity risks (Chapter 6). 
The varying scope and ambition of current NDC targets, and possible disincentives to 
broaden their scope and enhance their ambition, could be addressed by facilitating the 
adoption of ambitious and economy-wide mitigation targets and by preventing the 
transfer of carbon market units in situations of high environmental integrity risks. This 
latter approach could be implemented through eligibility criteria or limits on the 
generation, transfer or use of carbon market units. Limits could in particular address the 
risk that some countries have mitigation targets that correspond to higher levels of 
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emissions than independent projections of their likely emissions. If such ‘hot air’ can be 
transferred to other countries, it could increase aggregated emissions and create a perverse 
incentive for countries not to enhance the ambition of future mitigation targets. The thesis 
proposes a typology for such limits, explores key design options, and tests diﬀerent types 
of limits in the context of fifteen countries. The analysis indicates that limits to 
international transfers could, if designed appropriately, prevent most of the hot air 
contained in current mitigation targets from being transferred, but also involve trade-oﬀs 
between diﬀerent policy objectives (Chapter 7). 
The thesis concludes by discussing how four strategies to mitigate environmental integrity 
risks – robust accounting, ensuring unit quality, facilitating economy-wide and ambitious 
mitigation targets, and restricting international transfers – could be implemented under 
the Paris Agreement and CORSIA (see Figure S-1). Crediting mechanisms pose higher 
risks for environmental integrity than linking of ETSs and should therefore have a limited 
role in the future. International oversight can reduce the risks to environmental integrity 
to some extent. Acquiring countries could also reduce risks by only acquiring units from 
countries that also have ambitious NDC targets. Overall, policy-makers should not regard 
carbon market approaches as the one and only ‘silver-bullet’ to mitigating climate change 
but carefully assess what policy instrument or mix of instruments is best suited achieve 
and balance different policy objectives, in particular in light of the rapid transition that is 
necessary to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement (Chapter 8). 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Climate change is a serious threat to humanity. Its impacts are already being felt and could 
become much worse in the future. Climate-change impacts are diverse – including rising 
sea levels, more frequent extreme weather events, changing precipitation, expanding 
deserts, loss of biodiversity and ocean acidification – and could have serious consequences 
for humans, including significant loss and damage, threats to food security, abandonment 
of land, and increased migration (IPCC, 2014a). How much the earth will warm is critical 
for the scale of these effects. Limiting global mean temperature increase to 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels would have much less severe impacts than a 2°C increase but this 
would require a rapid peaking and steep decline of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions thereafter (IPCC, 2018). Limiting climate change is also crucial because self-
reinforcing feedbacks are a serious risk. They could push the earth beyond a threshold 
that causes continued warming in a ‘hothouse-earth’ pathway that likely causes series 
disruptions to ecosystems, society and economies, even if emissions are reduced (Steffen 
et al., 2018). 
In 2015, after many years of negotiations, countries adopted the Paris Agreement to 
strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change (UNFCCC, 2015). This 
landmark treaty aims to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. To reach these 
goals, all countries must, every five years, formulate and communicate mitigation 
measures in the form of nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Countries can 
determine themselves what mitigation measures they pledge. NDCs should, however, 
reflect the country’s “highest possible ambition” and each successive NDC should 
represent a “progression” beyond the current NDC. A ‘global stocktake’ is conducted 
every five years to assess whether the current mitigation pledges are adequate to meet the 
global goals of the Paris Agreement. This should then inform the formulation of countries’ 
subsequent NDCs. This ‘ambition cycle’ aims to strengthen the mitigation actions by 
countries over time. 
The agreement also includes several frameworks that support its implementation. Central 
elements are: an ‘enhanced transparency framework’ to track and review countries’ 
progress in reducing GHG emissions and achieving their NDCs; a framework to engage 
in international carbon market mechanisms; a framework for providing financial 
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resources to assist developing countries; and a “mechanism to facilitate implementation 
of and promote compliance”. In 2018, countries adopted the Katowice Climate Package – 
a first package of a rules to implement the provisions of the Paris Agreement. 
The Paris Agreement provides the international community with an ambitious framework 
for addressing climate change. This framework, however, needs to be filled and 
implemented by countries. In the run-up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, many 
countries communicated intended nationally determined contributions which then 
became their first NDCs. With these NDCs, we are, however, off-track to reach the goals 
of the Paris Agreement. Current NDCs are estimated to lead to a temperature increase of 
about 2.6-3.1°C above pre-industrial levels (Rogelj et al., 2016). Global emissions are still 
rising while they should be declining very soon. Achieving the goals of the Paris 
Agreement will therefore require a transition at a scale and pace that has no precedent in 
history.  
Carbon markets are seen as one of the possible means to raise the ambition of global 
mitigation action (Blandford, Davis, & Cozzi, 2017; Kreibich, 2018; Warnecke, Höhne, 
Tewari, Day, & Kachi, 2018). They provide flexibility where and when emissions are 
reduced and could thereby lower the cost of mitigating climate change. This can help 
countries to adopt more ambitious mitigation targets. Carbon markets could thus 
contribute to enhancing the ambition of NDCs and achieving the long-term goals of the 
Paris Agreement. 
If not designed and implemented robustly, however, carbon markets could lead to higher 
emissions and increase the cost of mitigating climate change (see e.g. Kollmuss, Schneider 
and Zhezherin, 2015; Cames et al., 2017). Ensuring environmental integrity of carbon 
market mechanisms is thus an important prerequisite for achieving the objectives of the 
Paris Agreement. 
International carbon market mechanisms have been implemented under the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol and in bilateral agreements. The Kyoto Protocol established three carbon market 
mechanisms: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which enables industrialized 
countries with mitigation targets to use emission reduction credits from projects 
implemented in developing countries; Joint Implementation (JI), which does the same 
with projects implemented in industrialized countries; and international emissions 
trading (IET), which allows industrialized countries to trade carbon market units with one 
another. 
The extent to which these mechanisms have achieved their stated goals has been 
questioned, particularly with regard to environmental integrity (Robert Bailis, Drigo, 
Ghilardi, & Masera, 2015; Calvin et al., 2015; Cames et al., 2017; Erickson, Lazarus, & 
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Spalding-Fecher, 2014; Haya & Parekh, 2011; He & Morse, 2013; Kollmuss et al., 2015; 
Michaelowa & Purohit, 2007; Purdon & Lokina, 2014; Schneider, 2009b, 2011; Spalding-
Fecher et al., 2012; Tuerk, Fazekas, Schreiber, Frieden, & Wolf, 2013). Drawing on the 
lessons from those experiences is therefore vital to ensure that market mechanisms work 
as intended under the Paris Agreement. 
The Paris Agreement establishes a new framework for using international carbon market 
mechanisms, which includes two main elements: 
• Cooperative approaches: Article 6.2 allows countries to engage in ‘cooperative 
approaches’ and to use ‘internationally transferred mitigation outcomes’ (ITMOs) 
towards their NDCs. Article 6.2 is commonly understood to provide a framework that 
allows countries to engage in international carbon market mechanisms – be it through 
international linking of emission trading schemes (ETSs), international crediting 
mechanisms, or direct bilateral government-to-government transfers – and to use 
internationally transferred carbon market units to achieve their NDCs. 
• Crediting mechanism: Article 6.4 establishes a new crediting mechanism under 
international oversight. The provisions of this mechanism resemble strongly those of 
the CDM: the mechanism has a dual objective of supporting mitigation action and 
sustainable development, is supervised by an international body, involves public and 
private entities, and requires mitigation action to be additional and to be verified by 
auditors. 
The Paris Agreement requires that environmental integrity be ensured for both the 
cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 and the new crediting mechanism under 
Article 6.4. Articles 6.1 and 6.2 specifically refer to “promoting” and “ensuring” 
environmental integrity, and the provisions of the new crediting mechanism under 
Article 6.4 include several elements that aim to safeguard environmental integrity, such 
as that mitigation beneﬁts be “real, measurable and long term” and that “additionality” be 
ensured (UNFCCC, 2015). 
This thesis assesses key issues for ensuring the environmental integrity of international 
carbon market mechanisms. The main overarching research question of the thesis is: 
How can the environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms be 
ensured in the new context of the Paris Agreement? 
To assess this, further research questions are: 
1. How should environmental integrity be defined in the context of international carbon 
market mechanisms? 
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2. What influences environmental integrity and what are the risks for undermining 
environmental integrity? 
3. What approaches could be used to mitigate environmental integrity risks and how 
could these approaches be implemented? 
4. What should be the role of international carbon market mechanisms in the future, 
given the risks for environmental integrity and the available means to address them? 
The thesis focuses on international carbon market mechanisms, noting that several aspects 
of the analysis and findings are also relevant for the domestic use of carbon market 
mechanisms. Moreover, the thesis focuses on the context of the Paris Agreement but also 
considers carbon market approaches that are implemented in other contexts. This holds in 
particular for the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
(CORSIA) that was adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 
2016. This new global scheme requires airline operators to purchase carbon market units 
to offset increases in carbon dioxide emissions from international flights above 2020 levels 
(ICAO, 2016a, 2018). With a mitigation gap of 1.6 to 3.7 GtCO2 over its operational period 
from 2021 to 2035, CORSIA could constitute the single largest demand for carbon market 
units after 2020 (Healy, 2017; ICAO, 2016b). 
Chapter 2 of the thesis first provides a comprehensive overview of key issues and options 
for ensuring environmental integrity. This includes how environmental integrity could be 
defined – here it is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of 
carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions – and a 
systematic identification and categorization of what influences environmental integrity 
and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks.  
The remainder of the thesis assesses specific aspects of achieving environmental integrity 
which were deemed to be of particular relevance for policy-makers and that had not yet 
been thoroughly investigated (Chapters 3 to 7). These aspects can be clustered in three 
broad themes: 
1. Accounting for the international transfer of carbon market units: Article 6.2 of the Paris 
Agreement requires countries to “apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the 
avoidance of double counting”. A lack of robust accounting could undermine 
environmental integrity in several ways (Chapter 2). If emission reductions are double 
counted, for example, actual global GHG emissions are higher than the sum of what 
individual countries report (see Chapter 3). Establishing and implementing robust 
accounting rules is thus an important prerequisite for achieving environmental 
integrity (see Chapters 2 and 3). An important question is therefore how robust 
accounting can be implemented in the new context of the Paris Agreement, taken into 
account the diverse scopes, metrics, types and timeframes of current NDC targets. 
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2. Quality of carbon market units: International carbon market mechanisms typically issue 
units which can be transferred through registries. If units do not have quality (i.e., if 
they do not lead to at least 1 tCO2e of emission reductions in the transferring country) 
aggregated emissions could increase (Chapter 2). An important question is therefore 
how future mechanisms should be designed so that they ensure unit quality, taking 
into account the new context of the Paris Agreement and the experiences and lessons 
from the existing mechanisms. 
3. Incentives and disincentives for enhancing mitigation action: Article 4.3 of the Paris 
Agreement calls for a “progression” of NDCs reflecting the “highest possible 
ambition”, and Article 4.4 encourages developing countries to move over time towards 
economy-wide targets. Moreover, Article 6.1 of the Paris Agreement explicitly 
envisages that the engagement of countries in international carbon market 
mechanisms allows for “higher ambition” in their mitigation actions. In practice, 
however, the possibility to engage in international carbon market mechanisms could 
provide both incentives or disincentives for enhancing mitigation action, and, vice 
versa, the ambition and scope of NDCs can aﬀect the global GHG emissions impact of 
international carbon market mechanisms in various ways (Chapter 2). An important 
question is therefore how the engagement in carbon market mechanisms can provide 
incentives, rather than disincentives, for enhancing the ambition and broadening the 
scope of NDC targets over time and avoid perverse incentives and lock-in into higher 
emissions pathways. 
Table 1-1 illustrates how the specific aspects investigated in this thesis relate to these three 
themes. Each chapter corresponds to a paper that has been published in a peer-reviewed 
journal. The papers have been editorially revised when including them in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 examines in detail how double counting of emission reductions can be avoided. 
Robust accounting and in particular avoiding double counting is a focus of international 
negotiations on the rules governing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, and international 
negotiations in Katowice in December 2018 failed on the question how double counting 
should be avoided for the crediting mechanism established under Article 6.4. This chapter 
assesses how double counting can occur, when it is relevant and how it could be addressed 
through international rules and the design of carbon market mechanisms. 
Chapter 4 turns to the second theme and assesses an interesting real-world example of how 
carbon markets can create perverse incentives and thereby undermine unit quality. As part 
of a larger study on the performance of the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism under 
the Kyoto Protocol (Kollmuss et al., 2015), this chapter assesses how projects abating 
hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) waste gas emissions in 
Russia increased the generation of waste gases to unprecedented levels as a means to 
increase credit revenues from the mechanism. This case presents an important lesson for 
Introduction 
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carbon markets under the Paris Agreement because JI was implemented in countries that 
had mitigation targets, and thus in a similar context as for countries with NDC targets.  
Table 1-1 Thematic focus of the chapters of the thesis 
  
Accounting for 
the international 
transfer of carbon 
market units 
Quality of 
carbon market 
units 
Incentives or 
disincentives 
for future 
mitigation action 
Chapter 2: Environmental integrity of 
international carbon market mech-
anisms under the Paris Agreement 
   
Chapter 3: Addressing the risk of 
double counting emission reductions 
under the UNFCCC 
   
Chapter 4: Perverse effects of carbon 
markets on HFC-23 and SF6 
abatement projects in Russia 
   
Chapter 5: Robust eligibility criteria 
essential for new global scheme to 
offset aviation emissions 
   
Chapter 6: Restricted linking of 
emissions trading systems: options, 
benefits, and challenges 
   
Chapter 7: When less is more: Limits 
to international transfers under 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
   
Chapter 8: Discussion, conclusions 
and recommendations  
   
Note: Dark green indicates that this aspect is the main focus of the chapter. Bright green indicates 
that this aspect is also considered. Grey indicates that this aspect is not considered. 
Chapter 5 takes up a matter that is controversially debated under both ICAO and the Paris 
Agreement: whether carbon market units from the Kyoto mechanisms should be eligible 
for use after 2020. The chapter assesses the environmental and economic implications of 
using offset credits from the largest mechanism to date – the CDM – under CORSIA, and 
analyses what type of eligibility criteria are necessary to perverse environmental integrity. 
Towards this end, a model is established that estimates the supply potential and the costs 
of generating certified emission reductions (CERs) for each of the 8,000 registered CDM 
projects and assesses under which conditions creating new demand for CERs from already 
existing projects triggers actual emission reductions, taking into account differences 
between project types. 
Chapter 6 turns the focus from crediting mechanisms to another form of international 
carbon market mechanisms: the linking of ETSs. Several jurisdictions are considering, or 
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have already established, links between their ETSs (ICAP, 2018), and some plan to account 
for the net flow of allowances between the linked ETSs under Article 6.2 of the Paris 
Agreement (European Union, 2017; Schneider, Cludius, & La Hoz Theuer, 2018). As 
linking of ETSs faces several practical and political challenges and risks, including with 
regard to whether allowances have ‘quality’ and whether linking provides incentives or 
disincentives to enhance the ambition of caps (Carbone, Helm, & Rutherford, 2009; Green, 
2016; Helm, 2003; Holtsmark & Sommervoll, 2012), policy-makers are considering also 
restricted forms of linking ETSs in order to mitigate these risks. This chapter uses a simple 
economic model and three criteria – abatement outcome, economic implications, and 
feasibility – to assess three different options for implementing restricted linking of ETSs: 
quotas, exchange rates, or discount rates options. 
Chapter 7 analyses a different approach to preserving environmental integrity, namely 
through limits to international transfers under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Limits, or 
eligibility criteria, are mainly considered to address the risk that countries could transfer 
‘hot air’ – a term used in context of mitigation targets that countries over-achieve without 
pursuing further mitigation actions (Boehringer, 2000; den Elzen & de Moor, 2002; 
Kollmuss et al., 2015). They could, however, also be used to address other environmental 
integrity risks, such as the lack of robust accounting system, concerns related unit quality, 
or possible disincentives to enhance mitigation action in the future. This chapter proposes 
a typology for limits, explores key design options, and quantitatively tests different types 
of limits in the context of fifteen countries. 
Lastly, Chapter 8 discusses the overall findings of the thesis, provides conclusions and 
makes recommendations. These can inform the ongoing negotiations on Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement, and the implementation of carbon market mechanisms by countries, 
jurisdictions and international organizations, such as ICAO. 
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Chapter 2  
Environmental integrity of international carbon 
market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement 
Abstract 
The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market 
mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key 
principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically 
identiﬁes and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including 
how it could be deﬁned, what inﬂuences it, and what approaches could mitigate 
environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if 
the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or 
lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identiﬁed that inﬂuence 
environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units 
generated (i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads 
to emission reductions in the transferring country); the ambition and scope of the 
mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future 
mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to deﬁne future 
mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is 
recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the signiﬁcant 
risks to environmental integrity. 
Key policy insights: 
• Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The 
diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in 
particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for 
international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time. 
• Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market 
mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring 
unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement 
Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13. 
• The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring 
countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy- wide 
Chapter 2 Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms 
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targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. 
Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would 
therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity. 
• Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk – through 
eligibility criteria or limits – could complement these approaches. 
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2.1 Introduction 
International carbon market mechanisms provide ﬂexibility as to where and when 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are reduced, and could thereby reduce the costs of 
mitigating climate change. This can help countries to adopt more ambitious mitigation 
targets. If not designed and implemented appropriately, however, international carbon 
market mechanisms could lead to higher global GHG emissions and could thereby also 
increase the costs of mitigating climate change. 
International carbon market mechanisms have been implemented under the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol and in bilateral agreements, including the international linking of emissions 
trading systems and bilateral crediting mechanisms such as the Joint Crediting 
Mechanism initiated by Japan. 
The Paris Agreement establishes a new framework for voluntary cooperation that can 
involve international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation 
contributions (UNFCCC, 2015). Article 6.2 allows countries to use ‘internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes’ (ITMOs) to achieve their nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs), while Article 6.4 establishes a new crediting mechanism under 
international oversight. Environmental integrity is a key principle of Article 6 and the 
Paris Agreement. 
This paper identiﬁes and categorizes key issues and options for achieving environmental 
integrity, both for international carbon market mechanisms in general and for the speciﬁc 
context of the Paris Agreement. The paper ﬁrst explores possible options for deﬁning 
environmental integrity. Drawing upon available research on speciﬁc aspects of 
environmental integrity, the paper then systematically identiﬁes and categorizes what 
factors inﬂuence environmental integrity and how environmental integrity could be 
undermined. This is followed by a systematic identiﬁcation and categorization of possible 
approaches to mitigate environmental integrity risks in the context of the Paris Agreement. 
Based on this analysis, conclusions and recommendations are provided. 
The environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms has, so far, 
mainly been investigated in the context of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Research on the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) under Article 12 of the Protocol focused on the 
additionality of projects (Cames et al., 2017; Erickson et al., 2014; Gillenwater, 2012; 
Greiner & Michaelowa, 2003; Haya & Parekh, 2011; He & Morse, 2013; Michaelowa & 
Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2009b; Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012; Stua, 2013; Trexler, 
Broekhoff, & Kosloff, 2006); the establishment of emission baselines (Robert Bailis et al., 
2015; Fischer, 2005; Hermwille, Arens, & Burian, 2013; Kartha, Lazarus, & Bosi, 2004; 
Kartha, Lazarus, & LeFranc, 2005; Lazarus, Kartha, Ruth, Bernow, & Dunmire, 1999; 
Spalding-Fecher & Michaelowa, 2013) and how national policies should be considered in 
Chapter 2 Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms 
22 
demonstrating additionality and establishing baselines (Liu, 2015; Spalding-Fecher, 2013). 
Other research areas include leakage eﬀects (Calvin et al., 2015; Geres & Michaelowa, 2002; 
Kallbekken, 2007; Schneider, Lazarus, & Kollmuss, 2010; Sonter, Barrett, Moran, & Soares-
Filho, 2015; Vöhringer, Kuosmanen, & Dellink, 2006), monitoring of emission reductions 
(Shishlov & Bellassen, 2016; Warnecke, 2014), and how the CDM could provide global net 
emissions reductions (Chung, 2007; Erickson et al., 2014; Kollmuss & Lazarus, 2011; 
Schneider, 2009a; Vrolijk & Phillips, 2013; Warnecke, Wartmann, Höhne, & Blok, 2014). 
Less literature is available on the environmental integrity of Joint Implementation under 
Article 6 of the Protocol (Kollmuss et al., 2015; Michaelowa, 1998; Schneider & Kollmuss, 
2015) and International Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the Protocol (Aldrich & 
Koerner, 2012; Tuerk et al., 2013). 
Relevant research was also conducted in the context of the negotiations under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) prior to the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement. This included mainly research on accounting for international 
transfers (Hood, Briner, & Rocha, 2014; Lazarus, Kollmuss, & Schneider, 2014; Prag, 
Aasrud, & Hood, 2011; Prag, Hood, Aasrud, & Briner, 2011; Prag, Hood, & Barata, 2013; 
Rich, Bhatia, Finnegan, Levin, & Mitra, 2014; Schneider, Kollmuss, & Lazarus, 2015); 
additionality and baseline setting for new, up-scaled carbon market mechanisms (de 
Sépibus & Tuerk, 2011; Füssler, Herren, Kollmuss, Lazarus, & Schneider, 2014); and 
governance arrangements (de Sépibus, Sterk, & Tuerk, 2013). 
The environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms has also been 
studied outside the context of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, with a focus on 
international linking of emissions trading schemes (Beuermann, Bingler, Santikarn, 
Tänzler, & Thema, 2017; Bodansky, Hoedl, Metcalf, & Stavins, 2016; Ranson & Stavins, 
2016; Schneider, Lazarus, Lee, & van Asselt, 2017); the incentives for countries to enhance 
or lower the ambition of mitigation targets if they can engage in international carbon 
market mechanisms (Carbone et al., 2009; Helm, 2003; Holtsmark & Sommervoll, 2012); 
and non-governmental crediting programs (Erickson & Lazarus, 2013; Lee, Lazarus, 
Smith, Todd, & Weitz, 2013). 
The Paris Agreement provides a new context for ensuring environmental integrity of 
international carbon market mechanisms. The diversity of NDC targets and less 
international oversight than under Kyoto Protocol could pose challenges for ensuring 
environmental integrity. Moreover, countries might implement new types of carbon 
market mechanisms, such as broad carbon pricing approaches or measures at the sectoral 
level, which may require new methods for quantifying emission reductions and ensuring 
environmental integrity. 
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A practical challenge is that the provisions of the Paris Agreement relating to 
environmental integrity are relatively general – which could be seen as ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ in order to achieve consensus – and are interpreted by Parties in diﬀerent ways. 
For example, there is no agreement whether and how the international guidance under 
Article 6.2 should address environmental integrity. 
The available research on environmental integrity in the context of the Paris Agreement 
focuses mainly on speciﬁc aspects, in particular accounting for international transfers, the 
design of crediting mechanisms, governance issues, incentives and disincentives for 
raising ambition, and the possible transition of the Kyoto mechanisms to the framework 
of the Paris Agreement (Bodansky et al., 2016; Broekhoff, Füssler, Klein, Schneider, & 
Spalding-Fecher, 2017; Cames et al., 2016; Greiner, Howard, Chagas, & Hunzai, 2017; 
Hermwille & Obergassel, 2018; Howard, 2017, 2018; Howard, Chagas, Hoogzaad, & Hoch, 
2017; Kreibich, 2018; Kreibich & Hermwille, 2016; Kreibich & Obergassel, 2016; La Hoz 
Theuer, Schneider, Broekhoff, & Kollmuss, 2017; Marcu, 2017; Michaelowa et al., 2016; 
Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, 2017; Mizuno, 2017; Schneider, Füssler, Kohli, et al., 2017; 
Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, 2017; Spalding-Fecher, 2017; Spalding-Fecher, Sammut, 
Broekhoff, & Füssler, 2017; Stavins & Stowe, 2017; Warnecke et al., 2018). 
These speciﬁc aspects have not yet been assessed and categorized in a systematic manner. 
This paper analyses the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement, reviews the relevant 
literature, and evaluates submissions by Parties to the UNFCCC secretariat1, with a view 
to deﬁning environmental integrity (Section 2.2), identifying and categorizing risks to 
environmental integrity (Section 2.3), and identifying and categorizing approaches to 
address them (Section2.4). Based on this analysis, conclusions and recommendations are 
provided (Section 2.5). 
The paper employs speciﬁc terminology and makes several assumptions. Mitigation 
targets communicated in NDCs are referred to as ‘NDC targets’. For simplicity, the term 
‘international transfers’ is used to refer to transfers of both mitigation outcomes generated 
under Article 6.2 and emission reductions resulting from the Article 6.4 mechanism. It is 
assumed that international mechanisms under Article 6 issue ‘units’ which are expressed 
as metric tons of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e), although the ﬁndings of this paper also hold if 
no formal units were issued. It is further assumed that countries achieve their NDC targets 
and that units are internationally transferred and used towards achieving NDC targets, 
and not for other purposes such as voluntary cancellation. 
                                                   
1 http://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionPortal/Pages/Home.aspx  
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2.2 How could environmental integrity be deﬁned? 
The term ‘environmental integrity’ is used in various UNFCCC decisions and the Paris 
Agreement but not deﬁned. Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Paris Agreement refer to 
“promoting” and “ensuring” environmental integrity. The provisions of the Article 6.4 
mechanism do not refer to environmental integrity speciﬁcally, but include several 
elements that aim to safeguard it, such as that mitigation beneﬁts be “real, measurable and 
long term”; that “additionality” be ensured; and that emission reductions be “veriﬁed and 
certiﬁed by designated operational entities”. Environmental integrity is also referred to in 
other parts of the Paris Agreement and its decision on adoption (Article 4.13 and 
paragraphs 92 and 107 of decision 1/CP.21). 
Based on a review of submissions and the literature (IPCC, 2014b; Woerdman, 2005), three 
possible deﬁnitions for environmental integrity are identiﬁed for the context of Article 6: 
1. Aggregate achievement of mitigation targets: Environmental integrity would be ensured if 
the engagement in international transfers does not lead to a situation where aggregate 
actual emissions would exceed the aggregated target level; 
2. No increase in global aggregate emissions: Environmental integrity would be ensured if 
the engagement in international transfers leads to aggregated global GHG emissions 
that are no higher as compared to a situation where the transfers did not take place; 
or 
3. Decrease of global emissions: Environmental integrity would be ensured if the 
engagement in international transfers leads to a decrease in global GHG emissions as 
compared to a situation where the transfers did not take place. 
The ﬁrst approach would imply that global GHG emissions could increase as a result of 
engaging in international transfers. It would enable countries to engage in transfers that 
are not associated with any “mitigation outcomes”, as referred to in Article 6.2. This 
approach also seems inconsistent with the principle in Article 6.1 that cooperation should 
“allow for higher ambition”. The third approach would build on the objective in Article 
6.1 to “allow for higher ambition” and that in Article 6.4 to “deliver an overall mitigation 
in global GHG emissions”. However, enhancing ambition and ensuring environmental 
integrity are two separate concepts in the Paris Agreement. Combining these concepts 
may be more complex to operationalize and could dilute each of them. In the following, 
the second deﬁnition is therefore employed. 
2.3 What inﬂuences environmental integrity? 
Various factors inﬂuence the global GHG emissions outcome from using international 
carbon market mechanisms. Drawing on the review of submissions and the literature, four 
main factors are identiﬁed: 
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1. Accounting for international transfers; 
2. Quality of units; 
3. Ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and 
4. Incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action. 
2.3.1 Accounting for international transfers 
Robust accounting of international transfers is a key prerequisite to ensure environmental 
integrity: if international transfers are not accounted for robustly, global GHG emissions 
could increase as a result of the transfers. A lack of robust accounting could undermine 
environmental integrity in several ways. 
First, if emission reductions are double counted, actual global GHG emissions are higher 
than the sum of what individual countries report. Double counting occurs when a single 
GHG emission reduction is counted more than once towards achieving mitigation targets. 
This can occur in three ways (Hood et al., 2014; Prag, Hood, et al., 2011; Prag et al., 2013; 
Schneider et al., 2015; UNFCCC, 2012c): 
1. Double issuance occurs if more than one unit is issued for the same emissions or 
emission reductions; 
2. Double claiming occurs if the same emission reductions are counted twice towards 
fulﬁlling targets: by the country where the reductions occur, through reporting of its 
reduced GHG emissions, and by the country or entity using the units issued for these 
reductions. It could also occur between national mitigation targets and international 
mechanisms to address emissions from international aviation or international 
shipping, such as the Carbon Oﬀsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation (CORSIA) adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 
2016a); and 
3. Double use occurs if the same issued unit is used twice to achieve a mitigation target. 
Second, the time frame of mitigation targets is a critical issue when accounting for 
international transfers. If the time period in which transferred mitigation outcomes occur 
– also referred to as the ‘vintage’ of mitigation outcomes – diﬀers from the year or period 
in which they are used to achieve a mitigation target, cumulative global GHG emissions 
could increase (Hood et al., 2014; Kreibich & Obergassel, 2016; Lazarus et al., 2014; Prag et 
al., 2013; Rich et al., 2014; Schneider, Füssler, Kohli, et al., 2017). This could, for example, 
occur if a country uses international transfers from a cumulative mitigation eﬀort over a 
period to achieve a single-year target. 
Third, if countries use diﬀerent metrics for mitigation targets, such as diﬀerent values for 
global warming potentials (GWPs), the international transfer of carbon market units can – 
if not converted appropriately – increase global GHG emissions. 
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Lastly, international transfers can involve activities that may result in emission reductions 
or removals that are only temporary, such as in the land-use, land-use change and forestry 
sector or in the case of geological storage of CO2. If reversals of emission reductions or 
removals are not appropriately accounted for, cumulative global GHG emissions could 
increase. 
Under the Paris Agreement, the diversity of NDCs is a key challenge for ensuring robust 
accounting for international transfers. Mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
were economy-wide and expressed in absolute amounts of GHG emissions. They were 
also based on common multi-year periods, GHGs and GWP values. Under the Paris 
Agreement, however, countries communicated a variety of mitigation targets in their 
NDCs. Some targets are not economy-wide but cover only some sectors, gases, activities 
or geographical areas. The absolute level of GHG emission targets is not always clear, in 
particular when targets represent a deviation from a business as usual emissions pathway 
that could be updated in the future. Many countries communicated also targets in metrics 
other than GHG emissions, such as targets for renewable energy deployment. Most 
countries communicated only targets for a speciﬁc year and not a period, and countries 
use diﬀerent GWP values (Graichen, Cames, & Schneider, 2016). If countries with diﬀerent 
target metrics, target years or GWP values engage in international transfers, this could 
lead to higher global GHG emissions. 
A further challenge speciﬁc to the Paris Agreement is that many NDCs include targets that 
are ‘conditional’ on support from other countries, sometimes in combination with less 
ambitious ‘unconditional’ targets. Some countries have stated in their NDC that such 
support could include the use of international market mechanisms. If, however, the same 
emission reductions are used to achieve both the conditional NDC of the transferring 
country and the NDC of the supporting country, this constitutes double claiming and 
leads to a weakening of overall ambition, compared to a situation where support is 
provided through forms of climate ﬁnance, in which the supporting country does not use 
the emission reductions to achieve its own NDC. 
2.3.2 Quality of units 
International carbon market mechanisms typically issue units which can be transferred 
through registries. Here, units are deﬁned as having quality if the underlying mechanism 
ensures that the issuance or transfer of one unit, expressed as 1 tCO2e, directly leads to an 
emission reduction of at least 1 tCO2e in the transferring country, compared to the 
situation in the absence of the mechanism. Hence, here the direct emissions outcome from 
the underlying mechanism is considered, independently of other more indirect factors, 
such as the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country. 
The factors that inﬂuence the unit quality vary according to the type of mechanism. 
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Under crediting mechanisms, the quality of credits is, in principle, ensured if the mitigation 
action is additional – that is, it would not occur in the absence of the incentives from the 
crediting mechanism – and if the emission reductions are not overestimated. Ensuring that 
emission reductions are not overestimated involves several aspects, including that the 
emission reductions be real, measurable and attributable to the credited activity and that 
indirect emission eﬀects be appropriately considered. 
In a market situation where the supply of credits considerably exceeds demand, however, 
the GHG emissions impact from creating further demand for credits is more complex. If 
in such a market situation projects have already been implemented – and hence 
investment costs are sunk – a key consideration for the global GHG emissions impact is 
whether the projects would continue to reduce GHG emissions even without credit 
revenues, or whether they are at risk of discontinuing GHG abatement (Schneider & La 
Hoz Theuer, 2017; Warnecke et al., 2017). 
Under emission trading systems (ETSs), the quality of allowances mainly depends on 
whether the ETS cap is set below the emissions level that would occur in the absence of 
the trading system, and whether emissions are monitored appropriately. Other design 
features, such as price collars, allowance reserves, import of credits, and provisions for 
banking of allowances, also aﬀect unit quality – mainly by altering the cap. If an ETS with 
an ambitious cap is linked to one that is over-allocated, linking could reduce aggregated 
abatement from both systems (Green, Sterner, & Wagner, 2014). 
The Paris Agreement could also enable direct bilateral government-to-government transfers, 
without using a crediting mechanism or linking ETSs, akin to transfers of assigned amount 
units (AAUs) under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. In some instances, these transfers 
could be underpinned by mechanisms: under the Kyoto Protocol, for example, countries 
established Green Investment Schemes (GISs) under which revenues from international 
transfers of AAUs were invested in activities designed to assist climate change mitigation 
(Tuerk et al., 2013). Where mitigation outcomes from speciﬁc mitigation actions are 
transferred, the quality of the transferred units hinges on similar criteria as for crediting 
mechanisms. Where direct bilateral transfers occur without implementing any mitigation 
action, the transferred units would not have quality. 
2.3.3 Ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring 
country 
The mitigation target of a transferring country can aﬀect the global GHG emissions impact 
of international transfers indirectly, because the target’s scope and ambition may 
determine whether the transfer of units that lack quality impacts the country’s eﬀorts in 
achieving its target. Assume a country that issues units lacking quality. The units are 
issued for emission reductions that fall within the scope of the country’s target and are 
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transferred to another country which uses them to achieve its target. If the transferring 
country has an ambitious target – which requires the country to pursue further mitigation 
action to achieve its target – it may have to compensate for the transfer in order to still 
achieve its target, either by further reducing emissions or by purchasing units. The country 
thus has an incentive to ensure that units generated by mechanisms have quality. The 
same may not be true, however, for a country with a target that is less stringent than its 
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions (i.e. which does not require the country to take 
mitigation action to achieve its target) or for units issued for emissions or emission 
reductions that fall outside the scope of the target. In these instances, the country might 
accrue more ﬁnancial revenues from over-estimating emissions reductions and selling the 
resulting units, without infringing its ability to achieve its target. 
The more ambitious a mitigation target is, the more likely it is that a country would 
compensate for the transfer of units that lack quality and therefore only authorize the 
transfer of quality units. This is supported by evidence from Joint Implementation under 
the Kyoto Protocol where units from countries with ambitious Kyoto Protocol targets were 
assessed to have a signiﬁcantly higher quality than those from countries with targets less 
stringent than the likely BAU emissions (Kollmuss et al., 2015). Whether a country 
compensates for a lack of unit quality and has incentives to ensure unit quality may also 
depend on when transfers are made. Before the target year or period, the country may not 
have certainty whether it will achieve its target and may thus be cautious in authorizing 
projects. However, once over-achievement of the target becomes certain, the country may 
have less incentive to ensure unit quality because it may no longer have to compensate for 
the transfer of units that lack quality. 
Under the Paris Agreement, a key challenge is that countries self-determine the ambition 
and scope of their mitigation targets. Independent evaluations indicate that the ambition 
of current NDC targets varies strongly, despite the uncertainties and limitations in 
assessing such ambition. A number of countries are projected to signiﬁcantly over-achieve 
their NDC targets with current policies in place. Moreover, the scope of many NDC targets 
is limited to some gases or sectors (Aldy & Pizer, 2016; Höhne, Fekete, den Elzen, Hof, & 
Takeshi, 2017; La Hoz Theuer, 2016; Meinshausen & Alexander, 2016; Rogelj et al., 2016). 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from these considerations. First, a lack of unit 
quality is critical in two situations: if the emission sources are not included within the 
scope of a mitigation target, or if the transferring country has a target that does not require 
further mitigation action. Second, the ambition and scope of targets is key for the incentive 
to ensure unit quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC 
targets may therefore also facilitate achieving environmental integrity under Article 6. 
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2.3.4 Incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action 
International carbon markets could lower the cost of mitigation, and thereby enable 
countries to adopt more ambitious mitigation targets. Article 6.1 of the Paris Agreement 
explicitly envisages that the engagement of countries in international transfers allows for 
“higher ambition” in their mitigation actions. In practice, however, the possibility to 
engage in international carbon market mechanisms could provide both incentives and 
disincentives for future mitigation action – and thereby indirectly aﬀect GHG emissions 
both positively and negatively. 
For acquiring countries, using international carbon markets could lower the costs of 
achieving their targets, and thereby enable these countries to adopt more ambitious 
targets. Yet for transferring countries, the possibility to use international carbon markets 
could create incentives to set mitigation targets at unambitious levels, or to deﬁne their 
scope narrowly, in order to accrue more beneﬁts from transferring units internationally 
(Carbone et al., 2009; Green, 2016; Helm, 2003; Holtsmark & Sommervoll, 2012; Howard, 
2018; Spalding-Fecher, 2017; Warnecke et al., 2018). 
International carbon market mechanisms could also aﬀect mitigation eﬀorts in more 
indirect ways: 
• Implementing market mechanisms could help to build capacity and increase 
awareness of climate issues, which might lead to enhanced mitigation eﬀorts in the 
future (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012); 
• Under crediting mechanisms, transferring countries could have perverse incentives 
not to adopt mitigation policies, because such policies might lower the potential for 
generating and exporting credits (Liu, 2015; Spalding-Fecher, 2013; Strand, 2011). This 
poses a dilemma: if crediting mechanisms require project developers to consider 
mitigation policies and regulations in the demonstration of additionality, they may 
discourage policy-makers from adopting such policies. If they allow project developers 
to ignore mitigation policies and regulations, they may credit activities that are not 
additional, because they would be implemented anyway due to the policies and 
regulations; 
• Crediting mechanisms could also create perverse incentives for project developers to 
pursue a more GHG-intensive course of action, so that the baseline from which 
emission reductions are credited is higher (Schneider, 2011; Schneider & Kollmuss, 
2015); and 
• Depending on how carbon market mechanisms are implemented, market participants 
could favour mitigation actions that are cost-eﬀective in the short and medium term, 
and neglect mitigation actions that are costlier but foster transformational change and 
avoid lock-in of more carbon-intensive technologies. For example, crediting landﬁll 
gas capture could provide incentives to continue pursuing landﬁlling, while other 
Chapter 2 Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms 
30 
waste management practices, such as composting or recycling, would lead to lower 
GHG emissions. 
2.4 Addressing environmental integrity under the Paris Agreement 
Environmental integrity could be addressed in diﬀerent ways, which are clustered here 
into four broad approaches: robust accounting; ensuring unit quality; facilitating 
economy-wide and ambitious mitigation targets; and restricting international transfers. 
Here we discuss how these four approaches could be implemented in the context of the 
Paris Agreement. For each approach, speciﬁc elements to implement it are identiﬁed and 
brieﬂy discussed (Figure 2-1). The eﬀectiveness and the political and practical feasibility 
of the approaches may strongly hinge on how they would be implemented and is subject 
to further research. 
 
Figure 2-1 Overview of approaches for addressing environmental integrity 
2.4.1 Robust accounting 
The Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21 include several provisions to achieve robust 
accounting: Article 4.13 requires countries to “account for their NDCs”. Article 6.2 requires 
countries engaging in international transfers to “apply robust accounting to ensure, inter 
alia, the avoidance of double counting”. Article 6.5 requires that emission reductions 
resulting from the Article 6.4 mechanism be used by only one Party to achieve its NDC. 
This is complemented by the transparency framework in Article 13, which requires 
countries to track progress towards achieving NDCs, and the global goals of the Paris 
Agreement. 
Accounting for NDCs is an important prerequisite for accounting for international 
transfers. This requires that NDC targets are clearly deﬁned (e.g. with regard to their 
geographical coverage, the emissions sources and GHGs included and the time frame 
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covered); that they are expressed in quantiﬁable terms (e.g. GHG emissions or megawatts 
of renewable power capacity); that the target level be clearly speciﬁed (e.g. in relation to 
historical data or a BAU emissions path); and that progress towards NDC targets be 
tracked. 
Accounting for international transfers requires several additional elements to be 
implemented. Establishing an accounting system and accounting rules for international 
transfers is a central element, in particular to avoid double claiming and to ensure that the 
accounting for international transfers is representative of the mitigation eﬀorts by Parties 
over time. 
Paragraph 36 of decision 1/CP.21 envisages that double claiming be avoided on the basis 
of ‘corresponding adjustments’ for emissions or removals. Corresponding adjustments 
could be applied to reported emission totals or to an emissions budget that reﬂects the 
emissions level of the NDC target, similar to the ‘assigned amounts’ established under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Both approaches avoid double claiming and imply that the transferring 
country would, for each unit transfer, need to reduce its emissions below its NDC target. 
Corresponding adjustments could be applied to transferring countries in two ways: either 
they are only applied if the emission reductions fall within the scope of the NDC target, 
or they are applied in an all cases, regardless of the scope of the transferring country. And 
they could apply to international transfers in the context of both Article 6.2 and Article 6.4, 
or diﬀerent approaches could be employed for international transfers of emission 
reductions generated under the Article 6.4 mechanism (Howard et al., 2017; Kreibich & 
Obergassel, 2016; Schneider, Füssler, Kohli, et al., 2017; Spalding-Fecher, 2017). 
Several practical challenges arise from the diversity of current NDCs. Targets in non-GHG 
metrics could be accounted for by applying adjustments in the respective metric of that 
target. For example, if a country has a target of installing 100 Megawatt of renewable 
power capacity and authorizes the international transfer of emission reductions from a 5 
Megawatt wind power project, it could apply an adjustment of 5 Megawatt to its reported 
progress in achieving its renewable power target (Schneider, Füssler, Kohli, et al., 2017). 
Countries that communicated a target range would need to clarify which target is used as 
basis for accounting for international transfers. If double claiming should be avoided also 
with regard to conditional targets, international market mechanisms could still be used, but 
only if the acquiring country does not use emission reductions that are also counted 
towards achievement of the transferring country’s NDC. 
A critical element is appropriate accounting for the time frame of mitigation targets and 
when the mitigation outcomes occurred. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, many NDCs 
only include single-year targets. Carbon market mechanisms, however, typically issue 
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units for multi-year periods. Several options could be pursued to address this challenge: 
(a) using continuous multi-year target trajectories or budgets, such as under the Kyoto 
Protocol, (b) accounting for transfers only in common single-year targets, or (c) 
approaches to make the transfers of mitigation outcomes representative over time, such 
as averaging transfers over deﬁned time periods (Howard et al., 2017; Lazarus et al., 2014; 
Prag et al., 2013; Schneider, Füssler, Kohli, et al., 2017). 
Other necessary elements for accounting for international transfers include systems to 
track international transfers, such as electronic registries or international transaction logs, 
as they were for example implemented under the Kyoto Protocol; appropriate design of 
market mechanisms in order to avoid double issuance of units; and the use of common 
metrics (e.g. GWPs), as envisaged in paragraph 31a of decision 1/CP.21. 
2.4.2 Ensuring unit quality 
Under the Paris Agreement, unit quality could be addressed through the rules, modalities 
and procedures of Article 6.4 and through international guidance on Article 6.2, though 
Parties have diﬀerent views on whether the latter should address environmental integrity 
issues other than robust accounting (Obergassel & Asche, 2017). Including provisions on 
unit quality in the guidance under Article 6.2 may help to prevent a situation where 
countries evade requirements under Article 6.4 by transferring units with less quality 
under Article 6.2 instead (Michaelowa et al., 2016). Countries could also be required to 
report on how they ensure unit quality, and the reported information could be reviewed 
under Article 13. 
Ensuring unit quality requires appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms. In 
practice, ensuring unit quality could be challenging, in particular if international guidance 
is general and vague. Crediting mechanisms face challenges in assessing additionality and 
emissions baselines, mainly due to the information asymmetry between project 
developers and regulators, and uncertainty of assumptions on future developments, such 
as international fuel prices (Cames et al., 2017; Fischer, 2005; Gillenwater, 2012; Kollmuss 
et al., 2015; Schneider, 2009b; Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012). Another challenge inherent to 
the concept of crediting is that oﬀsets subsidize the deployment of low-emitting 
technologies rather than penalizing the deployment of high-emitting technologies. As a 
consequence, oﬀsets lower the costs of energy (or other commodities or services), which 
can lead to greater use of energy (or other commodities or services). Such eﬀects, also 
referred to as ‘market leakage’, are commonly not accounted for under existing crediting 
mechanisms, and may thus lead to an over-estimation of emission reductions (Calvin et 
al., 2015; Kallbekken, 2007; Vöhringer et al., 2006). The ambition of ETSs also varies, and 
several existing ETSs face challenges with surplus allowances (Erik Haites et al., 2018; 
Narassimhan, Gallagher, Koester, & Alejo, 2018). Ensuring unit quality for new types of 
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mechanisms, such as broad carbon pricing policies or measures at the sectoral level, may 
require new approaches such as modelling or extensive data collection. Exchange rates, 
discount rates, and GISs have been used or proposed as means to mitigate concerns over 
varying unit quality, but these approaches also face challenges (Macinante, 2015; Marcu, 
2015; Schneider, Lazarus, et al., 2017; Tuerk et al., 2013). 
2.4.3 Facilitating economy-wide and ambitious mitigation targets 
Article 4.3 of the Paris Agreement calls for a “progression” of NDCs reﬂecting the “highest 
possible ambition”, and Article 4.4 encourages developing countries to move over time 
towards economy-wide targets. While these provisions guide Parties, NDCs are 
ultimately self-determined by them. Parties could, however, decide to establish 
participation requirements for engagement in international transfers under Article 6 that 
provide incentives for countries to expand the scope of their NDCs, such as by limiting 
international transfers to emission reductions generated from sectors or gases covered by 
the NDC of the transferring country or, alternatively, by requiring that countries commit 
to expand the scope of their NDCs to economy-wide targets in the future in order to 
participate in Article 6. Enhancing the ambition and scope of NDC targets could also be 
facilitated indirectly, such as through guidance on transparency and understanding of 
NDCs under Article 4.8, reporting and review under the transparency framework under 
Article 13, the global stocktake under Article 14, or the mechanism to facilitate 
implementation and promote compliance under Article 15. 
2.4.4 Restricting international transfers 
Approaches that restrict international transfers are not included in the Paris Agreement 
but were proposed by some Parties and are being considered in the negotiations of the 
rulebook for the Paris Agreement. International transfers could be restricted in situations 
where risks to environmental integrity are considered higher, for example, if a system to 
account for international transfers is not in place, if the units were issued under a 
mechanism without international oversight, or if the emission reductions were generated 
outside the scope an NDC target. The latter approach could partially also address concerns 
that countries could have perverse incentives to set future NDC targets unambitiously or 
to deﬁne their scope narrowly, in order to sell more units; if transfers were eﬀectively 
prevented in such situations, these countries would have less beneﬁts from setting targets 
unambitiously or narrowly. 
International transfers could be restricted in two ways: 
• Eligibility criteria could require countries to meet certain requirements before they can 
participate in international transfers under Article 6. Countries could, for example, be 
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required to have an accounting system in place or to have demonstrated that their 
mechanisms comply with internationally agreed principles on unit quality; and 
• Limits on international transfers could reduce or, in some instances, prevent international 
transfers. Limits could be established with the aim of (a) generally reducing the 
amount of international transfers and thereby limit detrimental eﬀects on unit quality, 
or (b) addressing speciﬁc environmental integrity risks, such as preventing transfers 
from countries with targets levels below BAU emissions while allowing countries with 
ambitious NDC targets to engage in transfers without limitations (La Hoz Theuer, 
Schneider, & Broekhoff, 2019). 
Both limits and eligibility criteria were established under the Kyoto Protocol but were 
mainly used to ensure robust accounting and did not speciﬁcally address the quality of 
units or ambition of mitigation targets. The ‘commitment period reserve’ limited the extent 
to which countries could transfer units and mainly addressed the risk of over-selling. 
Eligibility requirements to participate in international carbon markets focused on 
reporting of GHG inventories and the establishment of registry infrastructure (Yamin & 
Depledge, 2004). 
2.4.5 International rules versus responsibility by countries 
A key question in the negotiations on the rulebook for the Paris Agreement is to what 
extent environmental integrity will be addressed through international rules and how 
much responsibility will lie with the Parties engaging in international transfers. All the 
approaches identiﬁed above could be implemented through international rules or under 
the responsibility of countries. Some authors also caution against establishing onerous 
international requirements that could dampen incentives for ambitious international 
cooperation (Mehling, Metcalf, & Stavins, 2018). 
In either case, international reporting and review under Article 13 of the Agreement could 
help enhance transparency, and thereby provide incentives for countries to ensure 
environmental integrity and address any shortcomings in response to review ﬁndings. 
If international rules are not deemed suﬃcient, countries could address environmental 
integrity issues by forming ‘carbon clubs’ or committing to political declarations 
(Keohane, Petsonk, & Hanafi, 2017). Yet these approaches can only address environmental 
integrity by the participating countries, which may limit their eﬀectiveness. 
2.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
This paper has identiﬁed and categorized environmental integrity risks of international 
carbon market mechanisms and ways to overcome them under the Paris Agreement. 
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The risks for environmental integrity are notable. The diverse scope, metrics, types and 
timeframes of NDC targets pose challenges for robust accounting. The experience with 
existing carbon market mechanisms suggests that ensuring unit quality can be 
challenging. The diverse ambition and the limited scope of some NDCs reduces the 
incentives that countries have for ensuring unit quality. The literature also suggests that 
there is a material risk of countries choosing targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in 
order to sell more carbon market units. 
Addressing these risks is challenging but important. If environmental integrity is not 
ensured, international carbon market mechanisms do not achieve their objectives – they 
would neither reduce emissions nor cut the costs of mitigating climate change. This paper 
identiﬁed four broad approaches to address environmental integrity risks. 
Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. It would be 
greatly facilitated if countries move towards economy-wide GHG emissions targets based 
on continuous multi-year periods and common GWPs. Relevant decisions under the Paris 
Agreement could encourage or require countries to adopt such types of targets in future 
NDCs if they wish to engage in international transfers. With regard to current NDCs, it is 
recommended that international guidance speciﬁcally address how and when 
corresponding adjustments should be applied, how international transfers should be 
accounted for in the case of single-year targets and targets in metrics other than GHG 
emissions, and how international transfers should be transparently tracked and reported 
upon. Given that signiﬁcant demand for carbon market units could arise from CORSIA, it 
is also important that double counting is eﬀectively avoided between NDCs under the 
Paris Agreement and oﬀsetting obligations by airline operators under CORSIA. 
The adoption of ambitious and economy-wide targets signiﬁcantly reduces environmental 
integrity risks. Although NDCs are ultimately self-determined by Parties, the adoption of 
such targets could be facilitated through a range of measures, including through 
international guidance on clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs, or the global 
stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. 
The available experience suggests that ensuring unit quality can be challenging in practice. 
The environmental integrity risks may, however, diﬀer between mechanisms and 
activities. Countries could prioritize carbon market mechanisms or activities that pose 
lower risks to environmental integrity, such as internationally linking emissions trading 
systems with similar ambition levels. 
Restricting transfers in instances of higher environmental integrity threats could serve as a 
safeguard and mitigate other environmental integrity risks, but may also face practical 
challenges and constraints. 
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The feasibility and practical implementation of these four broad approaches is subject to 
further research. Which of these approaches – or combinations – are eﬀective may depend 
on how they are implemented. For example, vague international guidance on unit quality 
and weak governance arrangements to ensure adherence may not aﬀect the type and scale 
of transfers countries engage in. Whether an approach is eﬀective may thus largely depend 
on the political feasibility of designing it in a meaningful manner. 
Given that environmental integrity risks are signiﬁcant, that each of the approaches faces 
challenges and limitations, and that the identiﬁed approaches can be complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive, it is recommended that policy-makers pursue all four 
broad approaches to promote environmental integrity. 
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Chapter 3  
Addressing the risk of double counting emission 
reductions under the UNFCCC 
Abstract 
Avoiding double counting of emission reductions is a key policy concern to Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Double counting 
of emission reductions can occur when a single greenhouse gas emission reduction or 
removal, achieved through a mechanism issuing units, is accounted more than once 
towards attaining mitigation pledges. We systematically assess how double counting can 
occur and how it could be addressed. We identify that double issuance – the issuance of 
two units for the same reductions – and double claiming – the accounting of the same 
reductions both in a greenhouse gas inventory and in units towards attaining a mitigation 
pledge – are the most important forms of double counting. They can occur not only 
directly, but in rather indirect ways which can be challenging to identify. Addressing 
double counting effectively requires international coordination in three areas: accounting 
of units, design of mechanisms that issue units, and consistent tracking and reporting on 
units. While international agreement on principles for accounting and mechanism design 
is crucial to preventing double counting, the governance arrangements for 
implementation and international oversight could vary. This article discusses options and 
makes recommendations for rules to address double counting in two distinct periods: 
through 2020 and post-2020 under a potential new international climate regime. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Avoiding double counting of emission reductions is a key policy concern to Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for both the 
mitigation pledges made under the Cancun Agreements and a post-2020 climate regime 
(UNFCCC, 2012c). If emission reductions are double counted, actual global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions could be higher than the sum of what individual countries report. 
As a result, countries could appear to meet established mitigation pledges, while total 
emissions exceed these levels. Double counting of emission reductions would also make 
mitigation efforts less comparable and could discourage the use of market-based 
approaches to mitigate climate change, and thus increase global GHG abatement costs. 
This paper systematically assesses how double counting can occur and how it could be 
addressed. We consider double counting in the context of mechanisms, in which units, 
representing emissions or emission reductions, are issued and transferred between 
countries or other entities. We focus on mitigation pledges made under the UNFCCC 
which are expressed – ex-ante or ex-post – as absolute, multi-year GHG emission budgets. 
Although also important, we do not discuss potential double counting from mitigation 
pledges made outside the UNFCCC, mitigation pledges expressed in other metrics, such 
as renewable energy or energy efficiency targets, or mitigation pledges expressed for a 
single year. Under these circumstances, accounting for unit transfers is more complex 
(Hood et al., 2014; Lazarus et al., 2014; Prag et al., 2013). We also do not discuss issues 
arising from accounting for financial or technology pledges and the emission reductions 
resulting from such pledges (UNFCCC, 2012c), and the particular challenges arising from 
accounting for the land-use sector, such as distinguishing human-induced from natural 
changes, accounting for non-permanence of emission reductions or removals, quantifying 
emissions or removals from specific land-use activities, and accounting for harvested 
wood products (Canaveira, 2013; Hood et al., 2014; Prag et al., 2013). 
The term double counting is used in different ways by Parties and stakeholders (UNFCCC, 
2012c). We define the term broadly: double counting occurs when a single GHG emission 
reduction or removal, achieved through a mechanism issuing units, is counted more than 
once towards attaining mitigation pledges. In this context, we define mitigation pledges as 
internationally communicated mitigation commitments, targets or goals under the 
UNFCCC, including commitments inscribed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, Cancun 
pledges, and intended nationally determined contributions under a future climate regime. 
Units can be allowances and credits. Allowances are issued under cap-and-trade 
mechanisms where the emissions of a country or a group of entities are capped and 
allowances are allocated to the country or entities in line with the cap, such as under 
emissions trading schemes (ETS). Credits are units that are issued under a crediting 
scheme for emission reductions achieved against a crediting baseline, such as under the 
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). For the purpose of this paper, we make the 
simplifying assumption that one credit represents one metric ton of CO2 equivalent of 
additional emission reductions, meaning that the mitigation action would not occur in the 
absence of the incentives from the crediting mechanism, that the baseline reflects the 
emissions level that would occur in the absence of the incentives from crediting 
mechanism, and that actual emissions and any indirect emission impacts are accurately 
quantified. 
3.2 How can double counting occur? 
Based on a review of the existing literature and UNFCCC submissions (Hood et al., 2014; 
Prag, Hood, et al., 2011; Prag et al., 2013; UNFCCC, 2012c; World Resources Institute, 
2013a, 2013b), we identify three ways of how double counting can occur: 
1. Double issuance, which occurs if more than one unit is issued for the same emission or 
emission reduction. This leads to double counting of emission reductions if two or 
more units, representing the same emissions or emission reductions, are used to attain 
mitigation pledges; 
2. Double claiming, which occurs if the same emission reduction is counted twice towards 
attaining mitigation pledges: once through a GHG inventory by the country where the 
reduction occurs and once again by the country using a corresponding emission 
reduction unit. More specifically, double claiming will occur if: 
a. an emission reduction falls within the scope of a country’s mitigation pledge; 
b. the emission reduction is reflected in the country’s GHG inventory; 
c. the same emission reduction is also reflected in a unit that is transferred to 
another country; 
d. the transferred emission reduction unit is not accounted for by the transferring 
country (i.e. either by adding the unit transferred to its reported emissions or 
subtracting it from its emissions budget); and 
e. the country acquiring the unit uses it to attain its own mitigation pledge; and 
3. Double use, which refers to the situation where the same issued unit is used twice to 
attain a mitigation pledge, either twice by the same country or once each by two 
different countries. Double use may occur, for example, if a unit is duplicated in 
registries, or if one country uses the same unit in two different years to attain 
mitigation pledges. 
Below we further explore how double issuance and double claiming can arise. 
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3.2.1 Double issuance 
Issuing two units for the same emission or emission reduction under a single mechanism 
is the simplest and most obvious form of double issuance, and hence also easiest to 
address. In a fragmented carbon market, with multiple mechanisms under international, 
bilateral, national or non-governmental governance, there is a risk that two different 
mechanisms could issue a unit for the same emission or emission reduction (Table 3-1). 
Table 3-1 Overview of ways in which double issuance can occur 
Mechanism(s) 
involved 
Entities 
involved Description Example(s) 
One One 
Two units are issued under 
the same mechanism to the 
same entity for the same 
emissions or emission 
reductions. 
Double registration of a 
project under the same 
mechanism, double issuance 
due to two monitoring 
reports that overlap in time. 
Two One 
Two units are issued under 
two mechanisms to the 
same entity for the same 
emissions or emission 
reductions. 
A project developer registers 
a project under two 
mechanisms. 
One Two 
Two different entities are 
each issued a unit under the 
same mechanism for the 
same emissions or emission 
reductions. 
The producer and the 
consumer of a biofuel claim 
the same emission reduction 
under two projects registered 
under the same mechanism. 
Two Two 
Two units are issued under 
the two mechanisms to two 
different entities for the 
same emissions or emission 
reductions. 
The producer of a biofuel 
claims an emission reduction 
under mechanism A, and the 
consumer claims it under 
mechanism B. 
Double issuance can involve one or two mechanisms and one or two entities. Indirect 
forms of double issuance can arise if mechanisms issue units for indirect emissions that 
occur upstream or downstream of the entities receiving the units. Crediting mechanisms 
often award credit to those entities that undertake the mitigation actions, while the actual 
emission reductions occur elsewhere. This makes crediting mechanisms more vulnerable 
to double issuance than cap-and-trade mechanisms, for which the emission sources falling 
under the cap are clearly defined from the outset and any overlap with another cap-and-
trade mechanisms could be easily identified and avoided. 
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For example, the CDM issues credits to renewable power plant operators, while emissions 
are reduced in fossil fuel fired power plants, or to composting facilities for avoiding the 
dumping of waste on a landfill, while the emission reductions occur at the landfill sites. In 
some cases, the ownership of the emission reductions is not obvious, and different entities 
could potentially claim units for the same emission reductions. For example, in a project 
to promote efficient lighting in households, the households could claim the emission 
reductions, but so could an energy service company distributing efficient lamps, as could 
the producers of those lamps. 
Double issuance due to the accounting of indirect emissions can become particularly 
challenging where crediting mechanisms account for life-cycle emissions that may occur 
far upstream or downstream of where the mitigation activity is implemented. Imagine, for 
example, a project producing biofuels and another abating N2O from nitric acid 
production, both under the CDM. The biofuels project uses nitrogen fertilizer in growing 
its feedstock crops. Due to the biofuels projects, more fertilizer is consumed and hence 
more nitric acid is produced. The project abating N2O from nitric acid production can 
claim more credits due to the increased biofuel production. Double issuance would occur 
if the biofuels project used the actual N2O emission factor observed at the nitric acid plant 
to calculate upstream project emissions from nitric acid production. In this case, both 
projects would indirectly claim for the same reductions. Double issuance would be 
avoided if the biofuel project would use the unabated N2O emission factor to calculate 
project emissions. 
This example illustrates the challenges of identifying and addressing rather indirect forms 
of double issuance. An important hurdle is that information on where the emission 
reductions occur (e.g. at which nitric acid plant or landfill site) is sometimes not readily 
available. In some instances, double issuance may be difficult to identify at all. 
3.2.2 Double claiming 
Double claiming is controversially discussed in the context of transfer of units from 
developing to developed countries in the context of the Cancun pledges for 2020 
(UNFCCC, 2012c). Under the UNFCCC, developed countries can reflect in their biannual 
reporting the number of units that they intend to use (UNFCCC, 2012a). However, there 
are no reporting provisions for developing countries with regard to units issued, 
transferred, or used to attain mitigation pledges. Double claiming would occur if a seller 
country does not account for units issued for emissions or emissions reductions within its 
jurisdiction and internationally transferred (e.g. by adding them to its emissions 
inventory, or subtracting them from its emissions budget), and if the buyer country uses 
the units for attaining its mitigation pledge. This form of double counting could range 
from 0.4 to more than 1 Gt CO2e in 2020 (Erickson & Lazarus, 2013; UNEP, 2013). 
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As with double issuance, double claiming can occur in more indirect ways when 
mechanisms account for indirect emissions. Imagine, for example, a country that pledges 
to reduce emissions from deforestation, and also hosts an efficient cook-stove project 
under the CDM reducing the use of non-renewable biomass. The resulting emission 
reductions might be used for pledge attainment by both the host country and the country 
buying the credits from the cook-stove project. Another indirect form of double claiming 
can occur due to international trade of electricity, fuels, feedstocks and technologies, if the 
mitigation actions are taken in one country while the emission reductions occur in another. 
3.3 Relevance of double counting for UNFCCC 
Double counting of emission reductions is clearly relevant for mitigation pledges by 
Parties under the UNFCCC and its instruments. In addition, to achieve the ultimate 
objective of the Convention, avoiding double counting may also be important with regard 
to GHGs addressed under other treaties, such as GHG emissions from international 
aviation and maritime transport, which may be addressed under the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), or 
GHG emissions addressed under the Vienna Convention to Protect the Ozone Layer and 
its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. For example, the same 
emission reduction should not be used by both an airline to fulfil its requirements under 
a potential market-based measure under ICAO and by a Party towards attaining pledges. 
In the context of UNFCCC pledges, double counting could potentially occur where: 
1. Units (whether issued under domestic or international governance) are transferred 
internationally between national jurisdictions and used by the buyer country towards 
meeting its UNFCCC pledges; or 
2. Units are issued for domestic emissions or emission reductions for sectors or gases that 
do not fall within the scope (geographical coverage, emission sources, GHGs, and time 
period) of a mitigation pledge and are used by the same country towards meeting a 
UNFCCC pledge. 
In contrast, double counting is not relevant for the UNFCCC, if a country issues units 
under a domestic mechanism, such as an ETS, but does not use these units to attain its 
pledge under UNFCCC. In this case, the emission reductions from the domestic 
mechanism are reflected in the countries reported GHG emissions. Moreover, only the net 
transfer of units between domestic mechanisms is relevant in the context of UNFCCC 
pledges. For example, large volumes of allowances may be transferred between two linked 
ETS but only the net transfer would need to be accounted towards attaining UNFCCC 
pledges. In this regard, also the timing of accounting for unit transfers may be different: 
while changes in holdings of ETS units may be accounted and reflected in national 
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registries immediately, the accounting for UNFCCC purposes could occur once ex-post 
(e.g. together with reporting of GHG emissions). However, Parties could consider 
(voluntarily) extending UNFCCC rules for addressing double counting to other 
(domestic) mechanisms or encourage such mechanisms to apply the same rules, for 
several reasons. First, double counting of emission reductions at the domestic level could 
make it more difficult for countries to achieve their UNFCCC pledges; it is in the interest 
of countries to avoid double counting of emission reductions at domestic level. Second, 
double counting between UNFCCC pledges and voluntary actions, such as voluntary 
offsetting of emissions by individual, companies and institutions, could undermine the 
credibility of the market for voluntary offsetting. And third, internationally agreed rules 
to avoid double counting with units outside the scope of UNFCCC pledges could help 
ensure that carbon markets are seen as a credible and effective tool to mitigate climate 
change. 
3.4 Addressing the risk of double counting 
At COP18 in Doha, Parties agreed to consider the issue of double counting in the two work 
programs established under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) on a framework for various approaches (FVA) and a new market-based 
mechanism (NMM). However, whether and how double counting of emission reductions 
needs to be addressed under the UNFCCC is a controversial issue (UNFCCC, 2012c). 
An important question is whether double counting needs to be prevented ex-ante through 
internationally agreed rules or whether it is sufficient to determine ex-post, through 
tracking and reporting, how much double counting is occurring. We argue that preventing 
double counting ex-ante is important, for several reasons: First, not preventing double 
counting would make mitigation pledges less comparable. Second, allowing double 
counting of emission reductions could set disincentives to use international carbon market 
instruments, if countries that acquire units are not assured that they have sole claim to the 
reductions. Third, double counting of emission reductions could reduce the cost 
effectiveness of GHG abatement using carbon markets, since one unit would not 
necessarily represent one metric ton of emissions or emission reductions. Fourth, we 
showed above that double counting can occur in indirect forms; this could make it difficult 
to identify or quantify it ex-post. But even if the amount of double counting would be 
known ex-post, the aggregated mitigation outcome would be lower than the sum of what 
countries pledged, and the extent of double counting might be different than what was 
anticipated when agreeing on mitigation pledges. If the difference is significant, existing 
or future pledges might need to be adjusted or strengthened, in order to meet agreed 
climate protection goals. The need to strengthen future pledges as the result of double 
counting by some countries could introduce yet another source of potential conflict and 
divisiveness or divergence in international efforts to address climate change. 
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It is often argued that a system for consistent tracking and reporting of international units 
is crucial to addressing double counting (UNFCCC, 2012c). While such as system is 
important to facilitate the transfer and accounting of units, it is not sufficient to prevent 
double counting. Addressing double counting requires a coherent set of rules which 
address all stages of the life-cycle of units (Prag et al., 2013), including the issuance, 
transfer and use of units: 
• Accounting rules are key for addressing double claiming and to avoid the double use of 
one unit; 
• Rules for the design of mechanisms are mainly needed to address double issuance but 
are also needed to avoid indirect forms of double claiming; and 
• A system of consistent tracking of units is needed to facilitate the identification and 
avoidance of double counting through appropriate oversight on the issuance, transfer 
and use of units. 
3.4.1 Accounting of units 
We discuss two options for accounting of units, which both fully prevent double claiming 
and double use, as long as all countries involved in international transfers apply the same 
approach2: 
• Approach A: Accounting for net flows of units; and 
• Approach B: Restricting the use of units. 
Under approach A, units issued for domestic emissions or emission reductions that fall 
within the scope of a country’s mitigation pledge and transferred to other countries are 
subtracted from the emission budget of the originating country (or added to its verified 
emissions) and added to the emission budget of the country using the units to attain its 
mitigation pledge (or subtracted from its reported emissions). Units issued for domestic 
emissions or emission reductions that fall outside the scope of a country’s mitigation 
pledge, however, do not need to be subtracted from the country’s emission budget. They 
can either be used by the same country to attain its pledge – in this case the units are added 
to the country’s emission budget – or they can be transferred to other countries – in this 
case the units are added to the emission budget of the country using the units to attain its 
mitigation pledge. This approach builds on the accounting approach under the Kyoto 
Protocol. A country would meet its pledge if the following accounting balance gives a 
surplus equal to or larger than zero for the target period: 
                                                   
2 For simplicity, we do not reflect other reduction obligations, such as mandatory cancellations to 
address non-permanence or to compensate for excess issuance of units. 
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Surplus = Emission budget corresponding to the mitigation pledge 
+ Units acquired from other countries (or an international registry) and used 
for pledge attainment 
+ Units issued for domestic emissions or emission reductions that fall outside 
the scope of the mitigation pledge and used for pledge attainment 
– Verified emissions 
– Units issued for domestic emissions or emission reductions within the scope 
of the mitigation pledge and transferred to other countries 
Under approach B, only units issued for emissions or emission reductions that fall outside 
the scope of a mitigation pledge can be used to attain a mitigation pledge. Units issued for 
emissions or emission reductions that fall within the scope of a mitigation pledge could 
still be issued and transferred, but could not be used for attaining mitigation pledges. A 
country would meet its pledge if the following accounting balance gives a surplus equal 
to or larger than zero for the target period: 
Surplus = Emission budget corresponding to the mitigation pledge 
+ Units acquired from other countries (or an international registry), issued for 
emissions or emission reductions that fall outside the scope of a mitigation 
pledge, and used for pledge attainment 
+ Units issued for domestic emissions or emission reductions outside the 
scope of the mitigation pledge and used for pledge attainment 
– Verified emissions 
Both approaches require differentiating between reductions within and outside the scope 
of a mitigation pledge, where the scope includes the following dimensions: the time frame, 
the geographic area, the greenhouse gases, and the sectors or emission sources covered by 
the pledge. Hence, describing and expressing mitigation pledges unambiguously with 
regard to their scope is another important prerequisite to address double counting. 
Furthermore, the two approaches only effectively prevent double claiming if both the 
buyer and the seller country apply the same accounting approach. Hence, international 
agreement on a consistent approach for accounting of units is another prerequisite to 
avoid double claiming. 
Approach A ensures full fungibility of units (i.e. their exchangeability), since units issued 
for emissions or emission reductions within and outside the scope of a mitigation pledge 
can both be used by the buyer for attaining mitigation pledges. It also enables international 
linking of ETS: the net amount of allowances transferred between two ETS can be reflected 
in the UNFCCC pledges through additions to or subtractions from the emission budget. 
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Approach B provides flexibility in how units are issued, transferred and used by countries. 
It allows units for domestic reductions within and outside the scope of a pledge to be issued 
and transferred, without requiring the originating country to account for the transferred 
units. However, this option creates two types of internationally recognized units. Most 
importantly, this option requires the countries using the units for attaining their mitigation 
pledges to distinguish between these two types of units, and thus limits the fungibility of 
units. In practice, this option would likely imply that unit types that are not eligible for 
attaining mitigation pledges are excluded from ETS. Nevertheless, such units could be 
purchased and used through other channels, such as government programs for results-
based financing. 
Approach A appears to be the most simple and ‘logical’ way of accounting for units. We 
recommend this approach for a post-2020 climate agreement. Up to 2020, accounting of 
units is politically difficult to address. Units issued for emissions or emission reductions 
in countries with mitigation pledges made under the Cancun Agreements may be double 
counted as both the originating country and the country using the units would claim the 
same emission reductions. However, context is important with regard to these pledges. 
Some developing countries argue that their pledges were made assuming international 
support from developed countries, including through the use of mechanisms with unit 
transfer. It is also important to note that many developing countries have made a pledge 
under the Convention for the first time. In this regard, one could argue that deducting 
transferred units from their emissions budget (or adding them to their reported emissions) 
would constitute a burden for developing countries. For the period up to 2020, approach 
B could be an alternative way forward for the accounting of credits, while approach A 
could be applied to the accounting of allowances. 
Under both approaches, developed and developing countries could bilaterally agree to a 
shared approach for accounting of units under the Cancun pledges up to 2020. For 
example, developed countries could only use half of the units acquired from developing 
countries for compliance. Developing countries would then only need to deduct half of 
the issued and transferred units from their emissions budget. This option would avoid 
double counting, partially support developing countries in achieving their 2020 pledges, 
and may still reduce the costs for developed countries in meeting their pledges. In the 
absence of any international agreement to address double claiming, caution may be 
needed in considering the use of units for attaining pledges. In the absence of international 
agreement, Parties could seek to agree on accounting of units through bilateral 
agreements, however, doing so could be inefficient, not address all forms of double 
counting, deter international unit transfers, and limit the scale of associated international 
financial flows. 
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3.4.2 Design of mechanisms 
Appropriate design of mechanisms is another important prerequisite to avoid double 
issuance and double claiming, in particular with regard to crediting mechanisms. To 
effectively avoid double counting, we recommend agreeing internationally on principles 
or rules for the design of mechanisms. 
Transparent information on mechanisms is important to identify any double counting or 
to verify that double counting is not occurring. We recommend establishing a centralized 
information platform under the UNFCCC which includes information on each 
mechanism. Both cap-and-trade and crediting mechanisms should clearly specify their 
scope, including the jurisdictions, emission sources, greenhouse gases, time period 
covered. Furthermore, each crediting mechanism should maintain a publicly accessible 
database on credited activities which allows clearly identifying each credited activity, 
including the location, the emission sources and gases, and the vintage of the emission 
reductions. 
Double counting due to double issuance of units can be addressed in two ways: by 
allowing double issuance but ensuring that only one of the double-issued units is used to 
attain mitigation pledges or by avoiding double issuance (CAR, 2011; GSF, 2013; VCS, 
2013). The following approaches could be employed to avoid that one or more entities seek 
credits for the same emission reductions under the same or different crediting mechanisms 
(see Table 3-1): 
• Attestation by the entities seeking credits: Crediting mechanisms could require that any 
entity seeking credits sign an attestation declaring that it has not and will not seek 
credits for the same emission reductions under another or the same crediting 
mechanism. Such attestations are, for example, required by the Climate Action Reserve 
(CAR), the Gold Standard (GS) and the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) (CAR, 2011; 
GSF, 2013; VCS, 2013). Attestations could be formulated as legally enforceable 
declarations which would allow the regulatory body or others to seek legal remedies 
in the case of non-compliance. Attestations could be required once when a credited 
activity is approved or for each issuance request. 
• Written attestation from other entities: The regulator of a crediting mechanism could 
require the entities seeking credits under the mechanism to acquire an attestation from 
potential other entities, which could claim credits for the same emission reductions, 
that they have not and will not seek credits for the same emission reductions. This 
approach is, for example, followed in some CDM and GS methodologies. 
• Host country oversight: Countries hosting mechanisms could have the responsibility to 
ensure that no double issuance occurs within their jurisdiction. Parties could agree that 
host countries have to issue letters of approval for any emission reductions that are 
claimed within their jurisdiction. Letters of approval have to be issued under the CDM. 
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• Transparent procedures for transfer of credited activities between crediting mechanisms: 
Crediting mechanisms could establish transparent procedures to terminate crediting 
or transfer a credited activity to another mechanisms. The CAR and the VCS have 
procedures to both transfer projects from and to other schemes (CAR, 2011; VCS, 2013). 
• Verification of no double counting through third-party verifiers or regulators: Third-party 
verifiers or the regulators of a crediting mechanism could be required to check for each 
issuance request whether the same reductions have already been issued as credits in 
the same or another crediting mechanism. The scope of the check could depend on the 
material risk of double counting, implementing a risk-based approach. 
• Only one type of entity can seek credits: The regulator of a crediting mechanism or Parties 
could decide that only one type of entity (e.g. the producer, the operator, or the 
consumer) can seek credits under the mechanism. Under the CDM, the available 
baseline and monitoring methodologies often allow only one entity to claim CERs for 
a proposed project activity. 
• Limitation to activities with clear ownership of credits: The scope of crediting could be 
limited to activities with clear ownership of credits (e.g. those where the mitigation 
activity occurs in the same place as most of the emission reductions). The VCS and 
CAR intend to limit eligibility to projects types for which the ownership of the credits 
is unambiguous (CAR, 2011; VCS, 2012). 
Some of these approaches could pose challenges. Requiring entities to make declarations 
on what other entities will or will not do could pose legal risks for those entities, especially 
if they have no contractual arrangements with the other entities or if they do not know 
who they are. Even if the other entities never planned to seek any credits, they may be 
hesitant to make a written commitment, as they have no incentives to give away such 
rights and may not be aware of the consequences. Allowing only one type of entity to seek 
credits under one mechanisms may not necessarily prevent double issuance between 
different mechanisms; and seeking international agreement for all mechanisms which 
entities can seek credits may turn out to be difficult. The limitation of mechanisms to 
activities with clear ownership of credits could reduce the scope of mechanisms 
considerably. For these reasons, we recommend combining attestations by the entities 
seeking credits, host country oversight, transparent procedures for transfer of credited 
activities between mechanisms, and verification of no double counting through third-
party verifiers or regulators. 
The risk of double issuance or double claiming due to the accounting of indirect emissions 
could be addressed through appropriate principles for the design of mechanisms, such as 
the following: 
• In the case that indirect emissions overlap between a crediting mechanisms and a 
mitigation pledge or cap-and trade mechanism, double counting could be addressed 
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either if the jurisdiction implementing the mitigation pledge or the cap-and-trade 
mechanism establishes an allowance reserve to compensate for any credits that fall 
within its scope, or if the crediting mechanism avoids the crediting of any emission 
reductions that fall within the scope of the mitigation pledge or cap-and-trade 
mechanism. The following two principles could avoid both double counting and over-
crediting: 
a. Indirect baseline emissions that fall within the scope of a mitigation pledge or 
cap-and-trade mechanisms could either not be included in the calculation of 
emission reductions or a different unit type could be issued for those 
reductions; 
b. Indirect project (or leakage) emissions that fall within the scope of a mitigation 
pledge, should be included in the calculation of emission reductions or other 
units corresponding to that amount should be cancelled, in order to avoid over-
crediting of emission reductions. 
• In the case that indirect emissions overlap between two crediting mechanisms (or two 
credited activities within one mechanism), double counting could be addressed by 
ensuring that only one mechanism issues units for reductions in indirect emissions. 
The following two principles could avoid both double counting and over-crediting: 
a. In the case of indirect baseline emissions, the emission factor should reflect the 
actual emissions occurring with any credited activity implemented upstream 
or downstream (and not the emissions that would occur in the absence of the 
credited activity implemented upstream or downstream), in order to ensure 
that only the credited activity upstream or downstream claims the emission 
reductions. 
b. In the case of indirect project (or leakage) emissions, the emission factor should 
reflect the emissions that would occur in the absence of the credited activity 
implemented upstream or downstream (and not the actual emissions occurring 
with the credited activity implemented upstream or downstream), in order to 
ensure that only the credited activity upstream or downstream claims the 
emission reductions (see biofuels example in section 3.2.1). 
In many cases, pragmatic approaches are needed to implement these principles for 
accounting of indirect emissions. In some cases it is not known where the indirect 
emissions occur, and hence whether they fall within the scope of mitigation pledges or 
other credited activities. Default emission factors, derived in a representative manner 
reflecting these principles, can avoid double counting and over-crediting in a reasonable 
manner. 
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3.4.3 Consistent tracking of units 
Consistent tracking of unit flows is often regarded as a key means to address double 
counting. In our assessment, international oversight on the issuance and accounting of units 
is key to effectively prevent double counting; it allows ex-post detecting any double use of 
units or any inconsistencies in unit information between the originating country and the 
country using the units for attaining its mitigation pledge. Hence, international oversight 
on unit flows adds transparency but is not necessarily needed to prevent double counting. 
However, an important prerequisite for avoiding double counting is that sufficient 
information is attached to the units. Above we showed that it is important to identify 
whether a unit was issued for emissions or emission reductions within or outside the scope 
of a mitigation pledge. With this in mind, units should not only be tagged with regard to 
where the mitigation action occurs, such as the host country identifier under the CDM, 
but also in which country the reductions occur, when they occurred, and whether they fall 
within or outside the scope of a mitigation pledge. Understanding when the reductions 
from a unit occur is more difficult for allowances than for credits. Allowances may be 
issued for a particular calendar year or compliance period, but they can often be banked 
between compliance periods. This raises issues for accounting of UNFCCC pledges if 
allowances are banked from a period prior to a mitigation pledge into the period covered 
by the mitigation pledge (Prag et al., 2013). 
We recommend that international agreement is sought on information that should be 
attached to any units that are eligible for attaining mitigation pledges. Each unit should 
have a globally unique serial number which should include comprehensive information 
through relevant identifiers, including: 
• a unique identifier for each mechanism under which units are generated; 
• a country identifier which should, in the case of crediting mechanisms, include the 
country where the mitigation action takes place, and, if different, the country where 
the emission reduction occurred; 
• information on the vintage of the units, including the compliance period for which units 
were issued for trading mechanisms and the time period in which the emission 
reductions occurred for crediting mechanisms; 
• information whether or not the unit is issued for emissions or emission reductions that 
fall within or outside the scope of a mitigation pledge; 
• for crediting mechanisms, the relevant activity (e.g. the project number); 
• information whether the units are subject to provisions to address potential non- 
permanence. 
The governance arrangements and the level of international oversight on mechanisms and 
unit accounting is one of the politically controversial issues in UNFCCC negotiations 
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(Prag, Hood, et al., 2011; Prag et al., 2013; UNFCCC, 2012c). Parties could agree to establish 
governance arrangements under UNFCCC, or to make use of national, bilateral or non-
governmental governance structures. Table 3-2 highlights examples of government 
arrangements for the three stages of the life-cycle of units: mechanisms issuing units, 
registries transferring units, and the accounting of units. 
Table 3-2 Examples of governance arrangements for issuance, transfer and 
accounting of units 
 UNFCCC/multilateral National/bilateral Non-governmental 
Mechanisms 
issuing 
units 
CDM 
NMM 
Joint Implementation 
(JI) 
Joint Crediting 
Mechanism (JCM) 
JI track 1 
VCS 
GS 
CAR 
Registries 
transferring 
units 
CDM registry 
International 
transaction log (ITL) 
National registries 
under the Kyoto 
Protocol 
VCS registry 
GS registry 
CAR registry 
Balances 
accounting  
units 
Compilation and 
accounting database 
under the Kyoto 
Protocol 
Common reporting 
tables submitted for 
2020 UNFCCC 
pledges 
 
Above we showed that international agreement on common rules and principles for unit 
accounting and mechanisms is key to prevent double counting of emission reductions. 
However, which entities issue, transfer and account for units is less important, as long as 
procedures for reporting, review, and resolution of any non-compliance ensure that 
internationally agreed rules are followed. For any mechanisms that are not operated under 
the UNFCCC, we recommend conducting an initial international review which establishes 
the eligibility for issuing units that can be used to attain pledges under UNFCCC. The 
continued compliance could then be assessed through regular subsequent reviews. With 
regard to the transfer of units, we see less need for rigorous international oversight – as 
long as Parties agree on common rules for attaching relevant information to units – since 
any double counting could be detected when units are accounted. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In light of an increasingly fragmented carbon market and the current diversity of 
international mitigation pledges, double counting of emission reductions could 
significantly undermine international efforts to tackle climate change. Our analysis shows 
that double counting can occur in various forms and indirect ways. It may be difficult to 
address ex-post and should rather be prevented ex-ante. Addressing double counting 
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requires international coordination in three areas: accounting of units, design of 
mechanisms that issue units, and consistent tracking and reporting on units. A new 
international post 2020 climate regime should include principles and rules in all three 
areas. In the absence of international agreement, Parties could seek to avoid double 
counting through bilateral agreements, however, doing so could be inefficient, not address 
all forms of double counting, deter international unit transfers, and limit the scale of 
associated international financial flows. 
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Chapter 4  
Perverse effects of carbon markets on HFC-23 and 
SF6 abatement projects in Russia 
Abstract 
Carbon markets are considered a key policy tool to achieve cost-effective climate 
mitigation (IPCC, 2014b; World Bank, 2014). Project-based carbon market mechanisms 
allow private sector entities to earn tradable emissions reduction credits from mitigation 
projects. The environmental integrity of project-based mechanisms has been subject to 
controversial debate and extensive research (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012; Gillenwater & 
Seres, 2012; Hayashi & Michaelowa, 2013; IPCC, 2014b; Ruthner et al., 2011; Schiermeier, 
2011; Schneider, 2009b; Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012), in particular for projects abating 
industrial waste gases with a high global warming potential (GWP). For such projects, 
revenues from credits can significantly exceed abatement costs, creating perverse 
incentives to increase production or generation of waste gases as a means to increase credit 
revenues from waste gas abatement (Schneider, 2011; UNEP, 2007; UNFCCC, 2005, 2011; 
Wartmann, Hofman, & Jager, 2006). Here we show that all projects abating HFC-23 and 
SF6 under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation mechanism in Russia increased waste 
gas generation to unprecedented levels once they could generate credits from producing 
more waste gas. Our results suggest that perverse incentives can substantially undermine 
the environmental integrity of project-based mechanisms and that adequate regulatory 
oversight is crucial. Our findings are critical for mechanisms in both national jurisdictions 
and under international agreements. 
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The Kyoto Protocol’s project-based mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) for emission reductions projects in developing countries and Joint Implementation 
(JI) for projects in industrialized countries, provided industrialized countries flexibility in 
meeting their greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction commitments. Numerous sub-national 
and national jurisdictions are implementing similar mechanisms around the world, often 
in combination with emissions trading schemes (World Bank, 2014). 
Projects abating waste gases with a high global warming potential (GWP) can generate 
large volumes of emission reductions at low abatement costs (IPCC, 2014b; Rahman & 
Kirkman, 2015). Under the CDM, the two largest waste gas project types—incineration of 
hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) from hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22) production 
and destruction of nitrous oxide (N2O) from adipic acid production— account for only 
0.3% of the registered projects but generated about half of the 1.5 billion emission 
reduction credits issued so far (UNEP DTU Partnership, 2015). For such projects, revenues 
from credits can significantly exceed GHG abatement costs and, in some instances, the 
costs of producing the main product (UNFCCC, 2005; Wartmann et al., 2006). This can 
create perverse incentives for plant operators to increase production or waste generation 
beyond levels that would occur in the absence of crediting (Schneider, 2011; Schneider et 
al., 2010; UNEP, 2007; UNFCCC, 2011). If more waste gas is generated owing to the 
incentives from crediting, emission reductions are overestimated; the emissions baseline 
is inflated compared to the emissions that would actually occur without crediting, and, in 
consequence, excess credits are issued. 
Such perverse incentives can be avoided through appropriate safeguards in 
methodological standards for the calculation of emission reductions, mainly by capping 
the amount of production and waste generation to historically observed levels or 
conservative benchmarks for the purpose of calculating emission reductions. Under the 
CDM, safeguards to prevent perverse incentives were gradually introduced and 
strengthened over time, following observations that the initial safeguards may not have 
been adequate (Schneider, 2011; UNFCCC, 2011, 2012b). Whereas the CDM requires using 
internationally agreed standards and international approval for registering projects and 
issuing credits, JI allows using a project-specific approach for calculating emission 
reductions, and either the host countries or the international Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee (JISC) execute regulatory oversight. Under host country 
oversight, countries can largely establish their own rules for approving projects and 
issuing credits without international oversight. The host country can determine whether 
it deems emission reductions as additional. Under international oversight, the JISC 
oversees project approval and issuance of credits. 
This Letter assesses perverse incentives in the context of JI. We evaluate JI projects that 
incinerate high GWP waste gases, as these project types were particularly vulnerable to 
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perverse incentives under the CDM. Four such projects were registered under JI, all of 
them under host country oversight. They account for 54 out of the 863 million credits 
issued to the 604 JI projects registered as of 1 April 2015 (ref. UNEP DTU Partnership, 
2015). The four projects involve five plants: two hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22) 
and two sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) production plants in Russia, and one trifluoroacetic 
acid (TFA) production plant in France. The production of HCFC-22 generates 
hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) as an unwanted waste gas; in the production of SF6 a 
waste stream of SF6 is generated at rectification; and the production of TFA generates 
various unwanted fluorinated waste gases. The amount of waste gas generated depends 
on the production level of the main product – HCFC-22, SF6 and TFA – and the waste 
generation rate, which is defined as the quantity (mass) of waste gas generated per 
quantity (mass) of product produced (UNFCCC, 2011). The waste generation rate depends 
on factors, such as plant design, product purity requirements, and degree of process 
optimization (McCulloch & Lindley, 2007). In the absence of regulations, incentives, or 
voluntary commitments by the industry, the waste gases are usually vented to the 
atmosphere. The five registered JI plants capture and incinerate these waste gases (see 
Supplementary Documentation). 
The plant in France aimed to address perverse incentives by capping the emission 
reductions to the historical emissions of the installation. However, data on historical and 
monitored production and waste gas generation are not available to assess whether the 
cap adequately prevented perverse incentives. 
Three plants in Russia initially applied caps on the production and waste generation rate 
to avoid perverse incentives, drawing upon CDM standards. In the second quarter of 2011, 
the plant operators decided to retroactively change the way emission reductions are 
calculated as of 1 January 2010, removing the caps and crediting all waste gas destroyed. 
Moreover, data and information provided in the original project documentation was 
considered incorrect, or not applicable, and replaced (see Supplementary Information). 
Figure 4-1 shows that waste gas generation increased in all three facilities to 
unprecedented levels compared to both historical and originally projected levels, after 
abandoning methodological safeguards in 2011. 
Chapter 4 Perverse effects of carbon markets on HFC-23 and SF6 abatement projects in Russia 
56 
 
Figure 4-1 HFC-23 and SF6 waste generation at three plants in Russia. a, HFC-23 waste 
generation at the KCKK Polymer plant. b, SF6 waste generation at the KCKK 
Polymer plant. c, HFC-23 waste generation at the HaloPolymer Perm plant. 
Waste generation increased in all three plants beyond previously reported 
levels when plant operators decided in 2011 to abandon methodological 
safeguards to prevent perverse incentives. 
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Figure 1 | HFC-23 and SF6 waste generation at three plants in Russia.
a, HFC-23 waste generation at the KCKK Polymer plant. b, SF6 waste
generation at the KCKK Polymer plant. c, HFC-23 waste generation at the
HaloPolymer Perm plant. Waste generation increased in all three plants
beyond previously repo ted l vels when plant oper tors decided in 2011 to
abandon methodological safeguards to prevent perverse incentives.
are calculated as of 1 January 2010, removing the caps and crediting
all waste gas destroyed. Moreover, data and information provided
in the original project documentation was considered incorrect,
or not applicable, and replaced (see Supplementary Information).
Figure 1 shows that waste gas generation increased in all three
facilities to unprecedented levels compared to both historical and
originally projected levels, after abandoning methodological safe-
guards in 2011.
The project at the fourth plant in Russia was developed and
approved in 2011/2012 and claimed credits retroactively as of
1 January 2008. The project did not apply any methodological
safeguards to avoid perverse incentives; all waste gas destroyed was
credited. For the period 2008 to 2010, for which data on both
Figure 2 | SF6 waste generation at the HaloPolymer Perm plant. The GHG
inventory data includes emissions from both SF6 production plants in
Russia (KCKK Polymer and HaloPolymer Perm). After the start of crediting,
the waste generation from HaloPolymer Perm increased beyond historical
emission levels reported in the Russian GHG inventory from both plants.
SF6 production and SF6 waste generation are available, the average
waste generation rate was 16.9%, which considerably exceeds the
default value of 0.2% suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC; ref. 20) or the average historical waste
generation rate of 2.0% observed at the KCKK Polymer plant.
A comparison with GHG inventory data reported by Russia to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC; ref. 21) shows that waste generation significantly
increased with the implementation of the JI project (Fig. 2). Before
project implementation, the GHG inventory emissions from SF6
manufacturing—which cover both SF6 plants and which may not
only include waste gas emissions from SF6 production but also
emissions from handling of SF6 at the production site, and thus
represent the upper end of the possible range—varied between 4
and 53 tonnes of SF6 over the period 1990 to 2007, whereas after
project implementation the plant reported an average annual waste
gas generation of 117 tonnes of SF6.
The abrupt increase occurred in all four plants exactly at the
point in time when plant operators could generate (more) credits
by producing more waste gas, and higher levels of waste generation
were sustained thereafter. The increase in waste generation ismostly
attributable to an increase in the waste generation rate, and not in
production levels (see Supplementary Information). There was also
no reporting of any changes in plant capacity, design, or product
specifications which might have a ected the waste generation rate.
Without credit revenues, plant operators would have economic
incentives to reduce rather than increase waste generation13,14.
Absent methodological safeguards to prevent perverse incen-
tives, increasing waste gas generation beyond levels that would oc-
cur in the absence of crediting leads to excess issuance of credits. The
extent of such over-crediting is uncertain; it depends on how much
waste gas the plants would otherwise have generated. We assess the
magnitude of over-crediting using three scenarios to estimate the
plausible range of waste gas generation that would have occurred
in the absence of crediting (see Methods). We conclude that, in the
periods where methodological safeguards were not applied, about
28 to 33 million credits were issued in excess, corresponding to 66
to 79% of the credits issued for these periods.
Several lessons can be learned from this analysis. First, although
previous research indicated that perverse incentives a ected plant
operations, the extent and implications were more confined13,17,18.
Our results suggest that perverse incentives arising from project-
based mechanisms can have rather substantial adverse impacts
on environmental integrity, with about two-thirds of the credits
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The project at the fourth plant in Russia was developed and approved in 2011/2012 and 
claimed credits retroactively as of 1 January 2008. The project did not apply any 
methodological safeguards to avoid perverse incentives; all waste gas destroyed was 
credited. For the period 2008 to 2010, for which data on both SF6 production and SF6 waste 
generation are available, the average waste generation rate was 16.9%, which considerably 
exceeds the default value of 0.2% suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC; ref. IPCC, 2006) or the average historical waste generation rate of 2.0% 
observed at the KCKK Polymer plant. A comparison with GHG inventory data reported 
by Russia to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; 
ref. Russian Federation, 2014) shows that waste generation significantly increased with the 
implementation of the JI project (Figure 4-2). Before project implementation, the GHG 
inventory emissions from SF6 manufacturing – which cover both SF6 plants and which 
may not only include waste gas emissions from SF6 production but also emissions from 
handling of SF6 at the production site, and thus represent the upper end of the possible 
range – varied between 4 and 53 tons of SF6 over the period 1990 to 2007, whereas after 
project implementation the plant reported an average annual waste gas generation of 117 
tons of SF6. 
 
Figure 4-2 SF6 waste generation at the HaloPolymer Perm plant. The GHG inventory 
data includes emissions from both SF6 production plants in Russia (KCKK 
Polymer and HaloPolymer Perm). After the start of crediting, the waste 
generation from HaloPolymer Perm increased beyond historical emission 
levels reported in the Russian GHG inventory from both plants. 
The abrupt increase occurred in all four plants exactly at the point in time when plant 
operators could generate (more) credits by producing more waste gas, and higher levels 
of waste generation were sustained thereafter. The increase in waste generation is mostly 
attributable to an increase in the waste generation rate, and not in production levels (see 
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Figure 1 | HFC-23 and SF6 waste generation at three plants in Russia.
a, HFC-23 waste generation at the KCKK Polymer plant. b, SF6 waste
generation at the KCKK Polymer plant. c, HFC-23 waste generation at the
HaloPolymer Perm plant. Waste generation increased in all three plants
beyond previously reported levels when plant operators decided in 2011 to
abandon methodological safeguards to prevent perverse incentives.
are calculated as of 1 January 2010, removing the caps and crediting
all waste gas destroyed. Moreover, data and information provided
in the original project documentation was considered incorrect,
or not applicable, and replaced (see Supplementary Information).
Figure 1 shows that waste gas generation increased in all three
facilities to unprecedented levels compared to both historical and
originally projected levels, after abandoning methodological safe-
guards in 2011.
The project at the fourth plant in Russia was developed and
approved in 2011/2012 and claimed credits retroactively as of
1 January 2008. The project did not apply any methodological
safeguards to avoid perverse incentives; all waste gas destroyed was
credited. For the period 2008 to 2010, for which data on both
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Figure 2 | SF6 was e genera ion at the HaloPolymer Per plant. The GHG
inventory data includes emissions from both SF6 production plants in
Russia (KCKK Polymer and HaloPolymer Perm). After the start of crediting,
the waste generation from HaloPolymer Perm increased beyond historical
emission levels reported in the Russian GHG inventory from both plants.
SF6 production and SF6 waste generation are available, the average
waste generation rate was 16.9%, which considerably exceeds the
default value of 0.2% suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC; ref. 20) or the average historical w ste
generation rate of 2.0% observed at the KCKK Polymer plant.
A comparison with GHG inventory data reported by Russia to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC; ref. 21) shows that waste generation significantly
increased with the implementation of the JI project (Fig. 2). Before
project implementation, the GHG inventory emissions from SF6
manufacturing—which cover both SF6 plants and which may not
only include waste gas emissions from SF6 production but also
emissions from handling of SF6 at the production site, and thus
represent the upper end of the possible range—varied between 4
and 53 tonnes of SF6 over the period 1990 to 2007, whereas after
project implementation the plant reported an average annual waste
gas generation of 117 tonnes of SF6.
The abrupt increase occurred in all four plants exactly at the
point in time when plant operators could generate (more) credits
by producing more waste gas, and higher levels of waste generation
were sustained thereafter. The increase in waste generation ismostly
attributable to an increase in the waste generation rate, and not in
production levels (see Supplementary Information). There was also
no reporting of any changes in plant capacity, design, or product
specifications which might have a ected the waste generation rate.
Without credit revenues, plant operators would have economic
incentives to reduce rather than increase waste generation13,14.
Absent methodological safeguards to prevent perverse incen-
tives, increasing waste gas generation beyond levels that would oc-
cur in the absence of crediting leads to excess issuance of credits. The
extent of such over-crediting is uncertain; it depends on how much
waste gas the plants would otherwise have generated. We assess the
magnitude of over-crediting using three scenarios to estimate the
plausible range of waste gas generation that would have occurred
in the absence of crediting (see Methods). We conclude that, in the
periods where methodological safeguards were not applied, about
28 to 33 million credits were issued in excess, corresponding to 66
to 79% of the credits issued for these periods.
Several lessons can be learned from this analysis. First, although
previous research indicated that perverse incentives a ected plant
operations, the extent and implications were more confined13,17,18.
Our results suggest that perverse incentives arising from project-
based mechanisms can have rather substantial adverse impacts
on environmental integrity, with about two-thirds of the credits
2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange
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Supplementary Information). There was also no reporting of any changes in plant 
capacity, design, or product specifications which might have affected the waste generation 
rate. Without credit revenues, plant operators would have economic incentives to reduce 
rather than increase waste generation (Schneider, 2011; UNFCCC, 2011). 
Absent methodological safeguards to prevent perverse incentives, increasing waste gas 
generation beyond levels that would occur in the absence of crediting leads to excess 
issuance of credits. The extent of such over-crediting is uncertain; it depends on how much 
waste gas the plants would otherwise have generated. We assess the magnitude of over-
crediting using three scenarios to estimate the plausible range of waste gas generation that 
would have occurred in the absence of crediting (see Methods). We conclude that, in the 
periods where methodological safeguards were not applied, about 28 to 33 million credits 
were issued in excess, corresponding to 66 to 79% of the credits issued for these periods. 
Several lessons can be learned from this analysis. First, although previous research 
indicated that perverse incentives affected plant operations, the extent and implications 
were more confined (Schneider, 2011; Schneider et al., 2010; UNFCCC, 2012b). Our results 
suggest that perverse incentives arising from project-based mechanisms can have rather 
substantial adverse impacts on environmental integrity, with about two-thirds of the 
credits being issued in excess in periods when no safeguards were applied. Second, 
regulatory oversight by the host country alone may not be sufficient to ensure 
environmental integrity. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Russia had no incentives to ensure 
environmental integrity of JI projects; it had an emissions target well above its actual 
emissions and could issue credits from its emissions budget without repercussions for 
meeting its target. For the three plants in Figure 4-1 the methodological safeguards were 
removed at a point in time when perverse incentives from HFC-23 CDM projects received 
wide media and policymaker attention, leading ultimately to a ban of HFC-23 credits 
under the EU’s emissions trading scheme and a revision of the applicable methodological 
standard under the CDM (ref. European Commission, 2011; UNFCCC, 2011). Third, the 
Accredited Independent Entity (AIE) performing the relevant auditing functions – Bureau 
Veritas Certification – did not address the perverse incentives. Although AIEs were 
accredited by the JISC, the projects were implemented under oversight by the host 
country, in which case the JISC did not assess the performance of auditors or apply any 
sanctions in cases of non-performance. Finally, we note a lack of transparency, with project 
information being only partially publicly available. 
These lessons are critical for both ongoing international discussions on the review of JI 
and market-based mechanisms under the new climate agreement, as well as the growing 
use of domestic carbon markets around the world. Our findings confirm earlier research 
that project-based mechanisms are exposed to significant risks of over-crediting, for 
example, due to the information asymmetry between project operators and auditors or 
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regulators (Gillenwater & Seres, 2012; Ruthner et al., 2011; Schneider, 2009b; Spalding-
Fecher et al., 2012). If crediting mechanisms are further pursued, it is essential that 
adequate international oversight be executed for any mechanisms involving international 
transfer of credits, that methodological standards be internationally accepted and include 
appropriate safeguards to prevent perverse incentives, that mechanisms monitor the 
performance of auditors and apply effective sanctions in the case of non-performance, and 
that information on credited activities is transparent and publicly accessible. 
Methods 
Data on production and waste gas generation was gathered from project design 
documents (PDDs) and monitoring reports, published by the UNFCCC3 and the Russian 
Registry of Carbon Units4, and audited by AIEs. The monitoring and verification reports 
publicly available are incomplete for four out of the five plants: for HFC-23 and SF6 
abatement at KCKK Polymer, the first and second monitoring report covering the years 
2008 and 2009 are lacking. For HFC-23 abatement at HaloPolymer Perm, the first, second 
and fourth monitoring report, covering the years 2008 and 2009 and the period 1 January 
to 31 March 2011, are lacking, as well as the fourth verification report for the period 1 
January to 31 March 2011. Moreover, as of 1 January 2012, HaloPolymer Perm reports only 
HFC-23 incineration but no longer HFC-23 generation. We conservatively assume that all 
HFC-23 generated was incinerated. If HFC-23 was partially vented or sold, the actual 
HFC-23 generation in 2012 would be even higher than presented in Figure 4-1. Finally, 
monitoring reports are not publicly available for the plant in France. 
Project-based mechanisms generally calculate emission reductions by comparing an 
emissions baseline with monitored project emissions and adjusting for any indirect 
upstream or downstream leakage emissions occurring as a result of the project: 
ER = BE − PE – LE (Equation 4-1) 
where ER are the emission reductions, BE are the baseline emissions, PE are the project 
emissions and LE are the leakage emissions (all expressed as metric tons of CO2 
equivalent). Whereas project emissions can in most cases be directly measured, baseline 
emissions are estimated based on a counterfactual, hypothetical scenario. Baselines often 
aim to reflect the emissions level that would most likely occur if the project was not 
implemented, but could also be set at a lower, more conservative level – for example, to 
address uncertainties or to prevent perverse incentives. Over-crediting, or excess issuance 
of credits, occurs if the estimated baseline is higher than the emissions level that would 
                                                   
3 http://ji.unfccc.int  
4 http://www.carbonunitsregistry.ru 
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occur if the project was not implemented (or if project or leakage emissions are 
underestimated). 
Absent methodological safeguards, the four projects determine baseline emissions as the 
observed waste gas generation, that is, assuming that the same amount of waste gas would 
be generated and emitted in the absence of crediting. We estimate the extent of excess 
issuance of credits as the difference between the claimed baseline emissions (BEclaimed) and 
different assumptions on plausible baseline emission levels (BEplausible): 
E = BEclaimed − BEplausible (Equation 4-2) 
where E are the credits issued in excess, BEclaimed are the baseline emissions specified in the 
monitoring reports of the plants and BEplausible is our estimate of the plausible range of 
baseline emissions (both expressed in metric tons of CO2 equivalent). 
We use three scenarios to reflect the range of plausible baseline emissions (BEplausible). For 
the three plants in Figure 4-1, historical data on waste generation is available. We estimate 
the magnitude of over-crediting over the period 1 April 2011 to 31 December 2012, when 
methodological safeguards were not applied, assuming that the three facilities would have 
produced the same amount of waste gas per day as before the start of crediting, as during 
the crediting period before their decision to abandon the methodological safeguards, or as 
originally projected when the project was approved. The credits issued in excess would 
amount to 19.7, 17.3, or 17.6 million, respectively, corresponding to 69%, 61%, or 62% of 
the 28.3 million credits issued to the three facilities over that period. 
For SF6 abatement at HaloPolymer Perm in Figure 4-2 the magnitude of over-crediting is 
more uncertain because historical data is not available. We determine plausible baseline 
emission levels based on the SF6 production and a range of plausible assumptions on the 
waste generation rate: 
BEplausible = PSF6 × wSF6 × GWPSF6 (Equation 4-3) 
where PSF6 is the SF6 production at the plant (in metric tons of SF6), wSF6 is the waste 
generation rate expressed as metric tons of SF6 waste gas generated per metric tons of SF6 
produced, and GWPSF6 is the global warming potential of SF6 valid for the first 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (metric tons of CO2 equivalent per metric 
tons of SF6). We estimate the magnitude of over-crediting for the period 2008 to 2012 when 
methodological safeguards were not applied. For the period 2008 to 2010 we use the SF6 
production data reported by the plant. For 2011 and 2012, SF6 production data is not 
reported; we conservatively assume that the plant would operate at its maximum 
production capacity. We use three scenarios to estimate the plausible range of the waste 
generation rate, assuming that the plant would have operated at a waste generation rate 
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of 0.2%, as suggested by the IPCC, 2.0%, as observed before crediting at the KCKK 
Polymer SF6 production plant, or 3.8%, as approximated based on SF6 emissions data 
reported in the Russian GHG inventory (see Supplementary Information). The credits 
issued in excess would amount to 13.5, 11.9, or 10.2 million, respectively, corresponding 
to 99%, 87%, or 75% of the credits issued over that period. 
Supplementary documentation 
Additional project information 
The four registered JI projects include five production plants that produce HCFC-22, SF6 
and TFA. HCFC-22 is a GHG and an ozone-depleting substance regulated under the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. It is mainly used in 
refrigeration and air-conditioning appliances and as a feedstock in the production of 
polymers. HFC-23 is an unwanted by-product from HCFC-22 production; it has a GWP of 
12,400 over a 100 year time horizon (IPCC, 2013). SF6 is mainly used as insulator gas in the 
electrical industry. In the rectification of SF6, a small fraction of SF6 is lost through the off-
gas. Larger quantities may be lost in the process of filling cylinders but these emissions 
are not subject to the JI projects (IPCC, 2006). SF6 has a GWP of 23,500 over a 100 year time 
horizon (IPCC, 2013). TFA is the precursor to several products in the chemical industry. A 
range of fluorinated gases are unwanted by-products from TFA production. 
Project RU1000201 (unique number assigned by the international transaction log operated 
by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) covers two plants at 
the industrial facility KCKK Polymer which produce HCFC-22 and SF6. The project 
includes abatement of the HFC-23 waste gas stream from HCFC-22 production and the 
SF6 waste gas stream from SF6 rectification. Another industrial facility in Russia, 
HaloPolymer Perm, produces also both HCFC-22 and SF6. HFC-23 and SF6 emissions are 
addressed separately in two projects (RU1000202 and RU1000309). The projects 
RU1000201 and RU1000309 install a new HFC-23 and SF6 destruction unit, while project 
RU1000202 consists of a modernization and capacity enhancement of three existing 
destruction units. All three projects aim at destroying all HFC-23 and SF6. Another smaller 
HCFC-22 production plant in Russia, operated by JSC Khimprom Volgograd, was 
proposed as JI project but never registered. These three registered and the proposed 
project cover all production facilities in Russia: three HCFC-22 production facilities with 
a total capacity of about 44,000 tons per year and two SF6 production facilities with a total 
capacity of about 1,800 tons per year (UNIDO & GEF, 2012). Project FR1000029 at Rhodia 
Salindres in France abates a waste stream from the production of TFA consisting of HFCs, 
PFCs, and GHGs regulated under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer. 
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The projects RU1000201 and RU1000202 were developed at the same time by Camco 
International. They initially applied the CDM baseline and monitoring methodology 
AM0001 for HFC-23 destruction (version 5.2), with some adjustments. The methodology 
aims to avoid perverse incentives through two provisions:  
1. The amount of HCFC-22 eligible for crediting is capped to the maximum annual 
HCFC-22 production observed in the period 2002 to 2004. This provision aims to avoid 
perverse incentives to increase HCFC-22 production beyond levels that would be 
produced in the absence of the CDM; and 
2. The maximum HFC-23 that can be used for crediting is capped to the minimum of the 
annual waste generation rates observed in the period 2002 to 2004. This provision aims 
to avoid perverse incentives to artificially increase the HFC-23 waste generation rate 
beyond levels that would occur in the absence of the CDM. 
The original PDDs of the projects RU1000201 and RU1000202 both limited the amount of 
HCFC-22 that is eligible for crediting and established a cap on the maximum HFC-23 
waste generation eligible for crediting, in line with the methodology. No CDM 
methodology was developed for abatement of SF6 emissions from SF6 rectification, but 
project RU1000201 nevertheless capped the amount of saleable SF6 production and the rate 
of SF6 losses in relation to the saleable production of SF6, similar to the provisions in the 
CDM methodology for HFC-23 abatement. 
In 2011, both projects adopted a revision to the monitoring plan, using a JI specific 
approach instead of applying a CDM methodology. The new approach was applied 
retroactively as of 1 January 2010 to both projects. The revision removes both the cap on 
the amount of HCFC-22 production that is eligible for crediting and the cap on the waste 
generation rate; all waste gas generated becomes eligible for crediting. The revised 
monitoring plans also declare key data and information provided in the original PDDs as 
inaccurate, including regulations applicable in Russia and historical data on HCFC-22 
production, HFC-23 generation, and HFC-23 abatement. 
Both original PDDs state that HFC-23 was already abated in part prior to the 
implementation of the JI projects in existing incinerators, together with other waste gases 
originating from the same industrial facility. Historical abatement levels are partially 
quantified. The original PDDs indicated that the level of abatement depended on the 
capacity of the existing destruction units and the extent to which these had to destroy toxic 
waste gases. According to the original PDDs, the objective of both projects is to enhance 
HFC-23 abatement beyond historical levels. In contrast, the documentation of the revised 
monitoring plans of both projects declares that HFC-23 was not abated prior to the start of 
the JI project. With regard to SF6 abatement in project RU1000201, both the original PDD 
and the revised monitoring plan consistently state that it was not captured and abated 
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prior to the implementation of the JI project. Both original PDDs also considered 
applicable regulations with regard to a "specified level of maximum permissible 
emissions" in calculating the level of baseline emissions. The documentation on the revised 
monitoring plan of both PDDs concludes that no regulations are applicable and removes 
the relevant provisions from the calculation of baseline emissions. The information on the 
level of waste gas formation in the original PDDs is indicated as black continuous line in 
Figure 4-1, the information according to the revised monitoring plan as grey continuous 
line. Both the information in the original PDDs and the information in the revised 
monitoring plan was confirmed as correct by two different AIEs, Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV) at PDD determination and Bureau Veritas Certification (BVT) at verification. The 
project RU1000309 does not provide information whether SF6 was abated prior to the 
implementation of the project and states that its destruction is not required by regulations. 
In some countries, small quantities of HFC-23 are sold. According to information in the 
original PDD of project RU1000201, a small fraction of the HFC-23 was sold in the period 
2002 to 2007. In the calculation of emission reductions, the actual sales of HFC-23 are 
monitored and subtracted from the baseline emissions. However, the economic value of 
one ton of HFC-23 incinerated and credited under JI could be higher than the market price 
for HFC-23, depending on the price of ERUs and HFC-23. This could create perverse 
incentives for the project participants to incinerate rather than sell HFC-23. In the project 
RU1000201, the available monitoring reports, covering the period from 1 January 2010 to 
10 November 2012, document that no sales of HFC-23 occurred. The project RU1000202 
did not report any historical sales of HFC-23. 
Implications of the increase of waste gas generation 
An increase of the waste gas generation can have different implications with regard to the 
amount of potential over-crediting: 
• Increased waste generation rates: If the increase of waste gas generation occurs due to an 
increase in the waste generation rate, then the amount of over-crediting correlates with 
the increase in waste gas generation; 
• Production shifts: If the increase of waste gas generation occurs due to an increase in 
production of the main product — HCFC-22, SF6 or TFA — and if the product is used 
(and not vented to the atmosphere), then the emissions impact depends on where and 
how the product would otherwise be produced (i.e. at which waste generation rates 
the other plants would operate), whether the waste gas is abated, and whether any 
abatement occurs under JI or the CDM. Production shifts due to incentives from JI 
could lead to over-crediting and potential economic distortion of competition; and 
• Increase in production and venting of the product: In the worst case, the main product 
could be produced without demand, for the purpose of generating and incinerating 
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the waste gas under a crediting mechanism, and be vented to the atmosphere. In this 
case, the GHG emissions increase would be larger than the amount of credits issued, 
due to the GWP of the main products HCFC-22 and SF6. In addition, efforts to protect 
the ozone layer would be undermined in the case of HCFC-22. 
Monitoring data that would allow determining the way in which the waste gas generation 
was increased is not available. In the case of the three plants illustrated in Figure 4-1, the 
new approach towards calculating emission reductions, introduced in 2011 and 
retroactively applied as of 1 January 2010, does not monitor anymore HCFC-22 and SF6 
production. To assess whether the production or the waste generation rate increased in 
these plants, we estimate the plausible range of the waste generation rate using three 
scenarios: first, we assume that the plants would operate at their maximum HCFC-22 and 
SF6 production capacity. Information on the production capacities is provided in 
monitoring reports; the capacity did not change in the period 2010 to 2012 in any of the 
three plants. This approach provides the lower end of the possible range of the waste 
generation rate. Second, we use the annual HCFC-22 and SF6 production level projected 
in the original PDDs. And third, we correlate data from the projects with data from GHG 
inventory reports submitted by the Russian government to the UNFCCC (Russian 
Federation, 2014). In Russia, three HCFC-22 plants with a total capacity of about 44,000 
tons are reported to be operational (UNIDO & GEF, 2012). The two registered JI plants 
together have a capacity of 40,200 tons and thus make up for most of the production 
capacity in Russia. For the period 2002 to 2007, for which HCFC-22 production data is 
available from both the Russian GHG inventory and the two registered JI projects, the 
HCFC-22 production in the GHG inventory is reasonably consistent with the amount of 
HCFC-22 production reported by both plants in their revised monitoring plans under JI 
(see Figure 4-3). 
Figure 4-3 shows that the total HCFC-22 production in Russia did not substantially 
increase in 2011 and 2012 compared to previous years and was significantly lower than 
the total production capacity of 44,000 tons. Under this third approach, we assume that 
the two registered JI plants would continue to produce about 97% of the Russian 
production, as in the period 2002 to 2007. We allocate the total production to the two plants 
proportionally to their plant capacity, which is largely consistent with their historical 
production shares. 
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Figure 4-3 HCFC-22 production in Russia. The Russian GHG inventory includes data 
from three HCFC-22 production plants whereas the two registered JI projects 
include two HCFC-22 production plants. 
Figure 4-4 shows how the HFC-23 and SF6 waste generation rate developed over time, 
based on the three approaches to estimate HCFC-22 and SF6 production. The relative 
increase in the waste generation rate in Figure 4-4 is similar to the increase in absolute 
waste gas generation in Figure 4-1. Moreover, total HCFC-22 production in Russia did not 
increase substantially in 2011 and 2012 compared to previous years, except for the decline 
in 2009 which may be attributable to the economic recession in that year. This confirms 
that the increase in waste generation can largely be attributed to an increase in the waste 
generation rate. In 2012, the HFC-23 waste generation rate at HaloPolymer Perm not only 
exceeds the IPCC range of 1.5% to 4.0% but also any known values from other operating 
plants, including historical and monitored data from the 19 CDM plants located in 
developing countries (Schneider, 2011; UNFCCC, 2011). 
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Figure 4-4 HFC-23 and SF6 waste generation rates at the KCKK Polymer plant (panels 
a and b) and HFC-23 waste generation rate at the HaloPolymer Perm plant 
(panel c). For three different scenarios for HCFC-22 and SF6 production, the 
waste generation rate increases beyond historically observed levels, after the 
plant operators decided to abandon methodological safeguards to prevent 
perverse incentives. 
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In the case of SF6 abatement at HaloPolymer Perm, as illustrated in Figure 4-2, data on SF6 
production is not available for the period prior to 2008; therefore, the waste generation 
rate cannot be determined for that period. We approximate the waste generation rate 
roughly, by combining GHG inventory data for the period 1990 to 2007 with production 
data for the period 2008 to 2010. If the GHG inventory emissions were caused by the two 
plants proportionally to their production capacity, if the emissions were only caused from 
waste gas generation during production and not from handling SF6 at the production site, 
and if the plant in Figure 4-2 would have produced over the period 1990 to 2007 the same 
amount of SF6 as in the period 2008 to 2010, the waste generation rate would vary from 
0.4% to 5.8% over the period 1990 to 2007, with an average of 3.8%. This range is 
significantly lower than the rate of 16.9% reported by the plant in the period 2008 to 2010, 
which indicates that the increase in waste gas generation may be mostly attributable to an 
increase in the waste generation rate. 
Finally, we observe peaks in waste generation during some periods: HFC-23 and SF6 waste 
generation was significantly ramped up in October and November 2012 at HaloPolymer 
Perm and SF6 waste generation at KCKK Polymer peaked in the fourth quarter of 2011. A 
possible explanation could be that the further increase could enable the delivery of more 
credits as per the 1st of December delivery date commonly used for futures and other 
contracts in the carbon market. 
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Chapter 5  
Robust eligibility criteria essential for new global 
scheme to offset aviation emissions 
Abstract 
Aviation may have contributed as much as 4.9% to global radiative forcing in 2005 and its 
carbon dioxide emissions could grow by up to 360% between 2000 and 2050 (Owen, Lee, 
& Lim, 2010). In 2016, the International Civil Aviation Organization adopted a global 
scheme requiring airline operators to offset increases in carbon dioxide emissions from 
international flights above 2020 levels (ICAO, 2016a, 2017). Here we show that the scheme 
will only compensate for the emissions increase if robust criteria for the eligibility of offset 
credits are adopted. Offset supply from already implemented greenhouse gas abatement 
projects registered under the Clean Development Mechanism alone could exceed demand 
from International Civil Aviation Organization’s scheme. Most of these projects continue 
abatement even if they cannot sell offset credits. If the scheme allows airline operators the 
unlimited use of offset credits from already implemented projects, it will result in no 
notable emissions reductions beyond those that would occur anyway and neither offer 
incentives for new investments nor reward previous investments in offset projects. We 
recommend limiting the eligibility to new projects or projects that are at risk of 
discontinuing greenhouse gas abatement without further support. The findings are critical 
for negotiations under both International the Civil Aviation Organization and the Paris 
Agreement. 
 
Published as:5 
Warnecke, C., Schneider, L., Day, T., La Hoz Theuer, S., Fearnehough, H. (2019): Robust 
eligibility criteria essential for new global scheme to offset aviation emissions. Nature 
Climate Change, 9:3, 218-221, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0415-y   
                                                   
5 Note that figures and tables originally included in supplementary information were integrated in the 
main text and methods section. 
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Emissions from international civil aviation and maritime transportation are not included 
in countries’ climate change mitigation targets under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), its Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. 
Instead, the Kyoto Protocol has mandated countries to work through the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
to address these emissions. In 2010, ICAO adopted an aspirational goal of carbon-neutral 
growth, meaning that global net carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from international 
aviation should be frozen at their 2020 levels (ICAO, 2010). To pursue this goal, ICAO 
adopted the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
(CORSIA), which will complement measures to reduce emissions through technological 
and operational improvements and sustainable fuels with a mechanism for the purchase 
of offset credits to compensate for emissions (ICAO, 2016a, 2017). With an estimated 
mitigation gap of 1.6–3.7 Gton CO2 over its operational period from 2021 to 2035, CORSIA 
could constitute the single largest demand for offset credits after 2020 (ref. Healy, 2017). 
The CDM is the largest offsetting program available at present. It was established under 
the Kyoto Protocol to provide flexibility to industrialized countries in reaching their 
emission reduction targets. With the last commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ending 
in 2020, the future of the CDM is uncertain. In past years, the market for certified emission 
reductions (CERs) has been characterized by supply greatly exceeding demand, which has 
led to CER prices dropping well below €1 and a notable decline in project registration and 
CER issuance (Intercontinental Exchange, 2018; UNFCCC, 2017d). In this letter, we assess 
the environmental implications of using CERs issued for emission reductions up to 2020 
under CORSIA. 
Several factors influence the global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions outcome from using 
offset credits (Chapter 2). One important factor is that, at the time of project 
implementation, the investment in emission reductions should not have occurred in the 
absence of the incentives created by the offsetting program. This ex-ante determination of 
additionality is fundamental for achieving a climate neutral effect from offsetting. In a 
market situation where the supply of credits considerably exceeds demand, however, 
additionality at project inception, although unchanged, is not relevant for the climate 
effect of new support provided to projects that have made their investments already. 
Instead, a key consideration for the global GHG emissions effect of new demand (such as 
from CORSIA) is whether the projects would continue to reduce GHG emissions even 
without CER revenues, or whether they are at risk of discontinuing GHG abatement 
without these revenues. For this reason, we do not assess whether projects were additional 
at their inception but rather analyse their current vulnerability to discontinuing GHG 
abatement, a new concept that we developed as part of this research. We focus here on 
this aspect as it has major implications for CORSIA’s climate impact, noting that other 
aspects, in particular avoiding double counting of emission reductions, are also important. 
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Projects are typically vulnerable if they have ongoing operational costs but insufficient 
financial benefits beyond CER revenues to maintain the GHG abatement or if they face 
important non-financial barriers. For example, the use of biomass for energy generation 
requires the sourcing of biomass fuels for which supply is often more expensive and less 
reliable than for fossil fuels. Some biomass projects are at high risk of discontinuing GHG 
abatement because the sourcing of biomass is only economically viable with ongoing 
financial support. Some projects may also face non-financial barriers that could make the 
project vulnerable to discontinuation without continued CDM support; for example, if 
technical support provided through CDM intermediaries is no longer provided. In 
contrast, projects are typically non-vulnerable if ongoing alternative revenues or cost 
savings exceed ongoing operational expenditures once initial costs for project 
implementation have been sunk, or the dismantling of the project may incur larger costs 
than its continued operation. Once implemented, these projects have economic incentives 
to continue GHG abatement, with or without CER revenues. Projects also might continue 
GHG abatement because new policies promote or require continuation or because 
discontinuation is technically not viable. 
In a market situation where supply greatly exceeds demand, creating new demand for 
offset credits (such as through CORSIA) would not lead to further emission reductions if 
it is served by non-vulnerable projects. Here we show that this risk is material if all types 
of CER were eligible for use under CORSIA because (1) the CER supply potential exceeds 
the demand from CORSIA, (2) most CDM projects are not vulnerable to discontinuing 
GHG abatement without CER revenues and (3) these projects can supply offset credits at 
lower costs than vulnerable projects. 
To estimate the CER supply potential, we develop a new methodology that – in contrast 
to previous estimates (Rob Bailis, Broekhoff, & Lee, 2016; Cames et al., 2017; IGES, 2017; 
Warnecke, Day, & Tewari, 2015; World Bank, Ecofys, & Vivd Economics, 2016) – evaluates 
the actual status and operational conditions of CDM projects, in particular through an 
extensive survey of more than 1,300 projects, and CDM regulatory requirements that 
could limit the ability of projects to issue CERs (Methods). The survey results show that 
97% of the registered CDM projects were implemented, of which 90% (87% of the total 
registered) continue the operation of their GHG abatement activities, despite limited or no 
financial support from CER revenues (Table 5-1). Drawing upon this data, as well as other 
information (Schneider & Cames, 2014; UNFCCC, 2017d), the supply potential from the 
over 8,000 registered projects and ‘programmes of activities’ is estimated to be about 
4.65 × 109 CERs for the period 2013–2020 (Table 5-2). In contrast, the current demand for 
CERs—including recognition of CERs under emissions trading systems and carbon taxes, 
national and multilateral purchase programs, and voluntary offsetting—is estimated to 
amount to up to 600 × 106 over the same period (European Commission, 2018b; Hamrick 
& Gallant, 2017; ICAP, 2018; UNFCCC, 2016, 2017c). The remaining supply potential 
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(about 4 × 109) thus exceeds the demand from CORSIA of 1.6–3.7 × 109 offset credits (Healy, 
Van Velzen, Graichen, & Graichen, 2017), even if no other offsetting programs were 
eligible to supply credits and if no CERs were issued for emission reductions occurring 
after 2020. 
Table 5-1 Status of projects by project type 
Project type Share of 
projects that 
were 
implemented(a) 
Share of 
implemented 
projects that 
continue 
abatement(b) 
Share of 
implemented and 
abating projects 
that have a CDM 
monitoring system 
in place(c) 
Biomass energy: Agriculture and forestry residues 95% 82% 83% 
Biomass energy: Bagasse power 97% 68% 29% 
Biomass energy: Palm oil solid waste 100% 83% 50% 
Cement: Clinker 100% 81% 100% 
Coal mine methane 100% 91% 67% 
Energy efficiency: Household stoves 83% 100% 83% 
Energy efficiency: Household lighting 68% 83% 96% 
Energy efficiency: Industry 94% 87% 66% 
Energy efficiency: Coke oven gas / iron & steel heat 99% 88% 81% 
Energy efficiency: Cement heat 100% 100% 100% 
Fossil fuel switch: Oil to natural gas 100% 87% 80% 
Fossil fuel switch: New natural gas plant 100% 81% 87% 
Micro hydropower (<2 MW) 97% 71% 77% 
Hydropower (2-20 MW) 98% 99% 95% 
Landfill gas: Flaring 85% 62% 82% 
Landfill gas: Power generation 93% 79% 83% 
Methane avoidance: Flaring 98% 36% 73% 
Methane avoidance: Power generation 96% 79% 75% 
Methane avoidance: Composting 70% 69% 81% 
Methane avoidance: Domestic manure 94% 94% 100% 
N2O abatement from adipic acid production 100% 100% 50% 
N2O abatement from nitric acid production 100% 49% 93% 
HFC-23 abatement from HCFC-22 production 100% 69% 77% 
Solar photovoltaic 97% 99% 76% 
Solar water heating 100% 59% 100% 
Wind power 99% 98% 95% 
Global average 97% 90% 89% 
Data derived from a survey with a sample size of 1,310 CDM projects. The table summarizes the 
survey results by project type for the questions 3, 5 and 9 on the project status (see methods section). 
(a) The share has been determined based on the following answers to question 3: "Fully 
implemented", "Implementation / construction started", "Investment decision made", "Dismantling 
of project activity". (b) The share has been determined based on the following answers to question 
5: "in regular operation" and "No CDM-conformant operation, alternative GHG mitigation 
equipment operating". (c) The share has been determined based on the following answers to 
question 9: "implemented and operational". The answer "I don't know" was excluded from all 
totals. 
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Table 5-2 Factors contributing to a lower CER supply potential than the emission 
reductions anticipated in project design documents 
 Billion CERs % 
Ex-ante estimates in project design documents 7.67  
Contribution of different limitations -3.01 100% 
Lower actual issuance -1.90 63% 
Non-implementation of projects -0.10 3% 
Non-continuation of GHG abatement -0.42 14% 
Availability of data to monitor emission 
reductions 
-0.33 11% 
No administrative steps taken in time 
to renew the crediting period 
-0.27 9% 
CER supply potential 4.65  
To assess the extent to which CDM projects are vulnerable to discontinuing GHG 
abatement, we first systematically classify projects according to their likelihood of 
(dis)continuing GHG abatement without further support. This is done on the basis of an 
evaluation of applicable policies and laws, as well as economic and other conditions of 
projects in different countries (Methods). In a second step, we apply this vulnerability 
classification to the CER supply potential. Figure 5-1 shows the results in relation to the 
CER supply potential. About 3.8 × 109 CERs, or 82% of the total CER supply potential, stem 
from project types that typically have a low vulnerability to discontinuing GHG 
abatement. While many of these projects currently do not issue CERs, most could resume 
CER issuance if they had enough incentives to do so. For another 13%, the vulnerability is 
variable, depending on the specific circumstances of the project. Only about 
170 × 106 CERs, or 4% of the CER supply potential, are from project types that typically 
have a high vulnerability to discontinuing GHG abatement and that still report to be 
operational or could resume operations. The estimated CER supply potential from 
vulnerable project types is not only small because of the market share of vulnerable project 
types but also since many vulnerable projects already discontinued GHG abatement due 
to their vulnerability. We estimate that their share would otherwise be about twice as high. 
Additionally, some projects are not vulnerable anymore because domestic policies 
provide incentives or require their continued abatement. 
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Figure 5-1 CER supply potential for the period 2013–2020 by major project types and 
vulnerability to discontinuing GHG abatement. The main circle clusters the 
vulnerability of projects by major project types (see also Table 5-3). Some 
project types are further subdivided (outer circle) to show results for specific 
countries and project sub-types, where available. For methods and 
calculations, refer to Methods (CMM,  coal mine methane; IPP,  independent 
power producer; HFCs,  hydrofluorocarbons). 
  
LETTERS NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
policies promote or require continuation or because disc ntinuation is 
technically not viable.
In a market situation where supply greatly exceeds demand, 
creating new demand for offset credits (such as through CORSIA) 
would not lead to further emission reductions if it is served by non-
vulnerable projects. Here we show that this risk is material if all 
types of CERs were eligible for use under CORSIA because (1) the 
CER supply potential exceeds the demand from CORSIA, (2) most 
CDM projects are not vulnerable to discontinuing GHG abatement 
without CER revenues and (3) these projects can supply offset cred-
its at lower costs than vulnerable projects.
To estimate the CER supply potential, we develop a new method-
ology that (in contrast to previous estimates9–13) evaluates the actual 
status and operational conditions of CDM projects, in particular 
through an extensive survey of more than 1,300 projects, as well as 
CDM regulatory requirements that could limit the ability of proj-
ects to issue CERs (Methods). The survey results show that 97% of 
the registered CDM projects were implemented, of which 90% (87% 
of the total registered) continue the operation of their GHG abate-
ment activities, despite limited or no financial support from CER 
revenues (Supplementary Table 1). Drawing upon this data, as well 
as other information6,14, the supply potential from the over 8,000 reg-
istered projects and programmes of activities is estimated to be about 
4.65 × 109 CERs for the period 2013–2020 (Supplementary Table 2). 
In contrast, the current demand for CERs—including recognition 
of CERs under emissions trading systems and carbon taxes, national 
and multilateral purchase programmes, and voluntary offsetting—is 
estimated to amount to up to 600 × 106 over the same period15–19. The 
remaining supply potential (about 4 × 109) thus exceeds the demand 
from CORSIA of 1.6–3.7 × 109 offset credits5, even if no other offset-
ting programmes were eligible to supply credits and if no CERs were 
issued for emission reductions occurring after 2020.
To assess the extent to which CDM projects are vulnerable to dis-
continuing GHG abatement, we first systematically classify projects 
according to their likelihood of (dis)continuing GHG abatement 
without further support. This is done on the basis of an evaluation 
of applicable policies and laws, as well as economic and other condi-
tions of projects in different countries (Methods). In a second step, 
we apply this vulnerability classification to the CER supply potential. 
Figure 1 shows the results in relation to the CER supply potential. 
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Table 5-3 Overview of vulnerability to discontinuing GHG abatement for assessed 
project types 
  
Project type and sub-type Project vulnerability 
Biomass energy: Use of biomass-based fuels, 
such as agricultural and forestry residues, 
biogas and biodiesel, for energy generation 
Variable according to subtype and local conditions 
Bagasse power Low: Usually a low risk activity due to the highly 
positive economic conditions from the utilisation or sale 
of electricity to the grid (e.g. detailed analysis confirms 
this case for projects in India and Brazil).  
Biomass independent power producers 
(IPPs) and captive biomass energy 
Variable: Highly variable depending upon local market 
conditions for biomass and grid connectivity regulation. 
High vulnerability in some areas of India due to 
competition for biomass and the unreliable biomass 
supply; low vulnerability in Thailand. 
Coal mine / bed methane: Treatment and/or 
utilisation of methane from coal mines, 
including ventilation air methane 
Low: Financial benefits for power generation from 
methane utilisation often exceed operating 
expenditures. 
EE households: Lighting, stoves and 
appliances 
Variable according to subtype and local conditions 
Lighting Low: Despite disengagement of project owners, 
regulations often require continued use of lightbulbs 
(e.g. Mexico), whilst decreasing costs and increasing 
awareness of benefits makes their continued use likely 
even in the absence of regulation (e.g. Pakistan and 
India). 
Cooking stoves High: Disengagement of third party project owners. 
Barriers related to the affordability of new stoves, 
knowledge of benefits and cultural preferences may 
prevent continued use despite potentially being 
economically beneficial for owners. 
EE industry: Efficiency improvement in 
industrial plant processes 
Low: Significant cost savings with no or low additional 
OPEX 
EE own generation: Use of process wastes 
for heat or energy generation 
Low: Significant cost savings with no or low additional 
OPEX 
EE supply side: Efficiency improvements of 
existing energy generation facilities incl. 
fossil fuel plants, cogeneration and 
combined cycle projects 
Low: Significant cost savings with no or low additional 
OPEX 
Forests  
Afforestation, reforestation, mangroves and 
agroforestry 
Variable according to capacity of owner and local 
legislation 
Fossil fuel switch: New natural gas plants 
and switch from oil to natural gas 
Variable according to project subtype and global fuel 
markets 
Fugitive: Treatment of fugitive gases from 
oil and gas production 
Variable according to project subtype 
Geothermal Low: Significant revenues and very low OPEX 
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To assess the costs of supplying CERs, we derive a supply curve for the identified CER 
supply potential. For each CDM project we estimate the marginal cost of supplying CERs 
from today’s perspective, using various data sources and taking into account the project 
type, the country it is located in and our vulnerability classification. We assume that 
projects with low vulnerability have to cover only ongoing CDM transaction costs, 
whereas projects with high vulnerability must also cover their marginal GHG abatement 
costs (Methods). 
Project type and sub-type Project vulnerability 
HFCs: Treatment of HFC23 waste gases  
HFC23 in China and India Low due to domestic policies to incentivize abatement 
HFC23 in other countries High: OPEX incurred yet no significant financial 
benefits. Uncertain when emissions will be addressed 
under the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. 
Hydro  Low: Significant revenues and very low OPEX 
Landfill gas: Treatment of landfill gas and 
municipal solid waste including flaring and 
power generation activities 
Variable according to subtype and local conditions 
Methane avoidance: Avoidance, treatment 
and utilisation of methane from manure, 
wastewater, palm oil waste and composting 
Variable according to subtype and utilisation of wastes 
and methane 
Commercial livestock manure management Variable: Continuation is economically rational in the 
absence of barriers. Low vulnerability in Thailand. High 
vulnerability in Mexico and Brazil, where farmers do 
not have capacities to continue in the absence of third 
party project owners. 
Waste water Low: Revenues and cost savings from energy 
generation greater than operating expenditures. 
Common practice in India, Malaysia and Thailand, even 
outside of CDM. 
Palm oil solid waste composting Variable across local regions, depending on the 
maturity of the market for alternative uses of palm oil 
processing residues 
N2O: Decomposition of N2O from nitric and 
adipic acid production 
 
N2O in South Korea and Brazil Low: Specific situation for projects in these countries 
understood 
N2O in other countries High: Incurs OPEX but no or very low financial benefits 
PFCs+SF6: Avoidance, treatment or recycling 
PFC and SF6 gases 
Low (AM78) - High (AM35/65): No revenues but 
additional OPEX for projects using methodologies 
AM35/AM65 
Solar: Solar PV, solar thermal and solar 
water heating 
Low: Non-CER revenues usually greater than OPEX 
Wind  Low: Significant revenues and very low operating 
expenditures 
Other project types Unknown vulnerability 
Chapter 5 Robust eligibility criteria essential for new global scheme to offset aviation emissions 
 77 
 
Figure 5-2 Marginal costs of supplying CERs for the period 2013–2020. The left part of 
the ‘base case’ curve is relatively flat because it mainly includes projects with 
low vulnerability. These projects only have to cover ongoing CDM transaction 
costs – but no marginal abatement costs – to issue CERs. The right part of the 
curve is steeper because it includes mostly projects with high or variable 
vulnerability. These projects also have to cover GHG abatement costs. The 
figure also illustrates scenarios for vintage restrictions under consideration 
for CORSIA. Please note that this figure includes only the supply from 
registered projects. 
Figure 5-2 shows that all existing registered projects could supply over 4 × 109 CERs at a 
cost below €1 (black line). Almost 3.8 × 109 (92%) of these CERs are from low vulnerability 
projects. Projects classified as having high or variable vulnerability have higher costs of 
generating CERs (green line). If all CERs were eligible, the new demand from CORSIA 
would mostly be served by projects with low vulnerability. In consequence, the scheme 
may not achieve notable emission reductions beyond those that would occur without it. A 
further implication of this analysis is that CER prices would probably remain low. The 
sale of CERs would not generate substantial financial returns for project owners and host 
countries, beyond the transaction costs for verifying emission reduction and issuing CERs; 
as such, CORSIA would neither provide support for vulnerable projects, nor offer 
incentives to develop new projects. 
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About 3.8 × 109 CERs, or 82% of th  total CER supply potential, stem 
fr m project typ s that typically have a low vul erability to discon-
tinuing GHG abate ent. While man  of t ese projects currently do 
not issue CERs, most could resume CER issuance if they had enough 
incentives to do so. For another 13%, the vulnerability is variable, 
depending on the specific circumstances of the project. Only about 
170 × 106 CERs, or 4% of the CER supply potential, are from project 
types that typically have a high vulnerability to discontinuing GHG 
abatement and that still report to be operational or could resume 
operations. The estimated CER supply potential from vulnerable 
project types is not only small because of the market share of vulner-
able project types but also since many vulnerable projects already 
discontinued GHG abatement due to their vulnerability. We estimate 
that their share would otherwise be about twice as high. Additionally, 
some projects are not vulnerable anymore because domestic policies 
provide incentives or require their continued abatement.
To assess the costs of supplying CERs, we derive a supply curve for 
the identified CER supply potential. For each CDM project we esti-
mate the marginal cost of supplying CERs from today’s perspective, 
using various data sources and taking into account the project type, 
the country it is located in and our vulnerability classification. We 
assume that projects with low vulnerability have to cover only ongo-
ing CDM transaction costs, whereas projects with high vulnerability 
must also cover their marginal GHG abatement costs (Methods).
Figure 2 shows that all existing registered projects could supply 
over 4 × 109 CERs at a cost below €1 (black line). Almost 3.8 × 109 
(92%) of these CERs are from low vulnerability projects. Projects 
classified as having high or variable vulnerability have higher costs 
of generating CERs (green line). If all CERs were eligible, the new 
demand from CORSIA would mostly be served by projects with 
low vulnerability. In consequence, the scheme may not achieve 
significant.
m
 emission reductions beyond those that would occur 
without it. A further implication of this analysis is that CER prices 
would probably remain low. The sale of CERs would not generate 
significant financial returns for project owners and host countries, 
beyond the transaction costs for verifying emission reduction and 
issuing CERs; as such, CORSIA would neither provide support for 
vulnerable projects, nor offer incentives to develop new projects.
Q5
To address these risks, we recommend that ICAO restricts the 
types of offset credits that are eligible under the scheme to:
t Projects that are newly developed in response to CORSIA.
t Implemented projects that are vulnerable to discontinuing GHG 
abatement.
New projects could be promoted through ‘vintage’ restrictions, 
as envisaged under CORSIA2 and proposed by some Parties20; for 
example, by limiting eligibility to projects where the investment 
decision was made after the adoption of CORSIA or after the 
approval of the offsetting programme by ICAO. Vulnerable projects 
could be promoted by limiting eligibility to a list of project types 
that typically have a high vulnerability to discontinuing GHG abate-
ment (see Supplementary Table 3 for our assessment).
Figure  2 shows the implications of these and other pos-
sible restrictions on the potential and costs of supplying CERs. 
Restricting eligibility to projects classified as having a high or vari-
able vulnerability to discontinuing GHG abatement would reduce 
the potential supply to about 770 × 106 CERs. With regard to vin-
tage restrictions, alongside limiting eligibility to new projects, pol-
icy makers are also considering restrictions on the basis of recently 
implemented projects or the timing of the emission reductions. 
The figure shows that limiting eligibility to projects with an invest-
ment decision date on or after 1 January 2013 (blue line) would 
lower the supply potential considerably, to about 120 × 106 CERs. 
Restricting the supply potential to CERs from emission reductions 
that occurred on or after 1 January 2016 (purple line) would not 
be effective to ensure that CORSIA would trigger further emission 
reductions, as this would still provide for a large supply potential 
from projects with low vulnerability. Policy makers are also con-
sidering restrictions on the basis of the date of registration. Such 
restrictions would also not be effective, since there is a large port-
folio of projects that were developed before 2013 and that took 
administrative steps which secured their right to register under the 
CDM any time in the future6.
To conclude, our analysis shows that establishing robust eli-
gibility criteria is essential for CORSIA to achieve its objective of 
carbon-neutral growth. While these findings are critical for the 
ongoing negotiations of the rules for CORSIA, they are also relevant 
for other regimes, including domestic carbon pricing schemes that 
allow the use of offset credits, a possible future mechanism under 
IMO to offset emissions from international maritime transporta-
tion, and the Paris Agreement. Some countries proposed that CERs 
(and other Kyoto units) be eligible to achieve nationally determined 
contributions after 2020 (ref. 21). This could likewise undermine 
mitigation efforts under the Paris Agreement. We therefore recom-
mend that policy makers, when establishing new sources of demand 
for offset credits, restrict the eligibility to new projects that are 
developed in direct response to the new demand and/or to existing 
projects that are vulnerable of discontinuing GHG abatement.
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To address these risks, we recommend that ICAO restricts the types of offset credits that 
are eligible under the scheme to: 
• Projects that are newly developed in response to CORSIA; and 
• Implemented projects that are vulnerable to discontinuing GHG abatement. 
New projects could be promoted through ‘vintage’ restrictions, as envisaged under 
CORSIA (ICAO, 2016a) and proposed by some Parties (European Commission, 2018a); for 
example, by limiting eligibility to projects where the investment decision was made after 
the adoption of CORSIA or after the approval of the offsetting program by ICAO. 
Vulnerable projects could be promoted by limiting eligibility to a list of project types that 
typically have a high vulnerability to discontinuing GHG abatement (see Table 5-3 for our 
assessment). 
Figure 5-2 shows the implications of these and other possible restrictions on the potential 
and costs of supplying CERs. Restricting eligibility to projects classified as having a high 
or variable vulnerability to discontinuing GHG abatement would reduce the potential 
supply to about 770 × 106 CERs. With regard to vintage restrictions, alongside limiting 
eligibility to new projects, policy makers are also considering restrictions on the basis of 
recently implemented projects or the timing of the emission reductions. The figure shows 
that limiting eligibility to projects with an investment decision date on or after 1 January 
2013 (blue line) would lower the supply potential considerably, to about 120 × 106 CERs. 
Restricting the supply potential to CERs from emission reductions that occurred on or 
after 1 January 2016 (purple line) would not be effective to ensure that CORSIA would 
trigger further emission reductions, as this would still provide for a large supply potential 
from projects with low vulnerability. Policy makers are also considering restrictions on 
the basis of the date of registration. Such restrictions would also not be effective, since 
there is a large portfolio of projects that were developed before 2013 and that took 
administrative steps which secured their right to register under the CDM any time in the 
future (UNFCCC, 2017d). 
To conclude, our analysis shows that establishing robust eligibility criteria is essential for 
CORSIA to achieve its objective of carbon-neutral growth. While these findings are critical 
for the ongoing negotiations of the rules for CORSIA, they are also relevant for other 
regimes, including domestic carbon pricing schemes that allow the use of offset credits, a 
possible future mechanism under IMO to offset emissions from international maritime 
transportation, and the Paris Agreement. Some countries proposed that CERs (and other 
Kyoto units) be eligible to achieve nationally determined contributions after 2020 (ref. 
UNFCCC, 2018). This could likewise undermine mitigation efforts under the Paris 
Agreement. We therefore recommend that policy makers, when establishing new sources 
of demand for offset credits, restrict the eligibility to new projects that are developed in 
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direct response to the new demand and/or to existing projects that are vulnerable to 
discontinuing GHG abatement. 
Methods 
CER supply potential. The methodology applied to estimate the CER supply potential 
from each of the over 8,000 registered CDM projects and programmes of activities 
combines information from individual projects with information on project types and host 
country level, where available. Official information on CDM projects and their expected 
emission reductions is drawn from a UNFCCC database (UNFCCC, 2017d). The CER 
supply potential is estimated for emission reductions occurring from 1 January 2013 to 31 
December 2020, noting that CERs from emission reductions up to 2012 are unlikely to be 
eligible under CORSIA. For periods for which CERs have already been issued, UNFCCC 
data on the actual issuance is used (UNFCCC, 2017d). For programmes of activities, we 
determine the CER supply potential by aggregating information from all individual 
component project activities (CPAs) that have been included in the programmes of 
activities. We use the data available as of 12 April 2017. 
Under current CDM rules, project owners can issue CERs from past emission reductions 
at any time in the future, subject to four constraints that can affect the amount of and the 
period for which CERs can be issued: 
1. Technical implementation and operation status: Initial implementation and subsequent 
operation of projects is a key prerequisite for issuing CERs. Through our survey on the 
status and prospects of CDM projects we generate a unique database with project 
information not available at UNFCCC level. The survey gathers information on the 
implementation and operational status of GHG abatement activities and the 
operational status of CDM monitoring systems (Table 5-1). For industrial gas projects, 
we use data from a study that provides project-specific estimates of the emission 
reduction volume (Schneider & Cames, 2014). These estimates consider the plant-
specific performance and the effect of changes to methodologies at the renewal of a 
crediting period; 
2. Crediting periods: CDM project participants can choose between a fixed or a renewable 
crediting period. In principle, projects with renewable crediting periods can generate 
CERs for 3 times 7 instead of 10 years but administrative steps for renewal of crediting 
periods have to be taken 180 days before the previous crediting period ends. If these 
steps are not taken in time, CERs cannot be issued for a certain period (UNFCCC, 
2017b, 2017a). Our analysis of UNFCCC data (UNFCCC, 2017d) shows that more than 
1,000 projects have not taken these steps in time, most probably due to the current 
market situation. The renewal of crediting periods might require an update of the 
methodological approaches and data used to calculate emission reductions, which in 
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some instances can notably alter the amount of CERs in subsequent crediting periods. 
We identify for each project the duration of crediting periods and how CDM 
requirements for crediting period renewal affect the project’s ability to issue CERs; 
3. Availability of data to monitor emission reductions: Monitoring emission reductions is a 
further prerequisite for issuing CERs (UNFCCC, 2017b, 2017a). In the current market 
situation, many projects continue monitoring emission reductions but do not issue 
CERs, whereas others have stopped collecting data for CDM monitoring purposes. We 
assess which projects typically continue collecting relevant monitoring data and how 
CDM monitoring requirements affect their ability to issue CERs. UNFCCC data is used 
if projects have recently issued CERs, confirming an operational monitoring system. 
For projects without issuance activities, we use our own survey data about the 
operational status of CDM monitoring systems (Table 5-1); and 
4. Project performance: For many projects, the actual issuance of CERs differs from the 
amount expected when registering the project. This can have various reasons, 
including technical operation problems, management problems, or unanticipated 
availability of resources, such as a lower water availability for a hydropower plant or 
a lower methane generation from a landfill. The performance varies considerably 
between different types of projects. We therefore use UNFCCC data to evaluate the 
actual project performance of different project types and adjust the estimates of the 
CER supply accordingly (UNFCCC, 2017d). 
Figure 5-3 presents the methodology used to assess whether and for which time period 
projects can issue CERs. The flow chart identifies nine circumstances (questions 1 to 9) that 
can affect the ability to issue CERs over time and seven possible outcomes (A to G) for the 
period for which CERs can be issued. Key aspects that determine the ability to issue CERs 
include the continuation of GHG abatement or the possibility to resume abatement, the 
availability of monitoring data and CDM requirements governing the renewable of the 
crediting period. Important technical aspects are whether non-implemented projects could 
still be implemented with appropriate incentives (question 9) and whether projects that 
discontinued GHG abatement could be resumed (question 6). In the last case, several CDM 
requirements come into play, which partially differ between projects and programmes of 
activities, such as with regards to the requirements to continuously monitor emission 
reductions (question 4) and whether administrative steps to renew the crediting period 
have been undertaken (question 5) (UNFCCC, 2017b, 2017a). In several instances, issuance 
is temporarily not possible but could be resumed at a future point in time. We assume that 
these projects could re-start issuing CERs for emission reductions generated as of 
1 January 2019. 
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Figure 5-3 Methodological approach to assess the time period for which projects can 
issue CERs 
In some instances, we have sufficient information to clearly answer a question in Figure 
5-3 at the level of an individual project. In other instances, we have information and data 
at aggregated levels, such as information from our survey. In these cases, we use the 
survey results to assign probabilities to certain answers. For example, if the survey data 
indicate that 80% of biomass projects have ever been implemented (question 1), 80% of the 
CER potential from a biomass project would be carried forward to question 2 and 20% to 
question 9. The outcome for individual projects is thus a probability distribution across 
the eight possible outcomes that is used to calculate the CER supply potential of each 
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individual project over time. Table 5-2 summarizes how the different conditions of 
projects lower the potential of the CER supply, as compared to the emission reductions 
expected in project design documents. 
Vulnerability of projects to discontinuing GHG abatement. In this letter, we 
differentiate CDM projects on the basis of their vulnerability to discontinue GHG 
abatement without ongoing support. The underlying methodology to assess the likelihood 
of project continuation evaluates the projects’ conditions in a systematic step-wise process 
(Figure 5-4). The following aspects are considered: 
• Applicable laws and regulations: Laws and regulations in host countries might directly 
affect whether a project continues GHG abatement. They could explicitly require the 
continuation of the project or outlaw other practices which might cause the 
continuation of GHG abatement to be the only feasible option; 
• Economic benefits and costs: In the absence of CER revenues, the continuation of GHG 
abatement is heavily influenced by the net financial flows that occur as a result of the 
project’s continued operation, compared to discontinuing operation. Such flows 
include operational expenditures and financial benefits such as revenues or cost 
savings generated through the project’s outputs. Only costs incurred in the future are 
relevant; past costs such as upfront capital expenditure are not considered as they are 
not relevant for the decision whether or not to continue project operation. It is assumed 
that, in the case of bankruptcy due to the loss of CER revenues, a liquidator would 
continue operation if this generates positive cash flows as compared to discontinuing 
operation; and 
• Barriers and other conditions: Non-financial barriers or other conditions might also affect 
the continuation of GHG abatement. The continuation (or an alternative scenario to the 
continuation) might not be feasible, even if it results in positive net cash flows. This 
could, for example, be due to situations where the financial benefits are accrued by 
different entities than the operators of the project or where cultural preferences or 
information deficits prevent an economically attractive course of action from 
continuing without the support from CER revenues. 
In a first step, the methodology is applied to 18 different project types, considering their 
typical conditions, rather than to individual projects (main circle in Figure 5-1; Table 5-3). 
In a second step, a more detailed assessment is conducted for some project types and some 
individual projects, considering the situation of specific project sub-types and specific host 
countries for which information is available. This includes biomass, N2O, HFCs, 
households and methane avoidance (outer circle in Figure 5-1; Table 5-3). 
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Figure 5-4 Decision chart used for the assessment of the risk that different CDM 
project types discontinue GHG abatement 
On the basis of this assessment, we classify different project types as follows (Table 5-3): 
• High vulnerability: The majority of projects within the project type discontinue GHG 
abatement without CER revenues or alternative support; 
• Low vulnerability: The majority of projects within the project type continue GHG 
abatement even without CER revenues or alternative support; 
• Variable vulnerability: The conditions for continuing GHG abatement are variable across 
projects due to a high dependence on local conditions or specific circumstances of 
individual projects, such that a generalized classification of project vulnerability is not 
possible; and 
• Unknown vulnerability: The discontinuation risk of the project type has not been 
assessed. 
Survey on the status and prospects of CDM projects. Information from a comprehensive 
survey on the status and prospects of registered CDM projects is used for several 
components of our research, including aspects of the project vulnerability evaluation and 
the evaluation of the ability and the marginal costs of specific projects to issue CERs, as 
described in other methodology sub-sections. The survey was conducted in 2014. 
Of the 32 questions assessed in the survey, the results for the following fixed multiple-
choice questions were used in various parts of this research: 
Cont. scenario 1
Identify 
continuation and 
discontinuation 
scenarios
1
Assess applicable 
laws and regulations
2
Assess financial 
benefits and costs
3
Assess whether 
barriers prevent 
scenarios
4
Discont. scenario 1
Cont. scenario 2
Discont. scenario 2
Discont. scenario 3
Discont. scenario 4
Remove scenarios 
that could not be 
pursued due to 
applicable laws and 
regulations
Rank scenarios 
according to the 
attractiveness of the 
economic 
conditions
Remove scenarios 
that are prevented 
by barriers
Determine the most 
likely project 
scenario
Result
The highest ranked 
remaining scenario 
is the likely course 
of action
Discont. scenario 2
Discont. scenario 4
Discont. scenario 1
Cont. scenario 2
Discont. scenario 3
Cont. scenario 1
Cont. scenario 2
Discont. scenario 1
Discont. scenario 3
Cont. scenario 1
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• Question 3. What is the current technical implementation status of the CDM GHG 
mitigation activity? 
• Question 5. What is the current operational status of the CDM component of the GHG 
mitigation activity? 
• Question 9. What is the implementation status of the CDM monitoring system 
(measurements required for the CDM  only)? 
• Question 22. What CER price level is required by the project to continue verification 
and issuance activities? 
• Question 23. What is your best estimate on the total costs per verification and issuance 
cycle until successful CER issuance is achieved (for example costs for verifier, internal 
labour costs)? 
The results of questions 3, 5 and 9 are summarized in Table 5-1. 
The scope for the survey is defined as all 7,338 registered CDM projects with a registration 
date by 31 December 2012. The sampled population within this scope is defined by 
focusing on specific countries and project types to allow for a good representation of the 
largest participants in addition to some smaller countries and a good representation of all 
regions. To facilitate the inclusion of under-represented regions, some selected countries 
have been grouped together and were sampled and analysed at the regional level. A 
similar approach for project types selection is applied, leading to a representation of 
largest and smaller scale project types. Programmes of activities were considered as 
normal CDM projects for the analysis. This leads to specific combinations of countries and 
project types included in the analysis, representing over 77% of the total CDM project 
population as per the above-defined scope (Table 5-4). 
A stratified sampling exercise was conducted to sample sufficient projects from each host 
country and project type combination to return a maximum error margin of 20% at this 
sub-strata level, with the results then weighted appropriately for analysis at the primary 
strata and population levels. Disproportional stratified sampling is applied to gain an 
accurate representation of all sub-strata that cover a broad range of different numbers of 
projects while at the same time resource constraints predetermine the overall sample size. 
This resulted in a total sample size of 1,310 projects. This sample size returned a 
considerably improved error margin of around 10% at the primary strata level (specific 
host countries or project types), and 6% at the population level. For questions 3 and 5, an 
82.1% response rate from the sample was achieved, allowing for an estimated error margin 
of 7%. For question 9, the response rate was 66.3% with a 9% error margin. For questions 
22 and 23, the response rate was 44.7% and 40.2% respectively, with an error margin of 
11%. 
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Table 5-4 Total number of registered CDM projects per selected project type and 
country combinations 
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Brazil 16 27       2  6   41 23 15 60 3 1  1 4  1  51 251 
Chile 8            2 21 11 4 6 1    3  7  18 81 
China 131 2  5 60 4 15 4 78 106 1 20 3 745 1 62 19 40  30 2 44 11 138 1 1487 3009 
Colombia 2 1         1   9 13 3 1 3 1   2    1 37 
India 182 49 3 13  30 33 58 46 5 6 13 9 93  3 5 12 1 9  8 5 81 7 573 1244 
Indonesia 7  7 1    5  1  4 2 12 6 3 18 44 9   2     121 
Israel 1       1   1    2 5 1 2    4  7  2 26 
Malaysia 9  29     3    1 1 3 3 6 20 36 27        138 
Mexico 6     1 1 4 1     4 9 15 66 33    1 1   28 170 
Peru 1 1         1  3 27 3 1 1 1      5  1 45 
S. Africa 3     1 3 2 4     3 1 6  3    5  7 5 12 55 
S. Korea           4  4 11  5  1   1 4 1 32 1 13 77 
Thailand 16 3 3       3    2  6 4 65      26  3 131 
Vietnam 7 1     1 1  1   2 129 1 2 4 16  1     1 5 172 
C. America 4 2 2   1       5 28 1 2  11 1       11 68 
SS Africa 1 2    5 6       7 1     3    1  5 31 
TOTAL 394 88 44 19 60 42 59 78 131 116 20 38 31 1135 75 138 205 271 40 43 4 77 18 305 15 2210 5656 
The sampled projects were evaluated through a combination of online surveys, emails, 
telephone calls and in-person interviews. Project owners were the source of information 
for 47% of projects assessed, CDM project developers for 24% and CER buyers for 12%; 
information for the remaining 17% of projects was obtained from CDM consultants, 
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) and Designated National Authorities (DNAs). 
We evaluated whether respondents might have misrepresented their projects. A 
comparison of the responses for the operational status of projects from different 
respondent groups shows similar results and thus does not indicate such incentives for a 
specific respondent group. 
CER supply curve. The CER supply curve in Figure 5-2 represents the marginal cost of 
supplying CERs from today’s perspective and reflects the number of CERs that could 
come to market at a given price level. We derive the supply curve by combining the supply 
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potential of each registered project, as described above, with estimates of its marginal 
GHG abatement costs and ongoing CDM transaction costs. To calculate this, we use 
information on the project type, the country the project is located in and our classification 
of the project’s vulnerability to discontinuing abatement. 
The ongoing CDM transaction costs include costs associated with administrative 
processes to receive CERs, such as monitoring and verification of emission reductions, 
issuance fees, and costs related to the renewal of the crediting period, where applicable. 
The main source of data for ongoing CDM transaction costs is the survey described above, 
to which we add estimates of monitoring costs for each project type (Warnecke, Klein, 
Perroy, & Tippmann, 2013). Less than 10% of the supply potential is from project types 
that are not covered by the survey; for these we use cost estimates from another source 
(Vivid Economics, 2013). For the few project types not covered by either source, we apply 
the average costs from the survey data. 
To reflect that project owners may not be ready to proceed to the issuance of CERs if they 
do not make a profit, we add a margin of €20,000 to the ongoing CDM transaction costs. 
We apply this margin only to projects that were not issued with CERs over the two-year 
period before April 2017 (the date on which we extracted the issuance data), assuming that 
projects that recently issued CERs may continue to do so without any extra margin. 
Whether such a margin is required, and which size of margin, is uncertain. A sensitivity 
analysis confirms that the overall shape of the CER supply curve does not change if the 
margin is removed or if it increased it to €50,000. We also compared the survey results on 
administrative verification and issuance costs with alternative sources and tested the 
sensitivity of using cost estimates from three alternative sources. The choice of source does 
not materially affect the results. 
For projects with a high vulnerability, we also include an estimate of their marginal GHG 
abatement costs. These include any ongoing operational costs incurred for continuing 
abatement activities, minus any revenues or cost savings earned from the project’s 
activities (for example, the sale or own use of electricity generated) excluding revenues 
from the sale of CERs. Our estimates of marginal GHG abatement costs are derived from 
responses to questions 22 and 23 of the survey described above, except for industrial gas 
projects. For industrial gas projects (HFC-23 and N2O abatement) we use detailed data for 
each individual plant derived from a comprehensive review (Schneider & Cames, 2014). 
To test the robustness of our results, we also performed a sensitivity analysis in which we 
halved the marginal GHG abatement costs derived from the survey responses. This 
changes the slope of the CER supply curves slightly, but the overall findings remain 
robust. 
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The marginal GHG abatement costs for projects with a low vulnerability to discontinuing 
GHG abatement are assumed to be zero because these projects typically continue 
operations, whether or not they are issued with CERs. In the case of project types that have 
variable vulnerability, we randomly divide the projects into three equal groups. We 
assume that one-third of the projects have a low vulnerability and one-third have a high 
vulnerability and treat these as per all other projects falling within these respective 
categories. For the third group, we assign a randomly determined share of the project’s 
full marginal GHG abatement cost, such that, on average, projects within this third group 
face half of the marginal abatement costs that they would if they were highly vulnerable. 
We derive the supply curve by sorting projects in ascending order in terms of their 
marginal cost and calculating the cumulative potential supply of CERs (eligible to the 
particular scenario) at each price level from projects whose marginal cost is equal to or 
lower than that price. 
Data availability 
Parts of the datasets generated during or analysed for this letter are available upon 
request. The data can only be made available in aggregated form and some parts of the 
data cannot be provided due to the confidential nature of the survey responses and plant-
specific data used in this letter. 
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Chapter 6  
Restricted linking of emissions trading systems: 
options, benefits, and challenges 
Abstract 
With over 17 emissions trading systems (ETSs) now in place across four continents, 
interest in linking ETSs is growing. Linking ETSs offers economic, political, and 
administrative benefits. It also faces major challenges. Linking can affect overall ambition, 
financial flows, and the location and nature of investments, reduces regulatory autonomy, 
and requires harmonization of ETS design elements. This article examines three options 
that could help overcome challenges by restricting the flow of units among jurisdictions 
through quotas, exchange rates, or discount rates. We use a simple model and three 
criteria –abatement outcome, economic implications, and feasibility –to assess these 
‘restricted linking’ options. Quotas can enhance cost-effectiveness relative to no linking 
and allow policy-makers to retain control on the extent of unit flows. Exchange rates can 
create abatement and economic benefits or unintended adverse implications for cost-
effectiveness and total abatement, depending on how rates are set. Due to information 
asymmetries between the regulated entities and policy-makers setting the exchange rate, 
as well as uncertainties about future developments, setting exchange rates in a manner 
that avoids such unintended consequences could prove difficult. Discount rates, in 
contrast, can ensure that both cost-effectiveness and total abatement are enhanced. 
Overall, restricted linking options do not achieve the benefits of full linking, but also avoid 
some major pitfalls, as well as offering levers that can be adjusted, should linking concerns 
prove to be more significant than anticipated. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Emissions trading systems (ETSs) are a widely used policy tool to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. As of February 2016, 17 distinct ETSs operated across four continents, 
with another 15 in preparation or under consideration (ICAP, 2016). The emergence of 
these new systems, the adoption of the Paris Agreement with provisions enabling 
international transfers of units, and recognition of the challenges of building a global 
carbon market have led to renewed interest in options for linking ETSs. 
Linking ETSs can yield multiple benefits, such as leading to lower overall abatement costs, 
but can also face considerable challenges, in particular if the ambition and design of ETSs 
differ (Bodansky et al., 2016; Burtraw, Palmer, Munnings, Weber, & Woerman, 2013; 
Flachsland, Marschinski, & Edenhofer, 2009b; Ranson & Stavins, 2016). These challenges 
have raised interest in restricted forms of linking, which involves the partial, conditional, 
or restricted recognition of units from another ETS (Burtraw et al., 2013; Füssler, 
Wunderlich, & Taschini, 2016; Marcu, 2015; Mehling & Görlach, 2016). 
This article explores benefits of, and challenges for, options for restricted linking of ETSs. 
We assess three restricted linking options: quotas, which restrict the amount or type of 
units from other jurisdictions that can be used for compliance; exchange rates, which adjust 
the value of units transferred between jurisdictions by a conversion factor; and discount 
rates, which also involve a conversion factor, but placing a greater value on units of the 
own jurisdiction. We use a simple representation of two ETSs in two jurisdictions with 
linear marginal abatement cost curves to compare these options with regard to three broad 
criteria: GHG abatement outcome; economic implications, including cost-effectiveness, 
abatement costs, distributional impacts, and unit liquidity and fungibility; and feasibility, 
including implementation challenges arising from setting the quota, exchange rate, or 
discount rate, and how the restricted linking options affect the regulatory autonomy of a 
jurisdiction’s decision-maker. Our comparison of these options against criteria, while not 
a fully comprehensive analysis, provides important insights into the potential 
consequences of restricted linking that are particularly timely given increased interest in 
alternatives to full linking of ETSs. 
We begin by introducing the context for linking ETSs and the rationale for considering 
restricted forms of linking, along with describing the three restricted linking options 
(Section 6.2). We then introduce the methods and criteria used to assess these options 
(Section 6.3). We assess the options by comparing them to the situation of full linking and 
no linking (Section 6.4), discuss our findings (Section 6.5), and provide conclusions 
(Section 6.6). 
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6.2 Context and overview of restricted linking of ETSs 
Linking of ETSs generally means that one ETS accepts a unit that is also used by another 
ETS as a compliance instrument. The linking of ETSs can take different forms, with three 
main dimensions (Mehling & Görlach, 2016): 
• Bilateral/multilateral: Bilateral linking involves two ETS, whereas multilateral linking 
involves multiple ETSs; 
• Direct/indirect: Direct linking implies that one ETS accepts a unit issued by another ETS, 
whereas indirect linking refers to the situation in which two ETSs both recognize a unit 
from a third system. For example, both the EU ETS and the New Zealand ETS initially 
allowed the use of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from Joint Implementation 
(JI); and 
• Full/restricted: Full linking involves the unconditional mutual recognition of units 
without any quantitative or qualitative restrictions, whereas restricted linking involves 
the partial, conditional, or restricted recognition of units from another ETS (see below). 
Full linking of ETSs can yield multiple benefits, including lower overall abatement costs, 
enhanced market liquidity, reduced price volatility, a potential reduction in carbon 
leakage risks, and reduced transaction costs. By lowering overall costs, linking can 
generate domestic support and encourage jurisdictions to adopt more ambitious targets 
(Bodansky et al., 2016; Burtraw et al., 2013; Flachsland et al., 2009b; Kachi et al., 2015; 
Ranson & Stavins, 2016). 
Full linking of ETSs also faces considerable challenges, some of which policy-makers may 
address by exploring restricted linking of ETSs. Full linking may pose challenges if key 
ETS design elements – such as the allocation of allowances; measurement, reporting, and 
verification (MRV) standards; cost containment measures (price floors or ceilings); offsets 
rules and limits – differ between ETSs based on the political and economic context. Further 
challenges to full linking include: assessing and comparing the ambition of the ETS caps 
set by the jurisdictions; the potential for a sense of reduced ambition if linking to an ETS 
that is viewed as less stringent; real or perceived loss of regulatory autonomy; unequal 
capacities among jurisdictions; and potentially competing domestic policy objectives 
(Bodansky et al., 2016; Burtraw et al., 2013; Green et al., 2014; Eric Haites, 2014; Kachi et 
al., 2015; Ranson & Stavins, 2016; Sterk, Braun, Haug, Korytarova, & Scholten, 2006; Sterk 
& Schüle, 2009; Tuerk et al., 2009). 
To the extent that designs and ambition differ among jurisdictions, linking will alter 
carbon prices and the location and extent to which long-term investment in low-carbon 
technologies and any associated co-benefits occur (Bodansky et al., 2016; Flachsland, 
Marschinski, & Edenhofer, 2009a). While in principle these shifts – from higher- to lower-
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cost emission reduction opportunities – will improve overall economic efficiency, it may 
be difficult for policy-makers to justify these shifts to constituencies that may see reduced 
investment and co-benefits or face higher allowance prices. Furthermore, linking creates 
financial transfers across jurisdictions, which can be particularly challenging if the 
direction of flow is from smaller or less affluent jurisdictions towards larger or more 
affluent ones. Jurisdictions that see a decline (increase) in allowance prices from linking 
will also see a reduction (increase) in investment in abatement activities, a decrease 
(increase) in allowance auction revenues, and a net flow of resources to (from) other 
jurisdictions. Doda & Taschini (2016) suggest that the difference in (emissions) size and 
the existence of unilateral tax distortions (e.g. a tax on allowance transactions) may affect 
otherwise mutually advantageous linking arrangements. To the extent that allowances are 
auctioned, full linking could reduce overall auction revenues across the jurisdictions. 
Where auction proceeds are already earmarked for specific uses (e.g. tax rebates or 
investments), the decline, if significant, could create a political barrier to linking. In 
addition, linking may create political uncertainty, as another jurisdiction’s future 
withdrawal could undermine the system. Some even argue that linking can create a 
potential disincentive to maintaining or increasing ambition in an individual jurisdiction 
(Helm, 2003). Given the mix of benefits, obstacles, and risks, successful linking requires 
carefully matching jurisdictions with compatible ETS designs and domestic policy 
objectives (Comendant & Taschini, 2014), and “navigating tradeoffs between efficiency 
and political feasibility” (Green et al., 2014, p. 1066). 
The challenges to full linking have increased interest in options for restricted linking that 
jurisdictions could pursue to capture some of the political, economic, and environmental 
benefits associated with linking. Restricted linking enables the flow of units among 
jurisdictions, but with specific constraints to help address concerns that linkage of not fully 
harmonized ETSs might create. While these options have been discussed in many venues, 
they have yet to be examined thoroughly in the literature. This article aims to help fill that 
gap by exploring the potential advantages and drawbacks of different restricted linking 
options. We examine three restricted linking options: 
1. Quotas, also referred to as quantity limits, restrict the amount of (specific types of) units 
from other jurisdictions that can be used for compliance. Quotas can be formulated 
and implemented in different ways. They would be typically designed to limit overall 
net imports rather than exports and could be expressed as a fraction of total compliance 
obligations that an entity can surrender;6 
                                                   
6 One-way linking, which refers to the situation in which units from one jurisdiction are recognized in 
another jurisdiction but not vice versa, could be seen as a special case of quotas where one jurisdiction 
introduces a quota of zero, whereas the other jurisdiction does not apply a quota. 
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2. Exchange rates, also referred to as trading ratios, imply that units from one jurisdiction 
can be used for compliance in another, but their value is adjusted by a conversion 
factor. Exchange rates operate in a symmetrical fashion. If an exchange rate is set such 
that two units from jurisdiction A could be used in place of one unit in jurisdiction B, 
then in jurisdiction A, one jurisdiction B unit would be worth two-jurisdiction A units. 
This symmetry creates fungibility and enables units to flow readily back and forth 
among the jurisdictions; and 
3. Discount rates could be regarded as a variation on exchange rates. They also involve a 
conversion factor, but such that more than one unit from another jurisdiction is 
required to meet a compliance obligation in the own jurisdiction, thereby placing a 
greater value on units of the own jurisdiction. While exchange rates inherently require 
a symmetrical relationship in the value of jurisdictions’ allowances, discount rates do 
not. Jurisdictions could apply one discount rate in one direction of allowance flow (e.g. 
3:1 from system A to system B) and parity (1:1) or a rate of different magnitude in the 
other direction (e.g. 2:1 from system B to system A). 
These options are not mutually exclusive, but could be combined, for example, by 
applying both quotas and discount rates to units from another ETS. Some of these options 
have already been implemented in ETSs, and others are still being explored by policy-
makers and researchers. Quotas have been applied by most ETSs with regard to offsets, 
usually with the intent of ensuring that a certain fraction of the emission reductions be 
achieved domestically by the entities regulated by the ETS. 
Perhaps most examined through the World Bank’s Globally Networked Carbon Markets 
initiative,7 the concept of exchange rates has received limited attention in the carbon 
market literature (Füssler et al., 2016; Marcu, 2015). Burtraw et al. (2013) examine the 
implications of linking the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California ETS 
with an exchange rate where three RGGI units are equivalent to one California unit. Other 
research on trading ratios mainly focused on non-uniformly mixed pollutants, such as 
sulphur or nitrogen oxides, where the ultimate damage is strongly affected by the location 
of emission (Mendelsohn, 1986). There, the case for trading ratios is clearer; in an ETS for 
local or regional air pollutants, a trading ratio can make a ton of emission reduction in a 
more populated air shed more valuable than one in a remote area, increasing both health 
benefits and economic efficiency. For carbon dioxide (CO2) and most GHGs; however, 
damage is largely unaffected by the location of emission. The nature and rationale for 
exchange rates for GHG emissions have more to do with expanding markets, improving 
liquidity, and enabling links that might not otherwise be feasible. 
                                                   
7 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/globally-networked-carbon-markets  
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Discount rates were proposed in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
commonly referred to as the Waxman-Markey bill, which stated that an entity would need 
to turn in 1.25 tons of offsets for a compliance obligation of one ton, implementing 
effectively a 20% discount rate. Similarly, France introduced a general 10% discount on 
domestic JI projects, implying that only 90% of the emission reductions be issued as ERUs. 
Existing research has focused on discount rates in the context of offset mechanisms 
(Bakker, Haug, Van Asselt, Gupta, & Saïdi, 2011; Chung, 2007; Erickson et al., 2014; 
Schneider, 2009a; Warnecke et al., 2014). 
There are also situations where jurisdictions merge or join existing ETSs, and operate with 
the same, common rules and units. Examples include Norway joining the EU ETS, or 
Northeastern US States collaborating together to form the RGGI. We consider these 
situations to be distinct from linking, where the individual systems remain distinct in 
rules, units, and administration, and thus do not examine them further here. Policy-
makers can also pursue an incremental alignment of ETSs, program elements, such as 
coverage, allocation rules, or monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) standards, but 
stopping short of mutual unit recognition. This has also been referred to as “linking by 
degrees” (Burtraw et al., 2013). 
6.3 Methods 
We assess the three restricted linking options by comparing them with the situations of no 
linking and full linking. We use three broad criteria to evaluate the merits and drawbacks 
of each option: 
1. GHG abatement outcome: We assess the GHG abatement across and within individual 
jurisdictions, given existing emissions caps. We do not consider impacts on 
environmental co-benefits, since these are highly specific to the jurisdictions’ context. 
We also do not consider how an option could encourage or discourage deeper 
reduction targets in future periods, an implication that is more difficult to assess 
without significant speculation; 
2. Economic implications: We assess the cost implications, including cost-effectiveness, 
total abatement costs across and within individual jurisdictions and distributional 
impacts, and implications for unit liquidity and fungibility. For a given abatement 
outcome, we define cost-effectiveness as the total abatement costs in both jurisdictions 
with no linking divided by the total abatement costs in both jurisdictions with 
restricted (or full) linking. In cases where a restricted linking option changes the overall 
abatement outcome, we use this changed abatement level in comparing the costs with 
no linking; to this end, we assume that the abatement under no linking would change 
in each jurisdiction proportionally to their emission reduction targets. Market liquidity 
refers to the ability to purchase or sell units without causing drastic changes in their 
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price. We assume that liquidity increases with the number of actors in the market for 
the commodity. We consider two units as fungible if they can be mutually substituted 
in place of one another when surrendering them for compliance. We do not assess 
potential macroeconomic impacts, such as effects on employment, economic growth, 
or changes in environmental co-benefits, since they strongly depend on the specific 
context of the jurisdictions and the nature of abatement options pursued or not 
pursued as the result of linkage. We also do not assess the impacts on price volatility 
and the risk of carbon leakage (i.e. the risk of production shifts between jurisdictions 
as a result of carbon markets affecting competitiveness) which depend on several 
context-specific factors, including how allowances are allocated to entities, whether 
allowance prices are reflected in the cost of products, and the extent to which barriers 
may limit the trade of products among jurisdictions; and 
3. Feasibility: The feasibility of restricted linking options depends on many aspects. We 
explore two aspects that appear particularly important and can be assessed without 
the specific context of the jurisdictions: implementation challenges arising from setting 
the quota, the exchange rate or the discount rate, and how the restricted linking options 
affect the regulatory autonomy of a jurisdiction’s decision-makers. We do not assess 
other aspects, such as how economic and environmental outcomes are perceived by 
influential actors, or the impact of linking on a jurisdiction’s emissions goals, 
investment in low-carbon technologies, abatement costs for covered entities, or 
consumer costs, and how such impacts are assessed and communicated. These aspects 
often depend on the specific political and economic context of the jurisdictions. 
We use a simple representation of two ETSs in two jurisdictions to assess the abatement 
outcome and economic implications of the restricted trading options. In our model, we 
define each jurisdiction by: (1) the total abatement under no linking, reflected by the 
difference between its emission cap and business-as-usual (BAU) emissions and (2) a 
simplified, linear marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve that represents how its cost of 
reducing emissions increases with the level of abatement. We apply this model, first for 
reference, to the cases of no linking and full linking and then to quotas, exchange rates, 
and discount rates. We assume that the two ETSs have a long-term target path below BAU 
emissions (i.e. with no over-allocation of allowances) and allow for banking of allowances, 
providing entities with a certain long-term emissions budget, and that the two ETSs do 
not have any price containment mechanisms, such as offsets, reserves, floors, caps, and/or 
triggers. It is important to note the limitations of these assumptions, the criteria, and the 
simplified model, which are further discussed in Section 6.5. For the purpose of 
illustrating the results in charts, we set the parameters of the model such that, in the 
absence of any linking, one jurisdiction has an allowance price (per ton of CO2) three times 
higher than the other, similar to the parameterization used by Burtraw et al. (2013). We 
refer alternately here to the ‘lower-price’ jurisdiction (or jurisdiction A) and the ‘higher-
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price’ jurisdiction (or jurisdiction B). The simplified model and its application are further 
described in the supplementary information to this article. 
6.4 Assessment of restricted linking options 
6.4.1 The reference cases: no linking and full linking 
The cases of no linking and full linking of ETSs create helpful reference scenarios for 
examining restricted linking options. In the absence of linking, differing emission caps and 
marginal abatement lead to different allowance prices among systems. If systems are fully 
linked, their allowance prices converge, and abatement activity would shift from the 
higher-price jurisdiction (B) towards the lower-price jurisdiction (A). 
Figure 6-1 depicts this dynamic. It shows the contribution of each jurisdiction to total 
emission reductions or abatement (the width of the x-axis). Assuming no linking, 
abatement activity in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) moves from left to right along an 
abatement cost curve (red line) until its targeted emission reductions are achieved (width 
of the red dotted line). Similarly, abatement activity in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) 
moves along its abatement cost curve (blue line), but flipped, starting from the right side 
of the chart until its targeted emission reductions are achieved (width of the blue dotted 
line). The width of the x-axis corresponds to the total emission reductions in both 
jurisdictions, with the dotted red and blue lines indicating the reductions in each 
jurisdiction under no linking. The resulting allowances prices in the two systems (pA,0 and 
pB,0) differ, as shown. 
If these systems are fully linked, the allowance prices in the two systems converge at a 
common price (pE). Entities in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) abate more emissions, while 
entities in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) abate less. A respective amount of units is 
transferred from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) to the higher-price jurisdiction (B) (green 
dotted line), with a net financial transfer from the higher-price to the lower-price 
jurisdiction (the amount of units transferred, shown by the green dotted arrow, times the 
linked-system allowance price). 
Full linking leads to several economic benefits. The primary beneficiaries of the economic 
surplus from linking are the entities covered by the ETSs. Total costs to achieve the overall 
abatement outcome are reduced, and these benefits from increased cost-effectiveness are 
shared among the two jurisdictions. While there is greater abatement in the lower-price 
jurisdiction (A), the financial transfer (by entities) from the higher-price jurisdiction (B) in 
acquiring allowances exceeds the cost of the added abatement, providing an economic 
surplus, as shown by the red shaded area in Figure 6-1. For the higher-price jurisdiction 
(B), overall costs decrease because the reduction in abatement costs exceeds the transfer 
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payment made to the lower-price jurisdiction (A), creating the economic surplus shown 
by the blue shaded area. Furthermore, full linking enhances market liquidity by increasing 
the number of allowances and actors across the linked market, creating an added 
economic benefit. The units from the two jurisdictions are fully fungible. However, full 
linking requires considerable effort to harmonize and therefore also reduces the regulatory 
autonomy of the decision-makers (see Section 6.2). 
 
Figure 6-1 Implications of no linking and full linking (simplified model) 
6.4.2 Quotas 
Quotas will only have implications if they effectively limit the transfer of allowances. This 
holds if the quota is set lower than the net allowance flow under full linking. Figure 6-2 
illustrates the implications of a quota that enables 50% of the unit transfer that would occur 
with full linking (orange lines). The quota does not affect the overall level of abatement 
across jurisdictions, but affects the level of abatement in each jurisdiction. As under full 
linking, abatement increases in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) and decreases in the 
higher-price jurisdiction (B), but to a lesser extent than under full linking. The amount of 
allowances transferred (green line) corresponds to the quota limit. 
The economic implications of a quota will tend to lie between those of no linking and full 
linking. As Figure 6-2 shows, economic gains (shaded area) per net unit transferred among 
jurisdictions decrease as one moves from no linking (where the price disparities are 
highest) towards full linking (where price disparities disappear). For example, with linear 
MAC curves, as shown in Figure 6-2, a 50% quota yields 75% of the cost-effectiveness gains 
marginal abatement lead to different allowance prices among systems. If systems are fully
linked, their allowance prices converge, and abatement activity would shift from the
higher-price jurisdiction (B) towards the lower-price jurisdiction (A).
Figure 1 depicts this dynamic. It shows the contribution of each jurisdiction to total
emission reductions or abatement (the width of the x-axis). Assuming no linking, abate-
ment activity in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) moves from left to right along an abate-
ment cost curve (red line) until its targeted emission reductions are achieved (width of the
red dotted line). Similarly, abatement activity in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) moves
along its abatement cost curve (blue line), but flipped, starting from the right side of the
chart until its targeted emission reductions are achieved (width of the blue dotted line). The
width of the x-axis corresponds to the total emission reductions in both jurisdictions, with
the dotted red and blue lines indicating the reductions in each jurisdiction under no linking.
The resulting allowances prices in the two systems (pA,0 and pB,0) differ, as shown.
If these systems are fully linked, the allowance prices in the two systems converge at a
common price (pE). Entities in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) abate more emissions, while
entities in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) abate less. A respective amount of units is
transferred from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) to the higher-price jurisdiction (B) (green
dotted line), with a net financial transfer from the higher-price to the lower-price juris-
diction (the amount of units transferred, shown by the green dotted arrow, times the linked-
system allowance price).
Full linking leads to several economic benefits. The primary beneficiaries of the eco-
nomic surplus from linking are the entities covered by the ETSs. Total costs to achieve the
overall abatement outcome are reduced, and these b nefits from incr ased cost-effective-
ness are shared among the two jurisdictions. While there is greater abatement in the lower-
price jurisdiction (A), the financial transfer (by entities) from the higher-price jurisdiction
(B) in acquiring allowances exceeds the cost of the added abatement, providing an eco-
nomic surplus, as shown by the red shaded area in Fig. 1. For the higher-price jurisdiction
Fig. 1 Implications of no linking and full linking (simplified model)
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from full linking. Quotas imply that different prices persist in the two jurisdictions, though 
with a smaller difference (pA,Q, pB,Q). 
 
Figure 6-2 Implications of a quota set at 50% of the net allowance transfers under full 
linking (simplified model) 
Another interesting implication is how the relative economic gains for the two 
jurisdictions could differ from those under full linking. With quotas, the economic benefit 
shown by the hatched rectangle in Figure 6-2 could in principle accrue to either 
jurisdiction A or B, depending on how the quota is implemented. If the quota is expressed 
as a percentage of the compliance obligations by entities in the higher-price jurisdiction 
(B), it would limit the demand for allowance transfers from the lower-price jurisdiction (A). 
As the entities in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) would compete to sell allowances to the 
higher-price jurisdiction (B), the price for such transfers would likely settle at the 
allowance price in the lower-price jurisdiction (pA,Q), and the economic benefit shown by 
the hatched area in Figure 6-2 would confer to the entities in the higher-price jurisdiction 
(B). 
However, a quota could also be set on the supply side, as an export quota. To implement 
an export quota, the lower-price jurisdiction (A) could limit the number of allowances that 
can be used by other jurisdictions (e.g. B), for example, through auction licenses or permits 
that entities from other jurisdictions would need to hold and surrender when using its 
allowances outside the jurisdiction. Entities in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) would then 
compete for the rights to use a limited amount of allowances from the lower-price 
jurisdiction (A), and the price for using transferred allowances would likely settle at the 
(B), overall costs decrease because the reduction in abatement costs exceeds the transfer
payment made to the lower-price jurisdiction (A), creating the economic surplus shown by
the blue shaded area. Furthermore, full linking enhances market liquidity by increasing the
number of allowances and actors across the linked market, creating an added economic
benefit. The units from the two jurisdictions are fully fungible. However, full linking
requires considerable effort to harmonize and therefore also reduces the regulatory
autonomy of the decision-makers (see Sect. 2).
4.2 Quotas
Quotas will only have implications if they effectively limit the transfer of allowances. This
holds if the quota is set lower than the net allowance flow under full linking. Figure 2
illustrates the implications of a quota that enables 50% of the unit transfer that would occur
with full linking (orange lines). The quota does not affect the overall level of abatement
across jurisdictions, but affects the level of abatement in each jurisdiction. As under full
linking, abatement increases in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) and decreases in the higher-
price jurisdiction (B), but to a lesser extent than under full linking. The amount of
allowances transferred (green line) corresponds to the quota limit.
The economic implications of a quota will tend to lie between those of no linking and
full linking. As Fig. 2 shows, economic gains (shaded area) per net unit transferred among
jurisdictions decrease as one moves from no linking (where the price disparities are
highest) towards full linking (where price disparities disappear). For example, with linear
MAC curves, as shown in Fig. 2, a 50% quota yields 75% of the cost-effectiveness gains
from full linking. Quotas imply that different prices persist in the two jurisdictions, though
with a smaller difference (pA,Q, pB,Q).
Another interesting implication is how the relative economic gains for the two juris-
dictions could differ from those under full linking. With quotas, the economic benefit
shown by the hatched rectangle in Fig. 2 could in principle accrue to either jurisdiction A
Fig. 2 Implications of a quota set at 50% of the net allowance transfers under full linking (simplified
model)
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allowance price in the higher-price jurisdiction (pB,Q). In other words, the lower-price 
jurisdiction (A) would capture the scarcity rent (hatched area in Figure 6-2). In conclusion, 
quotas that limit supply will create greater economic benefits for the exporting, lower-price 
jurisdiction (A), while quotas that limit demand (or use) will create greater economic 
benefits for the importing, higher-price jurisdiction (B). 
Relative to no linking, quotas will increase market liquidity as they will increase the 
number of potential buyers and holders of units. Without full linking, however, 
jurisdiction A and jurisdiction B allowances would not be fully fungible and would 
therefore continue to be traded as different commodities at commodity exchanges. 
Deciding how and where to set the quota level presents a significant implementation 
challenge. Economic modelling could help policy-makers understand the implications of 
different quota levels, based on estimated marginal abatement potentials and costs, 
relative to a projection of BAU emissions. But history has shown that abatement potentials, 
abatement costs, and emissions trajectories can often diverge significantly from prior 
expectations. To respond to such unexpected developments, policy-makers could adjust 
the quota level over time. However, unless adjustments are predictable, they could 
undermine investment certainty. Furthermore, if one jurisdiction wishes to adjust a quota, 
it may require negotiation and agreement with policy-makers in other linked jurisdictions. 
Such a requirement may be laid down in a linking agreement, but it could also be made 
subject to a simplified amendment procedure (cf. Mehling & Haites, 2009). One option to 
avoid potentially difficult negotiations on quota adjustments could be agreeing ex ante on 
an automatic adjustment, triggered, for example, by observed allowance prices. If 
allowance prices were to exceed a threshold over a defined time period, an import quota 
could be increased, and conversely, it could be adjusted downwards if prices were to fall 
below a floor. 
An important feature of quotas is that, compared to full linking, they enable policy-makers 
to retain a certain level of control on the extent of unit flows and related impacts. 
6.4.3 Exchange rates 
The implications of exchange rates are more complex than those of quotas. First, in 
contrast to full linking or quotas, exchange rates can affect the total abatement across the 
two jurisdictions. Second, the abatement outcome and economic implications are highly 
sensitive to the value at which the exchange rate is set. 
Figure 6-3 illustrates the implications of different exchange rate values for two key 
parameters – total abatement and cost-effectiveness – using the model and parameters 
described in Section 6.2. For ease of comparison, the figure also illustrates the outcome for 
full linking, no linking, and quotas. The black line reflects different exchange rate levels 
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(R) that increase clockwise on the curve. For the purpose of this analysis, we define the 
exchange rate as the number of units from the jurisdiction with the expected lower-price 
absent linking (A) that are needed for compliance in the jurisdiction with the expected 
higher-price absent linking (B). 
 
Figure 6-3 Implications of varying exchange rates on total abatement and cost-
effectiveness (simplified model) 
The implications differ for three ranges of possible values: 
• ‘Effective’ exchange rates: We define effective exchange rates, found in the upper right 
quadrant in Figure 6-3, as rates at which both total abatement and cost-effectiveness 
are higher than with no linking. Exchange rates are effective if set above 1 (which 
corresponds to full linking, the upper grey dot in Figure 6-3), but lower than the ratio 
of allowance prices under no linking (1 < R < pB,0 / pA,0). The net flow of allowances is 
from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) to the higher-price jurisdiction (B), and as a result 
fewer emissions are allowed in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) for every allowance 
from the lower-price jurisdiction (A). As exchange rates move from the no linking 
value to the full linking value (parity), the flow of allowances from A to B increases, 
while the net emissions benefit per unit transferred decreases, leading to the behaviour 
shown in Figure 6-3, where the overall abatement outcome reaches a maximum at a 
middle-range rate; 
• ‘Reversed’ exchange rates: We define reversed exchange rates, found in the upper left 
quadrant in Figure 6-3, as below 1 (R < 1). We refer to them as reversed exchange rates 
shown in Fig. 3, where the overall abatement outcome reaches a maximum at a middle-
range rate.
• ‘Reversed’ exchange rates: We define reversed exchange rates, found in the upper left
quadrant in Fig. 3, as below 1 (R\ 1). We refer to them as reversed exchange rates
because they reverse in which jurisdiction allowances are valued higher: while units
still flow from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) to the higher-price jurisdiction (B), their
value is effectively ‘inflated’: less than one allowance from the lower-price jurisdiction
(A) is required to emit one more ton in the higher-price jurisdiction (B). Abatement
Fi . 3 Implications of varying exchange rates on total abatement and cos -effectiveness (simplified model)
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because they reverse in which jurisdiction allowances are valued higher: while units 
still flow from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) to the higher-price jurisdiction (B), their 
value is effectively ‘inflated’: less than one allowance from the lower-price jurisdiction 
(A) is required to emit one more ton in the higher-price jurisdiction (B). Abatement 
decreases in each jurisdiction relative to full linking, and as a result total abatement 
declines relative to both full linking and no linking. Cost-effectiveness decreases 
relative to full linking as well, though it remains above the no linking level until 
exchange rates reach low levels (not shown in Figure 6-3); and 
• ‘Overstated’ exchange rates: We define overstated exchange rates, found in the lower left 
quadrant in Figure 6-3, as rates set above the ratio of allowance prices under no linking 
(R > pB,0 / pA,0). We refer to them as overstated because they exaggerate the expected 
price difference between both jurisdictions with no linking. Remarkably, they reduce 
both total abatement and cost-effectiveness relative to no linking. In other words, 
overstated exchange rates lead to worse outcomes than no linking. Under overstated 
exchange rates, the direction of allowance flows and transfer payment reverses, with 
entities in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) buying allowances from the higher-price 
jurisdiction (B). As a consequence, less abatement occurs in the jurisdiction with the 
lower-cost abatement opportunities (A), while more abatement occurs in the 
jurisdiction with higher-cost abatement opportunities (B), decreasing the cost-
effectiveness. While not calling them overstated exchange rates, Burtraw et al. (2013) 
discuss such rates in the context of linking California-Québec and RGGI.8 
In all three cases, assuming no constraints on allowance flow or use, the exchange rate will 
determine the ratio of allowance prices: the price in jurisdiction B is always R times higher 
than the one in jurisdiction A. In comparison with quotas, exchanges rates allow the two 
jurisdictions’ allowances to be fully fungible and offer the same liquidity as full linking. 
Exchange rates could be set at different values depending on which policy objectives are 
pursued. If the primary policy objective is enhancing market liquidity while avoiding any 
other impacts, one could argue that an exchange rate set at the ratio of the allowance prices 
under no linking (R = pB,0 / pA,0) would best fit that purpose. If a key policy objective is 
enhancing cost-effectiveness, values closer to 1 may provide more benefits. If policy-
makers intend to ensure that total abatement is increased rather than decreased, moderate 
exchange rates, set between 1 and the ratio of allowance prices under no linking, would 
best ensure that this policy objective is met (aside, of course, from tightening the cap). 
Hence, approaching the ‘best’ exchange rates may require balancing different policy 
objectives. That said, for a broad range of policy objectives, policy-makers will likely want 
                                                   
8 Burtraw et al. (2013) evaluated an exchange rate of 3 between California-Québec and RGGI. The 
findings are similar to our simplified model, though our model does not account for the presence of 
floor prices. 
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to set the exchange rate within the spectrum of effective exchange rates, rather than 
overstated or reversed exchange rates, which lead to several adverse impacts. 
In practice, setting exchange rates poses several challenges. Ensuring that the exchange 
rate is set and remains within the effective range is difficult. Doing so requires that those 
who set exchange rates have good information and foresight, for each jurisdiction, on BAU 
emissions and on the abatement potential and costs. Yet, BAU emissions and abatement 
potential and costs may face major uncertainties. Furthermore, there may be information 
asymmetries between regulators and the regulated entities with respect to abatement 
opportunities and costs. Because of these uncertainties and information asymmetries, a 
regulator might set an exchange rate ex ante that, based on best available information at 
the time, appears to be in the effective range, but turns out to be a reversed or overstated 
exchange rate. 
Regulators could aim to adjust exchange rates to mitigate these risks. However, in practice, 
this too could be challenging. Once systems are linked through an exchange rate, only a 
single allowance price will remain. It then becomes impossible to observe, and difficult to 
impute from modelling or other data, what the relative allowances prices in different 
jurisdictions would have been were the systems not linked, the ratio of which is essential 
for understanding whether an exchange rate is effective, overstated, or reversed. And lastly, 
negotiating exchange rate values, including the basis for any adjustments over time, with 
other jurisdictions – or entrusting this process to a third party – could also be very 
challenging. Exchange rates could be viewed as valuing a jurisdiction’s climate mitigation 
actions; this perception could make negotiations on exchange rates politically sensitive. 
The World Bank’s Globally Networked Carbon Markets Initiative suggested that financial 
markets themselves could set exchange rates, and they could indeed ‘float’, as they do for 
currencies and other financial products. However, it remains unclear how this would 
work in practice. Unlike other products and services and the currencies used for their 
exchange, emissions allowances have no value outside the markets created by the 
regulators themselves. 
Exchange rates also do not provide advantages with regard to the regulatory autonomy 
of decision-makers. Once exchange rates have been set, decision-makers cannot influence 
allowance, investment, and financial flows. 
6.4.4 Discount rates 
Discount rates can be regarded as a variation on exchange rates, with a view to addressing 
some of the challenges inherent to exchange rates. In contrast to exchange rates, they do 
not need to be set in a symmetrical fashion, which allows establishing discount rates in 
ways that ensure that rates are always effective, and neither reversed nor overstated. If policy-
makers want to ensure that a discount rate always ‘lands’ in the effective range – even 
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under information asymmetry and uncertainty with regard to BAU emissions, abatement 
potential, and abatement costs – they could implement it in either of the following ways: 
1. One-way discount rates: One jurisdiction allows imports of allowances from another 
jurisdiction, converted at a discount rate above 1 (i.e. more than one allowance from 
the other jurisdiction is required to emit one more ton in the importing jurisdiction). 
No allowance exports would be allowed to the other jurisdiction; and 
2. Two-way discount rates: Both jurisdictions allow importing units, each using a discount 
rate that is above 1. In both directions of allowance flows, more than one imported 
allowance would be required to emit one more ton in the importing jurisdiction. 
The abatement outcome and economic implications are similar to those of effective 
exchange rates. The two approaches would guarantee that both total abatement and cost-
effectiveness could only increase as a result of allowance trade among jurisdictions. 
However, with discount rates, allowances are only transferred between jurisdictions if the 
difference in allowance prices without linking exceeds the discount rate. For example, if 
both jurisdictions applied a 20% discount to allowances imported from the other 
jurisdiction (1.25 imported allowances required per ton emitted), trade would only start if 
the price difference between the jurisdictions (with no linking) is larger than this 
differential. If the price difference is smaller, the outcome would be the same as for no 
linking. In other words, the price difference between the two jurisdictions is capped to a 
maximum of 20%. 
In this regard, discount rates can work in a similar manner as price containment 
mechanisms, unless prices rise simultaneously in both systems. Moreover, unlike 
exchange rates, discount rates do not provide for fungibility of allowances, and hence, like 
quotas or one-way linking, they also fail to provide for significantly enhanced market 
liquidity. 
Setting the level of discount rates, and possibly updating them, is an important challenge, 
similar to quotas as discussed above, but less so than for exchange rates, since they can be 
set up in ways that avoid unintended consequences. Applying discount rates reciprocally 
(both jurisdictions discount unit imports at the same rate) might address perceptions 
about valuing reductions differently across jurisdictions. Compared to exchange rates, 
discount rates could be more easily adjusted over time and would allow regulators to 
retain more decision-making autonomy compared to full linking. 
6.5 Discussion 
Our assessment of restricted linking options shows that the abatement outcome, the 
economic implications, and the feasibility differ considerably between the three options. 
Table 6-1 compares the three restricted linking options against the main criteria. 
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Table 6-1 Summary comparison of options against key criteria (relative to no linking) 
 
Total abatement 
Economic implications Feasibility 
 
Cost-
effectiveness 
Unit liquidity 
and fungibility 
Challenges to set quotas, 
exchange rates or 
discount rates 
Implications for 
regulatory autonomy 
Full 
linking 
• No change • Maximized 
cost-
effectiveness 
• Increased 
liquidity 
• Full fungibility 
 • Reduced regulatory 
autonomy 
Quotas • No change • Enhanced 
cost-
effectiveness 
• Increased liqui-
dity but much 
less so than full 
linking 
• No fungibility 
• Quota level difficult to 
set due to uncertainty 
and information 
asymmetry 
• Jurisdictions main-
tain stronger regu-
latory autonomy 
compared with full 
linking and can ad-
just quota levels 
Exchange 
rates 
• Increased total 
abatement 
with effective 
rates 
• Decreased 
total abate-
ment with 
reversed rates 
• Enhanced 
cost-effective-
ness with 
effective or 
moderately 
reversed rates 
• Decreased 
cost-effective-
ness with 
overstated or 
strongly re-
versed rates 
• Increased liquid-
ity (similar to full 
linking) 
• Full fungibility 
• Outcome could be con-
trary to the policy ob-
jectives pursued due to 
uncertainties and infor-
mation asymmetries in 
setting the exchange 
rate 
• Mutually agreeing ex-
change rate values and 
modalities for future 
adjustments could be 
politically challenging 
• Reduced regulatory 
autonomy  
Discount 
rates 
• Increased total 
abatement 
• Enhanced 
cost-
effectiveness 
• Increased liquid-
ity but much less 
so than full 
linking 
• No Fungibility 
• Rate level difficult to 
set due to uncertainty 
and information asym-
metry 
• Jurisdictions main-
tain stronger regu-
latory autonomy 
compared with full 
linking and can ad-
just discount rates 
The most appropriate option for restricted linking depends on the specific policy 
objectives pursued. If the ultimate goal of policy-makers is indeed full linking, and 
restricted linkage is viewed as a step towards that end, then quotas may be an attractive 
option. In contrast to exchange rates, they cannot undermine cost-effectiveness and overall 
abatement and do not create different perceptions of the relative value and implied 
ambition of each ETS that could ultimately hamper efforts to reach agreement on full 
linking. 
If the main policy goal is increasing liquidity, exchange rates could be considered. 
However, information asymmetries and uncertainties in setting the rate could seriously 
undermine the intended policy objectives. In this regard, one could question whether 
exchange rates would not mainly add another layer of complexity when negotiating a 
linking agreement, while not necessarily addressing the concerns with full linking. Our 
findings on exchange rates are similar to those of Burtraw et al. (2013), who evaluated an 
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exchange rate of 3 between California-Québec and RGGI. Under current allowance prices, 
this exchange rate would fall in the overstated range. 
By contrast, discount rates can avoid some of the challenges of exchange rates. Discount 
rates could be set up in ways that ensure that both cost-effectiveness and total emissions 
abatement are enhanced. They implicitly link flexibility and mitigation ambition – the 
more the regulated entities use the flexibility to import units from another jurisdiction, the 
more emissions are reduced. Applying discount rates reciprocally (both jurisdictions 
discount unit imports at the same rate) might address perceptions about valuing 
reductions differently across jurisdictions. 
Our analysis builds on a simplified model and several assumptions. The direction of the 
implications can be generalized to other two-jurisdiction relationships, where marginal 
abatement costs increase in a roughly linear fashion, entities can bank allowances and have 
certainty on a long-term target trajectory below BAU levels, and price containment 
mechanisms are not in place. Different parametrizations of the linear MAC curves lead to 
similar outcomes. 
In practice, many ETSs have features and circumstances which are not considered in this 
article, including price containment mechanisms, offset use, targets above BAU, political 
uncertainty on the ambition of future targets, more complex abatement cost functions, and 
transaction costs. Moreover, linking the ETSs of more than two jurisdictions would add 
further complexity (Mehling & Görlach, 2016). Price containment measures create well-
recognized challenges to linking (Harrison, Klevnas, Radov, & Foss, 2006). If two ETSs 
have a price floor, full linking will generally, but not always, impose the higher-price floor 
on both schemes. If only one of the two ETSs has a price floor, it will become applicable in 
both schemes and could increase the total abatement outcome from both ETSs (Burtraw et 
al., 2013). Linking can also change the amount and type of offsets used and thus the total 
abatement, depending on the extent of over- or under-crediting by different offset types 
(Erickson et al., 2014). If one system is over-allocated and the other not, then (restricted) 
linking them could reduce overall emissions abatement. Under uncertainty on the future 
target trajectory, entities may prioritize short-term over long-term abatement options, and 
(restricted) linking could lead to less cost-effective outcomes in a long-term perspective. 
Linking, whether full or restricted, could also have impacts on the ambition of the future 
target periods. If restrictions allow less harmonized systems to link, they could also reduce 
incentives to harmonize and move towards full linking. Finally, (restricted) linking two 
ETSs involves transaction costs which could outweigh the benefits for one or both of the 
linking partners (Flachsland et al., 2009a). 
Assessing these features and circumstances in the context of restricted linking requires 
considering the context of specific ETSs and is beyond the scope of this article and subject 
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to further research. Fully understanding the implications of restricted linking will require 
assessing other environmental, economic and political implications, such as on 
environmental co-benefits, price volatility, and risks of carbon leakage. Generally, the 
implications and feasibility of linking – whether full or restricted – will depend heavily on 
the design of the ETSs (e.g. allocation rules, price containment measures), the ambition of 
the caps (e.g. over-allocation or accumulated surpluses, political certainty), the size of the 
ETSs (e.g. if one ETS is much smaller than the other), the marginal abatement cost curves, 
and the use of price containment mechanisms. The present analysis provides only a partial 
picture of the various aspects that play a role when considering (restricted) linking of ETSs. 
It is therefore important for researchers and policy-makers to carefully consider and assess 
the implications of (restricted) linking in their specific context. 
6.6 Conclusions 
While restricted linking options do not, in principle, achieve the potential benefits of full 
linking, they can lessen some of the potential pitfalls. They can increase cost-effectiveness 
while maintaining more regulatory autonomy for decision-makers. They also offer easier 
off-ramps to terminate linking arrangements9 and levers to adjust (e.g. quota levels or 
discount rates), should linking concerns prove to be more significant than anticipated. 
Restricted linking options may thus represent a cautious approach that can be more easily 
implemented and explored where full linking is either infeasible in the near term or 
incompatible with the objectives of the jurisdictions involved. Borrowing the ‘match-
making’ analogy that Comendant and Taschini (2014) invoke for the process of finding the 
right ‘linking partner’, restricted linking is akin to moving in together, either before (or 
with no intention of) getting married. 
Our analysis shows that restricted linking could have unintended adverse outcomes. 
Careful consideration of the specific ETS design and context of the prospective linking 
partners is key to avoid such consequences. The most suitable option for restricted linking 
also depends on the policy objectives pursued. Quotas and discount rates, or their 
combination, could provide benefits compared to no linking, whereas exchange rates 
could lead to unintended adverse environmental and economic consequences. Discount 
rates are a promising option if the main policy objective is increasing cost-efficiency, 
flexibility and total abatement outcome, while maintaining regulatory autonomy. 
                                                   
9 Where linking is formalized in a linking agreement, this may require a termination procedure (Mehling 
& Haites, 2009). The way the termination of a linking agreement is organized may affect abatement costs 
and subsequent price divergence (Pizer & Yates, 2015). 
Chapter 6 Restricted linking of emissions trading systems: options, benefits, and challenges 
 107 
Supplementary information 
This supplementary information describes in more detail the simplified model used to 
assess options for restricted linking of emissions trading systems (ETSs). We use the model 
to compute the abatement level, allowance prices, and abatement costs. We apply the 
model, first for reference, to the cases of no linking and full linking, and then to quotas, 
exchange rates and discount rates. 
Model description 
In our model, we use a simple representation of two ETSs in jurisdictions A and B with 
linear marginal abatement cost curves. We assume that the two ETSs have a long-term 
target path below business-as-usual emissions (i.e. with no over-allocation of allowances) 
and allow for banking of allowances, providing entities with a certain long-term emissions 
budget, and that the two ETSs do not have any price containment mechanisms, such as 
offsets, reserves, floors, caps and/or triggers. The limitations of these assumptions are 
discussed in Section 6.5 of the article. 
We define each jurisdiction by: (1) the total abatement under no linking, reflected by the 
difference between its emission cap and business-as-usual emissions, and (2) a simplified, 
linear marginal abatement cost curve that represents how its cost of reducing emissions 
increases with the level of abatement: 𝑀𝐴𝐶$(𝐴𝐵$) = 𝐴 ∙ 𝐴𝐵$ (Equation 6-1) 𝑀𝐴𝐶*(𝐴𝐵*) = 𝐵 ∙ 𝐴𝐵* (Equation 6-2) 
where MACA and MACB are the marginal abatement costs in jurisdictions A and B for a 
given abatement level ABA or ABB. For a given abatement level ABA and ABB in 
jurisdictions A and B, the corresponding allowance prices and abatement costs in each 
jurisdiction are computed as:  𝑝$ = 𝐴 ∙ 𝐴𝐵$ (Equation 6-3) 𝑝* = 𝐵 ∙ 𝐴𝐵* (Equation 6-4) 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇$ = 0.5 ∙ 𝐴 ∙ 𝐴𝐵$2 (Equation 6-5) 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇* = 0.5 ∙ 𝐵 ∙ 𝐴𝐵*2 (Equation 6-6) 
where pA and pB are the allowance prices in jurisdictions A and B, and COSTA and COSTB 
are the abatement costs in jurisdictions A and B. 
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We define the cost effectiveness as the total abatement costs in both jurisdictions with no 
linking divided by the total abatement costs in both jurisdictions with restricted (or full) 
linking. The cost effectiveness (CE) is thus computed as: 𝐶𝐸 = 45678,:;4567<,:	45678;4567<	  (Equation 6-7) 
where COSTA,0 and COSTB,0 are the abatement costs under no linking. 
Where a restricted linking option changes the overall abatement outcome, we use this 
changed abatement level to calculate COSTA,0 COSTA, COSTB,0 and COSTB. To this end, we 
assume that the abatement under no linking would change in each jurisdiction 
proportionally to their emission reduction targets. 
For the purpose of illustrating the results in charts in the article, we set the parameters of 
the model such that, in the absence of any linking, jurisdiction B has an allowance price 
three times higher than jurisdiction A, similar to the parameterization used by Burtraw et 
al. (2013): 𝐴 = 0.3, 𝐵 = 0.6, 𝐴𝐵$,@ = 20, and 𝐴𝐵*,@ = 30 
where ABA,0 and ABB,0 are the abatement levels in each jurisdiction under no linking. 
No linking 
The allowances prices in jurisdictions A and B (pA,0 and pB,0) and the abatement costs in 
jurisdictions A and B (COSTA,0 and COSTB,0) are computed using Equations 6-3 to 6-6, 
based on the abatement levels without linking (ABA,0 and ABB,0). 
Full linking 
Under full linking, both ETSs have equal marginal abatement costs and the overall 
abatement level is unchanged. The market equilibrium is thus given by two conditions: 𝐴 ∙ 𝐴𝐵$,B = 𝐵 ∙ 𝐴𝐵*,B   and (Equation 6-8) 𝐴𝐵$,B + 𝐴𝐵*,B = 𝐴𝐵$,@ + 𝐴𝐵*,@ (Equation 6-9) 
where ABA,F and ABB,F are the abatement levels in jurisdictions A and B under full linking. 
This gives: 
𝐴𝐵$,B = *∙D$*8,:;$*<,:E$;*    and (Equation 6-10) 𝐴𝐵*,B = $∙D$*8,:;$*<,:E$;*     (Equation 6-11) 
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The equilibrium allowance price pE = pA,F = pB,F, the abatement costs in jurisdictions A and 
B (COSTA,F and COSTB,F), and the cost effectiveness under full linking (CEF) are computed 
with Equations 6-3 to 6-7 respectively, based on the abatement levels under full linking 
(ABA,F and ABB,F). 
Full linking involves a net transfer of allowances from jurisdiction A to jurisdiction B (TF), 
which is computed as: 𝑇B = 𝐴𝐵$,B − 𝐴𝐵$,@. (Equation 6-12) 
Quotas 
Quotas restrict the amount of units from other jurisdictions that can be used for 
compliance. Quotas can be formulated and implemented in different ways. Here we define 
the quota level Q as the fraction of allowances that can be imported by jurisdiction A 
divided by the amount of allowances that are imported under full linking. The allowance 
transfer under the quota (TQ) is thus given by 𝑇G = 𝑄 ∙ 𝑇B (Equation 6-13) 
The abatement levels under the quota in each jurisdiction (ABA,Q and ABB,Q) are then 
computed as: 𝐴𝐵$,G = 𝐴𝐵$,@ + 𝑇G   and (Equation 6-14) 𝐴𝐵*,G = 𝐴𝐵*,@ − 𝑇G. (Equation 6-15) 
The allowance prices in jurisdictions A and B (pA,Q and pB,Q), the abatement costs in 
jurisdictions A and B (COSTA,Q and COSTB,Q), and the cost effectiveness under the quota 
(CEQ) are computed with Equations 6-3 to 6-7 respectively, based on the abatement levels 
under the quota (ABA,Q and ABB,Q). 
Exchange and discount rates 
Exchange rates imply that units from one jurisdiction can be used for compliance in 
another, but their value is adjusted by a conversion factor. Exchange rates operate in a 
symmetrical fashion. If an exchange rate is set such that two units from jurisdiction A 
could be used in place of one unit in jurisdiction B, then in jurisdiction A, one jurisdiction 
B unit would be worth two jurisdiction A units. 
Discount rates could be regarded as a variation on exchange rates. They also involve a 
conversion factor, but such that more than one unit from another jurisdiction is required 
to meet a compliance obligation in the own jurisdiction, thereby placing a greater value 
on units of the own jurisdiction. While exchange rates inherently require a symmetrical 
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relationship in the value of jurisdictions’ allowances, discount rates do not. Jurisdictions 
could apply one discount rate in one direction of allowance flow (e.g., 3:1 from system A 
to system B) and parity (1:1) or a rate of different magnitude in the other direction (e.g., 
2:1 from system B to system A). 
We define the exchange or discount rate R as the number of allowances from jurisdiction 
A that are needed for compliance in jurisdiction B. 
In contrast to full linking and quotas, exchange and discount rates can alter the overall 
abatement from both jurisdictions. The market equilibrium is given by three conditions: 
First, the marginal abatement costs in jurisdiction B are R times higher than in 
jurisdiction A (Equation 6-16). Second, the abatement in jurisdiction A under the exchange 
or discount rate (ABA,R) corresponds to the abatement without linking, plus the allowances 
transferred to jurisdiction B (TR) (Equation 6-17). Third, the abatement in jurisdiction B 
under the exchange or discount rate (ABB,R) corresponds to the abatement without linking, 
minus the allowances imported, however, adjusted for the exchange or discount rate R 
(Equation 6-18): 𝑅 ∙ 𝐴 ∙ 𝐴𝐵$,J = 𝐵 ∙ 𝐴𝐵*,J (Equation 6-16) 𝐴𝐵$,J = 𝐴𝐵$,@ + 𝑇J (Equation 6-17) 𝐴𝐵*,J = 𝐴𝐵*,@ − 7KJ  (Equation 6-18) 
These three conditions give the abatement levels under the exchange rate in each 
jurisdiction: 𝐴𝐵$,J = $*8,:;J∙$*<,:L;8∙KM<  (Equation 6-19) 𝐴𝐵*,J = $*8,:;J∙$*<,:				J; <8∙K  (Equation 6-20) 
The allowance prices (pA,R and pB,R) and the abatement costs (COSTA,R and COSTB,R) in each 
jurisdiction under the exchange or discount rate are computed with Equations 6-3 to 6-6 
respectively. 
The allowance prices in jurisdictions A and B (pA,R and pB,R), the abatement costs in 
jurisdictions A and B (COSTA,R and COSTB,R), and the cost effectiveness under the 
exchange or discount rate (CER) are computed with Equations 6-3 to 6-7 respectively, 
based on the abatement levels under the exchange or discount rate (ABA,R and ABB,R). 
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Chapter 7  
When less is more: Limits to international transfers 
under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
Abstract 
International carbon markets can be an important tool in achieving countries’ mitigation 
targets under the Paris Agreement, but they are subject to a number of environmental 
integrity risks. An important risk is that some countries have mitigation targets that 
correspond to higher levels of emissions than independent projections of their likely 
emissions. If such ‘hot air’ can be transferred to other countries, it could increase 
aggregated emissions and create a perverse incentive for countries not to enhance the 
ambition of future mitigation targets. Limits to international transfers of mitigation 
outcomes have been proposed to address this risk. This article proposes a typology for 
such limits, explores key design options, and tests diﬀerent types of limits in the context 
of 15 countries. Our analysis indicates that limits to international transfers could, if 
designed appropriately, prevent most of the hot air contained in current mitigation targets 
from being transferred, but also involve trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent policy objectives. 
Given the risks from international transfer of hot air and the uncertainty over whether 
other approaches will be eﬀective in ensuring environmental integrity, we recommend 
that countries take a cautious approach and pursue a portfolio of approaches to ensure 
environmental integrity, in which case limits could provide for additional safeguards. 
Key policy insights: 
• Limits to international transfers involve trade-offs between different policy objectives, 
in particular reducing the risk that countries transfer hot air and enabling participation 
in carbon markets. 
• Under ‘relative’ limits a country may transfer mitigation outcomes to the extent that 
its actual emissions are below the limit. Relative limits derived from historical 
emissions data have significant limitations, and none of the tested approaches was 
found to be effective for all countries. Relative limits based on emission projections 
could be a more valid approach, although they are also technically and politically 
challenging. 
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• Under ‘absolute’ limits a country could only issue, transfer or acquire a certain amount 
of mitigation outcomes. Absolute limits set at sufficiently low levels could prevent 
countries from transferring large amounts of hot air, but are bluntly applicable to all 
countries, whether or not they have hot air. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published as: 
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7.1 Introduction 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows countries to use international carbon markets to 
achieve their mitigation targets communicated in nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs), hereinafter referred to as ‘NDC targets’. Article 6.2 allows countries to use 
‘internationally transferred mitigation outcomes’ (ITMOs) (i.e. climate change mitigation 
achieved in one country but claimed by another) to achieve their NDC targets. Article 6.4 
establishes a new crediting mechanism under international supervision that could be used 
for similar purposes. 
Carbon markets are considered a key tool to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(IPCC, 2014b). They can reduce the cost of achieving mitigation targets by providing 
ﬂexibility in how and where emissions are reduced and could thereby facilitate the 
adoption of more ambitious mitigation targets. Yet international carbon markets involve 
a number of environmental integrity risks (Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, 2019): if not 
designed and implemented appropriately, they could result in greater GHG emissions 
than if they were not employed. The Paris Agreement therefore requires Parties to ensure 
environmental integrity when engaging in international transfers of mitigation outcomes. 
A key risk to environmental integrity concerns international transfers from countries with 
weak mitigation targets. Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, some countries had mitigation 
targets which did not require the country to take any mitigation action, creating surplus 
units that were often referred to as ‘hot air’ (Boehringer, 2000; Boehringer, Moslener, & 
Sturm, 2007; Brandt & Svendsen, 2002; den Elzen, Roelfsema, & Slingerland, 2009; IPCC, 
2001, sec. 6.3.1; Paltsev, 2000; Victor, Nakicenovic, & Victor, 1998). Independent 
assessments of current NDC targets suggest that this situation may also arise under the 
Paris Agreement, since the mitigation targets of several countries could correspond to 
higher levels of emissions than the projection of their likely emissions level with the 
policies in place at the time of setting the target (CAT, 2018; den Elzen et al., 2016; 
Meinshausen & Alexander, 2016). These countries could thus appear to generate emission 
reductions (relative to their targets), without generating any actual emission reductions. 
Hot air could pose several risks to environmental integrity under Article 6. If the rules 
under Article 6 were to allow countries to transfer hot air to other countries, then global 
GHG emissions could end up higher than they would have been if the countries’ NDC 
targets were achieved without such transfers. This is because the transfer would allow the 
acquiring country to increase its emissions above its NDC target, while the transferring 
country would not need to engage in corresponding emission reductions to achieve its 
NDC target. Allowing countries to transfer hot air could also create a perverse incentive 
for transferring countries not to enhance the ambition of mitigation targets in future 
NDCs, in order to accrue higher beneﬁts from international transfers. Countries with hot 
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air, moreover, may have less incentives to ensure environmental integrity, as they would 
achieve their NDC target even if they engage in transfers that do not represent actual 
mitigation outcomes (Kollmuss et al., 2015; Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, 2019). 
Parties to the Paris Agreement are currently negotiating the rules for the implementation 
of Article 6. An important and controversial issue is whether and how international rules 
should promote environmental integrity. Several Parties have proposed that international 
transfers under Article 6 be subject to quantitative limits. Such limits are proposed to 
address environmental integrity concerns but also to pursue other policy objectives, such 
as ensuring that a minimum portion of mitigation action takes place domestically (see, e.g. 
AOSIS, 2017; Arab Group, 2017; Brazil, 2014, 2016, 2017; LMDC, 2017; Venezuela, 2017). 
While limits to international transfers are an important topic in the ongoing negotiations, 
research on this topic is sparse. This article explores how limits could be established and 
assesses the implications of diﬀerent types of limits, with a focus on whether and how 
they mitigate the risk of international transfer of hot air.  The article draws on relevant 
literature, submissions by countries, and the experience with limits under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. 
In addition, the implications of diﬀerent types of limits are tested in the context of 15 
countries, using data on historical emissions, information from NDCs, and independently-
established emission projections. 
The article employs speciﬁc terminology and makes several assumptions. Article 6.2 of the 
Paris Agreement does not specify what an ITMO is, nor how transfers should take place. 
ITMOs could be international units that are transferred between electronic registries or 
they could be amounts that are reported by countries for accounting purposes (Schneider, 
Füssler, Kohli, et al., 2017). It is assumed here that ITMOs are amounts reported by 
countries. For simplicity, the term ‘ITMOs’ is used to refer to transfers both of mitigation 
outcomes generated under Article 6.2 and of emission reductions resulting from the 
Article 6.4 mechanism. It is further assumed that ITMOs are expressed in tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (tCO2e), noting that the ﬁndings would also hold if this was not the 
case. 
No agreed deﬁnition of ‘hot air’ exists. This paper adopts the approach typically employed 
in the literature where hot air is deﬁned in the context of mitigation targets that countries 
over-achieve without pursuing further mitigation actions (Boehringer, 2000; den Elzen & 
de Moor, 2002; Kollmuss et al., 2015; Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, 2019; UNFCCC, n.d.; 
Victor et al., 1998). Throughout this paper, hot air is understood as the diﬀerence between 
the NDC target level and the projection of the likely emissions level with the policies in 
place at the time of setting the target. We use the projection with policies in place at the 
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time of setting the target because countries formulate their targets based on known 
circumstances at that point in time. 
7.2 General design options for limits to international transfers 
Limits could be pursued to achieve diﬀerent policy objectives. They could be established 
with the aim to prevent the transfer of hot air, or to reduce disincentives for transferring 
countries to increase ambition in future NDCs. They could also be introduced in order to 
address the risk of ‘over-selling’ (i.e. that countries transfer so many mitigation outcomes 
that they can no longer achieve their NDC target). Finally, limits could also be pursued to 
ensure that a minimum portion of mitigation eﬀort takes place domestically – which is 
often referred to as ‘supplementarity’. 
Limits could be applied not only to international transfers in the context of Article 6, but 
also in the context of ‘banking’ or ‘carry-over’ of units. Although this latter aspect is not 
further explored in this paper, similar considerations would apply. 
Limits to international transfers were employed under the Kyoto Protocol, albeit without 
addressing the risk of transfer of hot air. A principle of ‘supplementarity’ was established 
– that participation in market mechanisms should be ‘supplemental’ to domestic action – 
but never operationalized in the form of a quantitative limit. To prevent over-selling, a 
‘commitment period reserve’ was introduced, requiring that each Party maintain a 
minimum reserve of units that cannot be transferred internationally (Yamin & Depledge, 
2004). 
The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol includes a provision that aims speciﬁcally at 
addressing the risk of transfer of hot air: Article 3.7ter establishes that countries’ assigned 
amounts (i.e. their budget of emissions under the Kyoto Protocol) in the period 2013–2020 
cannot exceed each country’s average annual emissions over the period 2008–2010. This 
provision thus implicitly ensures that countries’ targets in the second commitment period 
correspond, at a minimum, to the average reported emissions for 2008–2010. In so doing, 
this provision reduces the amount of hot air that countries could transfer (Chen, 
Gütschow, Vieweg, Macey, & Schaeffer, 2013). The Doha Amendment, however, has not 
yet entered into force. 
In the ongoing negotiations, Brazil proposes limits to international transfers which could 
address the risk of transfers of hot air. Other countries and groups of countries – such as 
the Alliance of Small Island Developing States, the Arab Group, Like Minded Developing 
Countries and Venezuela – propose limits akin to the supplementarity principle and to the 
commitment period reserve, among others. This section explores various design options 
for limits, taking into account the various policy objectives mentioned above. Section 7.3 
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then tests diﬀerent options for limits, focusing speciﬁcally on the objective of preventing 
transfer of hot air. 
7.2.1 Relative and absolute limits 
Limits could be established in a number of ways. Here, two main types are distinguished. 
Under a relative limit, a country would be allowed to transfer ITMOs to the extent that its 
actual emissions in the target year or period are below a speciﬁed limit. This type of limit 
is referred to here as a relative because it would allow the country to transfer any amount 
of ITMOs – as long as it reduces emissions respectively below the limit. Relative limits can 
reduce the risk of transferring hot air and avoid perverse incentives for countries not to 
enhance the ambition of future NDCs. 
 
Figure 7-1 Relative limit based on emissions projections in 2030. The ﬁgure illustrates 
the application of a relative limit for a country with an NDC target for 2030 
(black square) that is less stringent than the projected emissions (blue line). 
The country thus has hot air (red arrow). The country implements mitigation 
actions which bring its emissions (black dashed line) below the emissions 
projection. In this example, the relative limit (orange line) for 2030 is set 
exactly at the level of the projection of the likely emissions level with the 
policies in place at the time of setting the target. The amount of ITMOs the 
country is allowed to transfer in 2030 corresponds to the reduction of 
emissions below the limit (green arrow). 
To prevent transfers of hot air, relative limits would ideally be set exactly at the projection 
of the likely emissions level with the policies in place at the time of setting the target, as 
shown in Figure 7-1. In this case, the limit would prevent transfers of hot air while still 
enabling transfers that do result from abatement action. In practice, however, establishing 
emission projections is both technically and politically challenging: they are based on 
assumptions about future developments and therefore involve considerable uncertainties. 
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No internationally agreed method exists to establish emission projections, and estimations 
often diverge considerably between authors, depending on the assumptions and methods 
used (Rogelj et al., 2017). Policy-makers could therefore also consider deriving relative 
limits from other parameters, such as average historical emissions, as proposed by Brazil 
(Brazil, 2014, 2017). 
Under an absolute limit, a country could issue, transfer or acquire only a certain absolute 
(or ﬁxed) number of ITMOs (e.g. a ﬁxed percentage of reported emissions in a given year). 
Absolute limits would restrict international transfers from all countries, irrespective of 
environmental integrity risks. They would, therefore, help contain rather than address the 
risk of transferring hot air. Absolute limits could also be employed to reduce the risk of 
over-selling or to operationalize the principle of supplementarity. 
7.2.2 Applicability to transferring or acquiring countries 
Limits could be applied to transferring and/or acquiring countries, as well as to diﬀerent 
groups of countries. Limits placed on transferring countries could help prevent hot air 
transfers, reduce perverse incentives not to enhance the ambition of future NDCs, and 
prevent over-selling. Limits placed on acquiring countries could help ensure 
supplementarity but may do little to address the hot air risk, because transferring 
countries could still in principle transfer all of the hot air contained in their NDCs. 
Limits could also apply to all countries, or only to some countries. Limits could, for 
example, not apply to least developed countries or to small island developing states, as 
these country groups are diﬀerentiated under the Paris Agreement. 
7.2.3 Applicability to types of transfers 
Limits could apply to all international transfers under the Paris Agreement or only to some 
types of transfers. Limits could, for example, not apply to ITMO transfers that are backed 
by mechanisms that may involve lower environmental integrity risks. International 
linkages between emissions trading systems (ETSs), for example, could have limited 
environmental integrity risks because jurisdictions with ambitious ETS caps are unlikely 
to link to an ETS that is much less ambitious or over-allocated (Ranson & Stavins, 2016). 
Although crediting mechanisms could also ensure environmental integrity, the available 
analyses indicate that they face considerable challenges and uncertainty in this regard 
(Cames et al., 2017; Erickson et al., 2014; Gillenwater, 2012; Kollmuss et al., 2015; Schneider, 
2009b). Yet distinguishing ITMO transfers backed by linkages of ETSs from other types of 
transfers could be technically and politically challenging. It would require international 
agreement on a deﬁnition of ETSs and a method to determine how many ITMOs were 
transferred through the linkage of two ETSs. 
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7.2.4 Methods for establishing the limit 
The level of limits could be established in a number of ways. Limits could be based on 
diﬀerent parameters, such as historical GHG emissions or the historical GHG emissions 
intensity per gross domestic product (GDP), a GHG emissions level corresponding to the 
NDC target, or actual GHG emissions in the target year or period. The parameters could 
be determined using diﬀerent reference periods, with various lengths and starting points. 
Finally, several methods could be applied to calculate the level of the limit, such as simple 
percentages, average values or an extrapolation of trends. 
7.2.5 Timing and point of application 
Internationally agreed limits are only eﬀective if they are adhered to when countries 
account for their NDCs. When and how limits could be applied would depend on the rules 
under the Paris Agreement. An ongoing application of limits (e.g. at the point of issuance 
in transferring countries and/or at the point of use by acquiring countries) could be 
implemented if ITMOs were international units that are tracked through registries. If 
ITMOs were amounts reported for the purpose of accounting for international transfers 
through ‘corresponding adjustments’, limits could be applied ex-post, when countries 
account for their NDCs. In this latter case, it would be the responsibility of countries to 
ensure that they engage in transfers in a manner consistent with the limit. 
Other design features are also relevant, such as considerations on when to establish and 
assess limits. These are not further considered here. 
7.3 Testing diﬀerent options for establishing limits 
7.3.1 Approach and methodology 
To understand the suitability and implications of the various options for establishing 
limits, diﬀerent methods for determining limits are tested in the context of 15 countries 
that represent a variety of circumstances. The diﬀerent options for establishing limits are 
assessed against two criteria: whether and how they address the environmental integrity 
risk of international transfers of hot air, and whether and how they allow countries to 
transfer ITMOs that result from actual mitigation action. 
To assess these implications, the GHG emissions levels corresponding to the NDC targets 
are compared with independently-established emissions projections in order to assess 
whether and how much hot air is contained in NDC targets. For each type of limit, it is 
then assessed whether and how the country could engage in international transfers and 
the extent to which this would involve hot air. The analysis assesses the implications for 
the year 2030, which is used as target year by all selected countries. It is important to note 
that this analysis is not an assessment of the ambition of individual NDC targets, which 
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would have to take into account equity and development considerations as well as other 
country circumstances. 
The data used for the analysis is derived from two main sources. Information on historical 
GHG emissions, on emissions projections, and on the quantiﬁcation of countries’ NDC 
targets is drawn from the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) project.10 The data from CAT is 
used because it provides independent, coherently-applied emissions projections derived 
from country-speciﬁc information. We use the 2015 emissions projections, as they 
approximately reﬂect the policies that were in place when countries set their targets. 
Where the CAT data includes a range for the level of NDC targets and/or for emission 
projections, the average value is used. Data gaps were ﬁlled using 2017 data from CAT 
and WRI (2017), making adjustments to ensure time series consistency. Some approaches 
make use of historical and projected GDP values; these were drawn from USDA-ERS 
(2017). 
7.3.2 Relative limits 
Relative limits could be established with the objective to prevent the transfer of hot air 
while enabling the transfer of mitigation outcomes that are additional to those 
implemented at the time when the target is set. In this case, relative limits set exactly at 
the level of emissions projections with policies in place at the time of setting the target 
would – theoretically – best achieve both objectives (see section 7.2.1 above). As 
establishing emissions projections is both technically and politically challenging, several 
alternative approaches for establishing relative limits are tested, with the aim of 
understanding whether they could be good approximations of emissions projections with 
policies at the time of setting the target. 
In total eight alternative approaches are tested to each of the 15 countries. These include 
relative limits based on historical GHG emissions, as proposed by Brazil, or based on 
historical GHG emissions per gross domestic product (GDP). In addition to using average 
historical data to establish the limit, the extrapolation of historical trends is also tested, using 
the least squares method. In all scenarios, a historical reference period is used to calculate 
the average values or extrapolate the trend, though with diﬀerent lengths. For average 
historical data, three-year and ﬁve-year periods are tested; for the extrapolation of 
historical trends, ﬁve-year and ten-year periods are tested. Table 7-1 shows the results of 
the analysis. For each country and for each approach to establish relative limits, the table 
presents the deviation of the relative limit from the average emissions projections in 2030. 
The smaller the deviation, the better the approach approximates the emissions projections. 
A negative value denotes a situation where the relative limit lies below (i.e. is more 
                                                   
10 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1482-3 
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stringent than) the projections. Information on the range of the projections by CAT is also 
provided, highlighting the uncertainty surrounding the projections. Finally, Table 7-1 also 
presents the relative diﬀerence between the NDC target level and the emissions 
projections; positive values mean that the NDC target level is above the projection (i.e. 
contains hot air). Figure 7-2 illustrates the results of the diﬀerent approaches for selected 
countries. 
Table 7-1 and Figure 7-2 show that none of the analysed approaches is eﬀective for all 
countries. The calculated relative limits often diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the emission 
projections, leading to high standard deviations for all approaches for relative limits. In 
many cases, the diﬀerence between the relative limit and the emissions projection is larger 
than the diﬀerence between the NDC target and the emissions projection. This implies that 
none of the tested approaches achieves the objective of preventing the transfers of hot air 
for all countries while enabling ITMO transfers that result from mitigation actions. It was 
also not possible to identify groups of countries, such as developed or developing 
countries, for which a particular approach would consistently achieve these objectives. 
The results, however, diﬀer between the diﬀerent approaches. 
Table 7-1 Deviation of relative limits from average emission projections in 2030 
Country 
Range of 
emissions 
projection 
NDC 
compared 
to average 
projection 
Deviation of relative limits from avg. emission projections in 2030 
Historical GHG emissions Historical GHG emissions per GDP 
Average Trend Average Trend 
3 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs 10 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs 10 yrs 
Argentina +/−14% −6% −35% −35% −39% −22% +2% +9% −214% −212% 
Brazil Single point −5% −23% −25% +10% +8% +6% +8% −21% −31% 
China +/−4% +10% −24% −28% +54% +49% +123% +130% −23% −72% 
Ethiopia Single point −40% −70% −70% −61% −54% −5% +4% −272% −281% 
EU +/−7% −13% +16% +18% −30% −24% +54% +57% −11% −37% 
Gambia Single point −23% −42% −46% +30% +13% +30% +25% +129% +92% 
India +/−1% +5% −54% −56% −13% −16% +74% +79% −10% −14% 
Indonesia Single point +21% −36% −39% +17% −6% +66% +68% +29% −36% 
Japan +/−5% −11% +8% +6% +43% −6% +25% +23% +56% −3% 
New Zealand Single point −37% −13% −13% −10% −21% +37% +39% +2% −21% 
Norway Single point −52% +2% +2% −5% −8% +45% +45% +15% −11% 
Peru Single point −22% −43% −44% −20% −21% +18% +23% −64% −96% 
Russia +/−1% +17% −14% −15% +4% −2% +10% +10% −1% −68% 
South Africa Single point −44% −39% −39% −29% −22% −11% −10% −29% −43% 
South Korea +/−8% −27% −8% −12% +63% +34% +47% +45% +65% +11% 
Standard deviation  0.24 0.24 0.35 0.25 0.35 0.36 1.01 0.90 
Source: Own calculations based on 2015 data by CAT and by USDA-ERS (2017). Figures in red 
indicate hot air. 
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Figure 7-2 Results for relative limits for selected countries 
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Relative limits based on the average of historical GHG emissions would imply that countries 
can only transfer ITMOs if they are on a decreasing emissions pathway. That would 
prevent the transfer of all hot air contained in the NDC targets of the tested countries. Yet 
most countries have increasing emission trends. This type of limit could make it diﬃcult 
for these countries to engage in international transfers, especially if they would have to 
reduce emissions far below their NDC target before being able to transfer ITMOs (see 
example of India in Panel A of Figure 7-2). Nonetheless, the standard deviations in Table 
7-1 indicate that relative limits based on the average of historical GHG emissions 
performed best in approximating emission projections among the countries and options 
tested. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the results were found between 3-year and 5-year 
reference periods. Panel A in Figure 7-2 illustrates this limit for a country with stable 
emissions (Norway) and for countries with increasing emissions (Russia and India). 
Relative limits based on trends of historical GHG emissions are good approximations for 
emissions projections for the few countries where the rate of increase or decrease in 
emissions is expected to stay stable over time, such as in the case of Russia (see panel B in 
Figure 7-2). Yet this approach quickly loses accuracy when countries’ rates change over 
time – which is the case for most other countries analysed here, such as China. The time 
period used to calculate the trend was found to have a very signiﬁcant impact for some 
countries, such as for Japan. Somewhat surprisingly, for the tested countries, the standard 
deviation indicates that relative limits based on trends of GHG emissions fared overall 
worse in approximating emissions projections than relative limits based on averages of 
GHG emissions. 
Relative limits based on the average of historical emissions intensity (i.e. GHG emissions per 
GDP), as shown in panel C, are close to the emission projections for a few countries, such 
as Brazil, but lie far above the projections for most countries – as the emissions intensity is 
expected to decrease for most of the countries. This is of little consequence for countries 
such as New Zealand, whose targets are more stringent than the emission projection. It 
would, however, allow for most or all of the hot air to be transferred for other countries, 
such as in the case of Indonesia. 
Relative limits based on trends of historical emissions intensity, as shown in panel D, could 
potentially reﬂect that the emissions intensity is decreasing for most countries. Yet the 
suitability of this approach depends on how countries’ rate of emissions intensity changes 
over time. In India, for example, the rate of decrease is expected to stay relatively constant 
until 2030. In Argentina, the rate of decrease is expected to become less prominent over 
time, causing this type of limit to fall below the emissions projection. In Gambia, a change 
in the trend causes this type of limit to lie far above the projections. The standard deviation 
indicates that limits based on trends of historical emissions intensity are the worst 
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performing approach among all relative limits tested in terms of their suitability as an 
approximation of emissions projections. 
7.3.3 Absolute limits 
Six approaches for establishing absolute limits are tested. These include absolute limits 
based on GHG emissions and absolute limits based on NDC target levels. For limits based 
on the NDC target level, the reference period is the NDC target year (i.e. 2030). For limits 
based on GHG emissions, two options are tested: GHG emissions in the three years 
preceding the communication of the NDC target, with a time gap to account for data 
availability (2010–2012); and projected GHG emissions in the three years preceding the 
target year with a time gap to account for data availability (i.e. 2025–2027). For illustrative 
purposes, the implications are assessed for ﬁxed percentages of 1% and 5%, noting that 
any other values could be used. 
Table 7-2 Transferrable volumes of ITMOs under diﬀerent absolute limits in 2030 
(MtCO2e) 
  Limits based on 
average 2010– 
2012 emissions 
 Limits based 
on pre-target 
year emissions 
 Limits based on 
NDC target level 
 Amount of 
hot air 1% 5%  1% 5%  1% 5% 
Argentina −33 3 17  5 23  5 24 
Brazil −71 10 50  12 59  12 61 
China 1393 106 530  144 722  153 763 
Ethiopia −125 1 5  2 8  2 9 
EU −514 46 232  39 195  35 174 
Gambia −1 0 0  0 0  0 0 
India 285 25 124  49 245  57 285 
Indonesia 230 7 35  11 57  13 66 
Japan −129 13 65  12 60  11 54 
New Zealand −31 1 4  1 3  1 3 
Norway −27 1 3  0 1  0 1 
Peru −30 1 4  1 5  1 5 
Russia 435 23 113  29 143  31 154 
South Africa −419 6 29  5 26  5 26 
South Korea −196 7 34  5 27  5 27 
Aggregated amount of hot air (100%) 2344         
Amount of hot air that can be transferred 160 802  233 1167  253 1267 
Percentage of hot air that can be transferred 7% 34%  10% 50%  11% 54% 
Percentage of hot air that is prevented from 
transfer 93% 66%  90% 50%  89% 46% 
Source: Own calculations based on 2015 data by CAT. Note: negative values for the amount of hot 
air denote situations where the country’s NDC target is more stringent than the projection of the 
likely emissions with the policies in place at the time of setting the target. Figures in red indicate 
hot air. In the bottom section of the table, the volume of hot air and the “amount of hot air that 
could be transferred” correspond to the sum from the four countries with hot air. Cells marked 
with a ‘0’ are rounded-down ﬁgures. 
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Table 7-2 outlines the results for each country and each approach for establishing absolute 
limits. The upper section of the table presents how much hot air is estimated to be 
contained in each NDC target and contrasts this amount with the volume (in MtCO2e) that 
each country would be able to transfer internationally under diﬀerent absolute limits. The 
bottom section of Table 7-2 summarizes the results for each of the approaches. 
The results in Table 7-2 illustrate that absolute limits would contain the transfer of hot air 
from countries such as Russia and China, but also restrict transfers from countries with 
NDC targets more stringent than BAU, such as South Africa. The table also indicates that, 
in containing hot air transfers, the threshold used (i.e. 1% or 5%) plays a more important 
role than the parameter employed to derive the limit. A 1% limit on any of the parameters, 
for example, would prevent about 90% of the hot air from being transferred – whereas a 
5% limit would allow up to 54% of the hot air to be transferred. 
7.4 Discussion and conclusions 
In considering limits to address the risks from international transfers of hot air, policy-
makers may have to balance various policy objectives. Those include reducing the risk that 
countries engage in the transfer of hot air, facilitating participation in international 
transfers (in particular for countries that eﬀectively engage in mitigation action), and 
avoiding disincentives for countries to increase the ambition of future NDCs targets. 
Practical considerations – such as methodological challenges and the political feasibility 
of diﬀerent options – are also relevant, among others. Ultimately, the setting of limits is a 
policy choice that must balance these policy objectives. 
The analysis in this article showed that approaches for establishing relative limits based on 
historical emissions data have signiﬁcant limitations. Among all approaches tested here, 
none was found to be eﬀective for all countries: in some instances, the limits were far 
below the projection of the likely emissions with the policies in place at the time of setting 
the target, in others they were far above. Among the countries and options tested, relative 
limits based on historical GHG emissions were most eﬀective in preventing the transfer of 
hot air. This is because this type of limit prevents transfers of hot air from all countries 
with increasing GHG emission trends. While the analysis in this article is limited to 15 
countries, data by Meinshausen and Alexander (2016) on current NDC targets and 
emissions projections for 196 countries indicates that most countries with hot air have 
increasing emission trends – which means that this type of limit would prevent nearly all 
hot air in current NDC targets from being transferred. This type of limit would, however, 
only allow countries with decreasing emissions pathways to transfer ITMOs. While this 
could be seen to be consistent with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, it could 
prevent many developing countries from engaging in international carbon market 
mechanisms – even if their targets do not contain hot air. This, in turn, could make it 
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diﬃcult to agree on such an approach under the consensus-based decision-making process 
under the UNFCCC. 
Given the challenges with approaches based on historical emissions data, relative limits 
based on emission projections may provide a more valid approach if relative limits are to 
be considered, although they also face technical and political challenges. Any limits based 
on emission projections would ideally be based on an internationally agreed methodology 
which would include provisions to ensure consistency and comparability between 
countries and means to address the uncertainty of key variables such as economic growth. 
Absolute limits set at suﬃciently low levels could prevent an individual country from 
transferring large amounts of hot air. The analysis showed that the threshold used (e.g. 
1% or 5%) is the main factor in the eﬀectiveness of absolute limits in preventing transfers 
of hot air, with the lower of the two tested thresholds being signiﬁcantly more eﬀective in 
containing (albeit not fully preventing) transfers of hot air. Further advantages of absolute 
limits include that they are simple and provide ex-ante certainty on the volume of 
permissible transfers. A key disadvantage is that they are bluntly applicable to all 
countries – whether or not there is a risk of transfer of hot air – and could thus aﬀect 
countries’ ability to engage in international transfers. This, in turn, could potentially 
increase the costs of mitigating climate change if, without such limits, countries were to 
engage in larger amounts of transfers that are backed by actual emission reductions. The 
ability to transfer is impacted mainly by the threshold applied. For example, if countries 
representing half of global GHG emissions were transferring countries, a 1% limit would 
imply a total global potential for ITMO transfers of about 250 million tCO2e in 2030. Other 
possible impacts of absolute limits may also be important to consider. Absolute limits on 
the basis of NDC target levels, for example, could generate perverse incentives for 
countries not to enhance the ambition of future NDC targets. Similarly, limits based on 
pre-target year emissions could provide disincentives for countries to over-achieve their 
NDC targets, as this would aﬀect the limit applicable to the subsequent period. 
For both relative and absolute limits, a key political challenge is that countries may be 
reluctant to agree to international rules that might restrict their ability to engage in 
international transfers. This holds for all approaches but may be particularly relevant for 
the context of international linking of ETSs where the amount of transfers is driven by the 
regulated entities. As ITMO transfers that are backed by linking of ETSs may also pose 
lower environmental integrity risks (see section 7.2.3), policy makers could consider 
exempting such transfers from any limits. While this increases complexity, it could help 
balance the policy objectives of promoting environmental integrity and enabling 
participation in international carbon markets. It may also be important to set limits in a 
way that minimizes the possibility of manipulation that could result in inﬂated limit 
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levels. The methodology should therefore be internationally agreed and be applied 
consistently across countries. 
The analysis has a few limitations. An important limitation is that there are signiﬁcant 
uncertainties in emissions projections and challenges in interpreting NDC targets. For 
these reasons, the results for individual countries are also uncertain. Another limitation is 
that the analysis was conducted only for 15 countries and only four of them are estimated 
to have hot air. Other data and assessments of NDC targets, however, conﬁrm that the 
ambition of NDC targets varies strongly and that hot air could be included in a large 
number of NDCs (den Elzen et al., 2016; Meinshausen & Alexander, 2016). Whether and 
how much hot air a country has varies also considerably between the diﬀerent 
assessments. This conﬁrms that establishing emission projections and interpreting NDC 
targets is not straightforward and that limits derived from emission projections may be 
both technically and politically diﬃcult to implement. 
Whether or not limits are ultimately needed also depends on whether other policy 
approaches can eﬀectively address environmental integrity risks under Article 6. Several 
approaches could be pursued (Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, 2019): First, environmental 
integrity risks could also be addressed by ensuring that ITMOs represent actual abatement 
action, such as through international guidance and oversight on the implementation of 
carbon market mechanisms. The experience from existing carbon market mechanisms 
suggests, however, that ensuring quality can be both technically and politically 
challenging (Cames et al., 2017; Kollmuss et al., 2015; Schneider, 2009b). Second, 
environmental integrity risks might also be reduced by facilitating progression in the 
ambition of NDC targets. Yet this could prove to be diﬃcult, as NDCs are self-determined 
by Parties. Third, countries could pursue approaches outside the context of the UNFCCC 
and the Paris Agreement, such as forming ‘carbon clubs’ (i.e. groups of countries that 
apply uniform environmental integrity principles or provisions). These clubs, however, 
can only address environmental integrity within members of the club, and rely on the 
willingness of club members to ensure environmental integrity, even when circumstances 
change (Schneider, Füssler, La Hoz Theuer, et al., 2017). Finally, a key question is whether 
buyer countries will acquire ITMOs from countries that have hot air and whether and how 
they can identify the situations where acquiring ITMOs involves environmental integrity 
risks. In the early years of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, several countries declared that 
they would not purchase hot air. In later years, however, several countries purchased units 
that originated from countries with hot air and that were unlikely to be backed by actual 
emission reductions (Kollmuss et al., 2015; Tuerk et al., 2013). Any declared intentions by 
countries to uphold environmental integrity would thus need to survive the test of time, 
which may be diﬃcult in the context of changing political climates and rising carbon 
prices. 
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In promoting environmental integrity under the Paris Agreement, the balance between 
centralized international oversight on the one side and ﬂexibility for countries and market 
participants on the other has always been a controversial point of discussion. This is 
particularly the case with the bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement. In the light of past 
experiences with the Kyoto Protocol and the potentially signiﬁcant volume of hot air 
contained in current NDCs (see Table 7-2), we recommend that policy-makers carefully 
consider how to address the risk of hot air under the Paris Agreement. 
Given the uncertainty of whether other approaches to promote environmental integrity 
will be eﬀective, we recommend that Parties take a cautious approach and consider 
establishing limits for those types of transfers that pose higher environmental integrity 
risks. Given the challenges identiﬁed with relative limits, absolute limits may be a simpler 
option to pursue. 
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Chapter 8  
Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
This thesis assesses key issues for ensuring environmental integrity of international carbon 
market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement. This includes a systematic identification 
and categorization of what influences environmental integrity and what approaches could 
mitigate environmental integrity risks (Chapter 2) and a thorough analysis of specific 
aspects of ensuring environmental integrity (Chapters 3 to 7). 
This chapter discusses key findings, draws overall conclusions and makes 
recommendations for ensuring environmental integrity of international carbon market 
mechanisms. The chapter address both how international rules can promote 
environmental integrity and how environmental integrity can be ensured when designing 
and implementing carbon market mechanisms on the ground. The conclusions and 
recommendations aim to inform policy-makers and stakeholders involved in the ongoing 
negotiations on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and on the Carbon Offsetting and 
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) adopted by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as policy-makers and stakeholders implementing 
domestic, bilateral or non-governmental carbon market approaches. 
While the previous chapters were written before the adoption of the rulebook for the Paris 
Agreement by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Paris Agreement (CMA) in Katowice in December 2018, this chapter specifically reflects 
the outcome from Katowice and makes recommendations for the development of 
international rules on Article 6 – on which agreement could not yet be reached in 
Katowice. The chapter also reflects recent developments on international rules for 
CORSIA and makes respective recommendations, where relevant. 
The chapter synthesizes the findings in relation to the four research questions that were 
identified in the introduction (Chapter 1). Section 8.1 addresses the first question: how 
environmental integrity could be defined in the context of international carbon market 
mechanisms. The discussion, conclusions and recommendations with regard to the second 
and third research questions are structured around the four approaches that were 
identified in this thesis for addressing environmental integrity: robust accounting; 
ensuring unit quality; facilitating economy-wide and ambitious mitigation targets; and 
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restricting international transfers. Sections 8.2 to 8.5 assess for each of these four 
approaches what influences environmental and what the risks for undermining 
environmental integrity are (second research question) and what approaches could be 
used to mitigate these risks and how these approaches could be implemented (third 
research question). This is followed by a broader perspective on the role that international 
carbon markets should play in the future, given the risks for environmental integrity and 
available means to address them (forth research question, section 8.6). 
8.1 Defining environmental integrity 
The term ‘environmental integrity’ is used in various decisions under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement but has 
not yet been defined. In the context of international carbon market mechanisms, the term 
could, in principle, be defined in three ways (Chapter 2): 
1. Aggregate achievement of mitigation targets: Environmental integrity would be ensured if 
the engagement in international transfers does not lead to a situation where aggregate 
actual emissions would exceed the aggregated target level; 
2. No increase in global aggregate emissions: Environmental integrity would be ensured if 
the engagement in international transfers leads to aggregated global emissions that are 
no higher as compared to a situation where the transfers did not take place; or 
3. Decrease of global emissions: Environmental integrity would be ensured if the 
engagement in international transfers leads to a decrease in global emissions as 
compared to a situation where the transfers did not take place. 
The ﬁrst approach would imply that global emissions could increase as a result of 
engaging in international transfers. The third approach would mix the definition of 
environmental integrity with the concepts of “allowing for higher ambition” (Article 6.1) 
and delivering an “overall mitigation in global emissions” (Article 6.4) which both address 
the objective that carbon markets should ultimately facilitate lowering global emissions. 
The second definition is therefore recommended to be employed. 
8.2 Robust accounting 
Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for achieving environmental integrity. Ensuring 
robust accounting is much more challenging under the Paris Agreement than it was under 
Kyoto Protocol. Under the Kyoto Protocol, mitigation targets were expressed as absolute, 
economy-wide greenhouse gas (GHG) emission budgets for common and continuous 
multi-year periods, based on a common basket of GHGs and using common Global 
Warming Potential (GWP) values to convert gases other than CO2 into CO2 equivalents. 
This makes accounting for the transfer of carbon market units relatively straight-forward. 
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Under the Paris Agreement, countries can determine themselves what type of mitigation 
targets or actions they communicate in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). 
This led to considerable diversity in the scope, metrics, types and timeframes of NDC 
targets. Many NDC targets are not expressed as absolute levels of GHG emissions but 
relative to business-as-usual (BAU) emissions or relative to the gross domestic product 
(GDP). Many NDCs also include targets in metrics other than GHG emissions, such as 
targets for renewable electricity generation. Some NDCs do not cover all sectors of the 
economy or all GHGs, some are ‘conditional’ on the provision of support, some include 
target ranges, and some do not include any quantitative mitigation targets but only actions 
or strategies. Countries use also different GWP values to quantify and account for their 
NDCs. A further cross-cutting challenge is that many NDCs are not clearly described 
(Graichen et al., 2016).  
This diversity could undermine robust accounting in different ways. If emission 
reductions are double counted, actual global GHG emissions are higher than the sum of 
what individual countries report (Chapter 3). Environmental integrity could also be 
undermined if the diverging time frames of current NDC targets are not appropriately 
accounted for, if countries use inconsistent metrics such as different GWP values, or if any 
reversals of emission reductions or removals, such as in the land-use, land-use change and 
forestry (LULUCF) sector, are not appropriately accounted for (Chapter 2). Establishing 
and implementing robust accounting rules is thus an important prerequisite for achieving 
environmental integrity. 
Providing clarity on NDC targets is a first important perquisite for enabling robust 
accounting (Chapter 2). This could, in principle, be facilitated through the Katowice 
decision on mitigation (“Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 
1/CP.21”), which includes detailed provisions for what information countries should 
provide with regard to their mitigation targets. This guidance is, however, only 
mandatory for second and subsequent NDCs. Robust accounting for the international 
transfer of carbon market units would be facilitated if future decisions under Article 6 
would require countries to update their NDC, as necessary, and fully apply this guidance 
if they choose to voluntarily engage in Article 6 or authorize the use of offset credits under 
CORSIA. 
Avoiding double counting of emission reductions is a key concern when engaging in 
international carbon market mechanisms. The negotiations on international rules for 
Article 6 in Katowice failed mainly due to disagreement on whether and how double 
counting should be avoided for the new crediting mechanism established under 
Article 6.4. 
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Chapter 3 showed that double counting can occur in three forms – double issuance, double 
claiming and double use – and that a range of measures are necessary to avoid all three 
forms of double counting. This includes accounting rules and systems to avoid double 
claiming; the appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms to avoid double issuance, 
such as provisions to avoid that the same activity can issue carbon market units under 
more than one carbon market program and that indirect overlap in the emission reduction 
claims is avoided; and systems to track unit transfers to avoid all forms of double counting. 
While all forms of double counting are recognized in provisionally approved rules for 
CORSIA (ICAO, 2017), the negotiations on Article 6 focused on avoiding double claiming 
and the draft negotiation texts do not include provisions for avoiding double issuance. I 
therefore recommend that all three forms of double counting be addressed under Article 6. 
The Paris Agreement and the Katowice decisions foresee that double claiming be avoided 
through the application of ‘corresponding adjustments’ to reported GHG emissions. The 
timing of the application of such adjustments is a critical and challenging aspect that has 
yet to be resolved. Key questions include what should trigger the application of an 
adjustment, to which calendar year adjustments should be applied, and when the 
application of adjustments should be reported. An important challenge is the application 
of adjustments in the context of single-year targets. Carbon market mechanisms typically 
operate based on multi-year periods. If carbon market units from several years are 
internationally transferred between countries and used to achieve a single-year target, 
aggregated GHG emissions could increase under a range of scenarios (Schneider, Füssler, 
Kohli, et al., 2017). Among the various options considered to address this challenge 
(Chapter 2), using continuous multi-year targets, such as under the Kyoto Protocol, is the 
most robust option, in particular in the light of CORSIA which uses continuous multi-year 
periods and is likely to become the single largest source of demand for carbon market 
units in the next decade. Multi-year targets also provide the advantage that they pose 
fewer risks for countries to achieve their targets and provide more certainty and clarity on 
the impact of NDCs on cumulative emissions. I therefore recommend that countries 
engaging in international carbon market mechanisms move over time towards continuous 
multi-year NDC targets. This could be required or encouraged in two ways: through 
international guidance under Article 6, which could for example include respective 
participation requirements, and through international agreement on ‘common time 
frames’ for NDCs, as envisaged under Article 4.10 of the Paris Agreement.  
Applying consistent GWP values is another element of robust accounting. Similar to the issue 
of the time frame of mitigation targets, robust accounting could also be exacerbated if 
countries used different GWP values to account for their NDCs (Chapter 2). While the 
Katowice decisions on mitigation and the transparency framework (“Modalities, 
procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support 
referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement”) foresee the use of common GWP values 
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for second and subsequent NDCs, countries still use a large diversity of GWP values in 
their current NDCs. To address this challenge, I recommend that international rules on 
Article 6 establish a participation requirement that countries engaging in the international 
transfer of carbon market units should use the same GWP values. 
The accounting for emission reductions that are not covered by NDC targets is a further 
important topic in the negotiations. If the emission reductions from a carbon market unit 
do not fall within the scope of the NDC of the transferring country, double counting would 
not occur, and hence a corresponding adjustment would theoretically not be necessary on 
the side of the transferring country (Chapter 3). Some Parties, however, raised concerns 
that such an accounting approach could create disincentives for countries to move towards 
economy-wide mitigation targets, as envisaged under Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement, 
and that transferring countries could have less incentives to ensure the quality of the 
transferred units (Chapter 2). A further practical challenge is that this approach requires 
distinguishing whether or not emission reductions occurred within or outside the scope 
of NDCs, which can prove to be difficult in some instances (Chapter 3). To address these 
concerns, such carbon market units could not be eligible for international transfers under 
the Paris Agreement or corresponding adjustments could be required regardless of 
whether the emission reductions occurred within or outside the scope of NDCs. The latter 
approach would also simplify accounting, as it would not require determining whether or 
not emission reductions are covered by NDCs. 
In summary, robust accounting for international transfers of carbon market units under 
the Paris Agreement and the use of carbon market units under CORSIA would be greatly 
facilitated if countries (a) move towards a system of continuous multi-year time frames of 
mitigation targets; (b) express targets such that they could be converted – at least ex-post 
– into absolute levels of GHG emissions; (c) apply common GHG metrics; and (d) broaden 
the scope of NDC targets with the view to including all sectors and all GHGs reported in 
GHG inventories under the Paris Agreement (CO2, CH4, N2O, PFCs, HFCs, SF6 and NF3). 
This should preferably be required or encouraged through relevant decisions under the 
Paris Agreement but could also be addressed in bilateral or multilateral agreements 
between jurisdictions engaging in carbon market approaches. 
Recommendations for international rules under the Paris Agreement and ICAO 
International rules for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement could facilitate robust accounting 
through the establishment of minimum requirements and participation requirements 
which countries need to satisfy if they choose to voluntarily engage in Article 6 or 
authorize the use of offset credits under CORSIA. This could include a requirement to 
apply international guidance on the Katowice decision on mitigation (“Further guidance 
in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21”) already to their first NDC; a 
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requirement to use in second and subsequent NDCs multi-year targets or trajectories as 
the basis for accounting for carbon market units; and a requirement that two countries 
engaging in a voluntary cooperation under Article 6 use the same GWP values to account 
for their NDCs. Furthermore, provisions for Article 6 should reflect and address all forms 
of double counting, through respective definitions and by including specific provisions on 
how carbon market mechanism could be designed to address double issuance. To avoid 
disincentives for broadening the scope of NDC targets over time, adjustments could be 
required for all types of transfers, regardless of whether or not they are covered by NDC 
targets. An outstanding future decision on common timeframes for NDCs could foresee 
that countries communicate mitigation targets for common multi-year periods. These 
rules would also facilitate robust accounting for carbon market units used under CORSIA. 
8.3 Ensuring unit quality 
Ensuring unit quality requires appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms. What 
influences unit quality and how it can be ensured depends on the type of carbon market 
mechanism (Chapter 2). This thesis focuses on crediting mechanisms but also addresses 
the international linking of emissions trading systems (ETSs). 
Under crediting mechanisms, the quality of credits is, in principle, ensured if the mitigation 
action is additional – that is, it would not occur in the absence of the incentives from the 
crediting mechanism – and if the emission reductions are not overestimated. A key 
challenge is assessing additionality and emissions baselines, mainly due to the 
information asymmetry between project developers and regulators, and uncertainty of 
assumptions on future developments, such as international fuel prices. Under the new 
context of the Paris Agreement, a further challenge is how NDC targets should be 
considered in quantifying emission reductions. Another challenge inherent to the concept 
of crediting is that oﬀsets subsidize the deployment of low-emitting technologies rather 
than penalizing the deployment of high-emitting technologies. As a consequence, credits 
lower the costs of energy (or other commodities or services), which can lead to greater use 
of energy (or other commodities or services). Such eﬀects, also referred to as ‘market 
leakage’, are commonly not accounted for under existing crediting mechanisms, and may 
thus lead to an over-estimation of emission reductions (Chapter 2). 
The Kyoto mechanisms provide important insights in the challenges with ensuring the 
quality of credits. An important lesson is the risk with projects abating industrial waste 
gases with high GWPs. For such projects, revenues from credits can significantly exceed 
abatement costs, creating perverse incentives to increase production or generation of 
waste gases as a means to increase credit revenues from waste gas abatement (Schneider, 
2011; UNEP, 2007; UNFCCC, 2005; Wartmann et al., 2006). The analysis of projects abating 
HFC-23 and SF6 under Joint Implementation (JI) in Chapter 4 showed that these projects 
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increased waste gas generation to unprecedented levels once they could generate credits 
from producing more waste gas, thereby substantially undermining the quality of the 
credits. Due to these perverse incentives, about two third of the issued credits do not 
represent actual emission reductions. This case study also revealed severe issues with the 
performance and oversight of auditing companies and a lack of transparency, as project 
information is only partially publicly available. 
Similar concerns were also identified with other JI projects that were implemented in 
countries that had weak mitigation targets and that had therefore no incentives to ensure 
the quality of transferred units. Overall, the lack of unit quality under JI may have 
increased global GHG emissions by about 600 million tCO2e – of which 400 million tCO2e 
alone occurred due to the recognition of JI credits under the EU ETS (Kollmuss et al., 2015). 
For the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), various assessments conclude that for a 
large share of projects the additionality is unlikely or questionable (Cames et al., 2017; 
Erickson et al., 2014; Schneider, 2009b). On the other hand, many projects are likely to 
continue operation without issuing credits and may thus contribute to lowering global 
GHG emissions (Erickson et al., 2014; Schneider & Cames, 2014; Spalding-Fecher et al., 
2012; Warnecke et al., 2017, 2015). 
Recently, an important controversy emerged whether credits from already implemented 
CDM and JI projects should be eligible for use after 2020. In the negotiations on the rules 
for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, some Parties proposed that these credits be eligible 
for achieving NDCs, and the ICAO considers allowing airline operates to use these credits 
under CORSIA. The unlimited use of these credits could, however, seriously undermine 
environmental integrity. While additionality and the quantification of emission reductions 
are, in principle, key considerations for unit quality, the GHG emissions impact from using 
credits from already implemented projects is more complex. If the supply of credits 
considerably exceeds demand, a key consideration for the global GHG emissions impact 
is whether already implemented projects would continue to reduce GHG emissions even 
without credit revenues, or whether they are at risk of discontinuing GHG abatement. A 
detailed assessment of the status and operating conditions of existing CDM projects in 
various countries shows that most of these projects continue abatement even if they cannot 
sell offset credits. This is because they have ongoing revenues (e.g. from electricity sales) 
which exceed their ongoing operational costs. The results from modelling the offset credit 
supply potential and the marginal costs of generating offset credits show that using these 
credits after 2020 will result in no notable emissions reductions beyond those that would 
occur anyway and result in low offset credit prices that neither offer incentives for new 
investments nor reward previous investments in offset projects (Chapter 5). 
These findings are important for the future use of crediting mechanisms under the Paris 
Agreement and CORSIA, and for crediting mechanisms under national or bilateral 
Chapter 8 Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
136 
agreements or by non-governmental organizations. Overall, the available evidence 
suggests that project-based mechanisms are exposed to significant risks of over-crediting 
and that using credits from already implemented projects after 2020 could seriously 
undermine future mitigation efforts. To mitigate these risks, it is essential that: 
• crediting mechanisms establish stringent project eligibility criteria which effectively 
exclude project types with uncertain additionality;  
• crediting mechanisms require the use of internationally accepted or thoroughly 
reviewed methodological standards to quantify emission reductions and that such 
standards include appropriate safeguards to prevent perverse incentives; 
• crediting mechanisms monitor the performance of auditors and apply effective 
sanctions in the case of non-performance; 
• information on credited activities be transparent and publicly accessible; 
• the use of offset credits from already implemented projects be limited to new projects 
(i.e. which were implemented after the decision to allow the use of offset credits was 
made) or projects that are at risk of discontinuing greenhouse gas abatement without 
further support. 
Under emission trading systems (ETSs), the quality of allowances mainly depends on 
whether the ETS cap is set below the emissions level that would occur in the absence of 
the trading system, and whether emissions are monitored appropriately. The ambition of 
current ETSs varies, and several existing ETSs face challenges with surplus allowances 
(Erik Haites, 2018; Narassimhan et al., 2018). Other design features, such as price collars, 
allowance reserves, import of credits, and provisions for banking of allowances, also aﬀect 
unit quality – mainly by altering the cap. If an ETS with an ambitious cap is linked to one 
that is over-allocated, linking could reduce aggregated abatement from both systems 
(Chapter 2).  
In practice, this seems unlikely to happen, for several reasons. First, while some ETSs are 
over-allocated in the short-term, most ETSs have a price that is well above zero (World 
Bank & Ecofys, 2018). This means that the market participants expect – at least in the long-
term – that there is scarcity and no over-allocation of allowances. Second, most ETSs have 
established mechanisms that address or avoid continued over-allocation, such as price 
floors or stability mechanisms (ICAP, 2018). And third, whether policy-makers from a 
jurisdiction with an ambitious ETS cap would want to link with a jurisdiction with a weak 
ETS cap is questionable, as this would involve considerable financial flows to the other 
jurisdiction. Borrowing on the analogy of ‘carbon dating’ (Doda & Taschini, 2016), linking 
partners may want to find a match with similar ambitions. ETSs also have the advantage 
that they penalize the generation of emissions rather than subsidizing the reduction of 
emissions (which could lead to leakage effects, see Chapter 2) and that they directly expose 
all covered entities with a carbon price. 
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Overall this suggests that environmental integrity risks from international transfers of 
carbon market units are likely to be higher for crediting mechanisms than for international 
linking of ETSs. 
Recommendations for international rules under the Paris Agreement and ICAO 
Under the Paris Agreement, unit quality could be addressed through the rules, modalities 
and procedures of Article 6.4 and through international guidance on Article 6.2, though 
Parties have diﬀerent views on whether the latter should address environmental integrity 
issues other than robust accounting (Obergassel & Asche, 2017). In the current negotiation 
texts, specific provisions to ensure unit quality are only included for the Article 6.4 
mechanism. For international cooperation under Article 6.2, the text requires countries 
only to report on how they promote environmental integrity. In the light of the experiences 
with JI, it seems however questionable whether an approach that only provides 
transparency will provide sufficient incentives for countries to ensure unit quality. In 
contrast to the current status of the negotiations under the Paris Agreement, ICAO 
adopted a more stringent approach where crediting programs must demonstrate that they 
ensure unit quality and be approved by the ICAO Council. I therefore recommend 
strengthening the approach to ensuring unit quality under the Paris Agreement. This 
could include the elaboration of principles and concrete criteria for how Parties should 
ensure unit quality (see examples above), a thorough international review of how 
countries ensure environmental integrity, or the establishment of an international body 
that oversees the engagement of countries in international carbon market mechanisms. 
8.4 Facilitating economy-wide and ambitious mitigation targets 
The ambition and scope of mitigation targets can impact environmental integrity in 
indirect ways. If a country has an ambitious economy-wide mitigation target and transfers 
units that lack quality, it may have to compensate for the transfer in order to still achieve 
its target, either by further reducing emissions or by purchasing units. The same may not 
be true, however, if the mitigation target of a country is so weak that it does not require 
the country to take any mitigation action to achieve its target, or if the emission reductions 
fall outside the scope of the target. In these instances, the country might accrue more 
ﬁnancial revenues from over-estimating emissions reductions and selling the resulting 
units, without infringing its ability to achieve its target. 
Countries with weak mitigation targets have less incentives to ensure the quality of the 
units they authorize for use by other countries or by airline operators under CORSIA 
(Chapter 2). The experience with JI showed that this risk is material (Chapter 4). And, 
unfortunately, the ambition and scope of current NDCs varies strongly. The available 
evaluations suggest that many NDC targets indeed do not require the country to take any 
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further mitigation action to action to achieve it (Aldy & Pizer, 2016; Höhne et al., 2017; 
Rogelj et al., 2016) (Chapter 7). 
This has also implications for whether international carbon markets provide incentives for 
countries to enhance the ambition and broaden the scope of NDC targets over time, as 
envisaged in Articles 4.4 and 6.1 of the Paris Agreement. For acquiring countries, using 
international carbon markets could lower the costs of achieving their targets, and thereby 
enable these countries to adopt more ambitious targets. Yet for transferring countries, the 
possibility to use international carbon markets could create incentives to set mitigation 
targets at unambitious levels, or to define their scope narrowly, in order to accrue more 
benefits from transferring units internationally (Carbone et al., 2009; Green, 2016; Helm, 
2003; Holtsmark & Sommervoll, 2012; Howard, 2018; Spalding-Fecher, 2017; Warnecke et 
al., 2018) (Chapter 2). 
Facilitating the adoption of economy-wide and ambitious mitigation targets could thus be 
one of the possible means to indirectly mitigate environmental integrity risks from 
international carbon market mechanisms. Article 4.3 of the Paris Agreement calls for a 
“progression” of NDCs reﬂecting the “highest possible ambition”, and Article 4.4 
encourages developing countries to move over time towards economy-wide targets. While 
these provisions guide Parties, NDCs are ultimately self-determined by them. This 
narrows the possibilities to facilitate ambitious targets through international rules. Several 
approaches could, however, provide incentives for countries to enhance the ambition 
broaden the coverage of NDC targets, as pointed out below. 
Recommendations for international rules under the Paris Agreement and ICAO 
Parties could consider establishing participation requirements for the engagement in 
international transfers under Article 6 and the use of carbon markets under CORSIA with 
the view to providing incentives for countries to expand the scope of their NDCs. This 
could be implemented by limiting international transfers to carbon market units from 
emission reductions covered by the NDC or, alternatively, by requiring that countries 
commit to expand the scope of their NDCs to economy-wide targets in the future or that 
they apply adjustments regardless of whether the emission reductions are covered by the 
NDC in order to participate in Article 6 (see also Section 8.2). Enhancing the ambition and 
scope of NDC targets could also be facilitated indirectly, through transparent information 
on NDCs, reporting and review under the transparency framework under Article 13, the 
global stocktake under Article 14, or the mechanism to facilitate implementation and 
promote compliance under Article 15 (Chapter 2). 
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8.5 Restricting international transfers 
Approaches that restrict the international transfer of carbon market units could 
complement other approaches to promote environmental integrity: they could be 
implemented with the view to ensuring that robust accounting systems are in place; that 
carbon market units have quality; or that the engagement in carbon market approaches 
provides incentives, or avoids disincentives, for enhancing the ambition and scope of 
mitigation targets over time (Chapter 7). 
Restrictions could apply to the issuance, transfer or use of carbon market units and be 
implemented in several ways: 
• Eligibility criteria which require that certain requirements must be met in order to issue, 
transfer or use carbon market units (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 7); 
• Limits (or quotas) which restrict the number or type of carbon market units that may be 
issued, transferred or used (Chapters 2, 6 and 7); 
• Exchange rates which adjust the value of carbon market units transferred between 
jurisdictions by a conversion factor (Chapters 2 and 6); and 
• Discount rates which also involve a conversion factor but place a greater value on 
carbon market units of the own jurisdiction (Chapters 2 and 6). 
Both eligibility criteria and limits were established under the Kyoto Protocol. They were 
mainly used to ensure robust accounting and did not speciﬁcally address the quality of 
units or the ambition of mitigation targets (Chapter 7). Approaches that restrict 
international transfers are not included in the Paris Agreement but were proposed by 
some Parties and are being considered in the negotiations of the international rules for 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The ICAO explicitly foresees eligibility criteria for offset 
credits that may be used under CORSIA (Chapter 5). These criteria cover accounting 
issues, such as avoiding double counting of emission reductions and addressing non-
permanence, and issues related to unit quality, such as criteria for the assessment of 
additionality and the quantification of emission reductions. Most non-governmental 
crediting programs also have project eligibility criteria with the aim of ensuring unit 
quality. Limits are often applied for the use of credits in ETSs (ICAP, 2018) and could also 
be used for the linking of ETSs (Chapter 6). Exchange or discount rates are both explored 
as a means to mitigate risks with regard to the quality of units (Chapters 2 and 6). 
The findings from this thesis suggest that eligibility criteria, limits and discount rates 
could mitigate environmental integrity risks whereas exchange rates may not be effective 
and could lead to unintended consequences: 
• Eligibility criteria are a simple and effective tool to restrict the engagement in carbon 
market approaches to conditions that pose less threats to environmental integrity. 
Chapter 8 Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
140 
They are particularly suitable for crediting mechanisms where eligibility could be 
limited to activities with a high likelihood of additionality. While this approach is 
increasingly embraced by non-governmental offsetting programs (of which several are 
in the process of excluding project types with less certainty of additionality) it proved 
to be politically difficult to agree upon under multilateral mechanisms, such as the 
CDM and JI. Eligibility criteria could also be imposed by buyers of offset credits. Most 
governmental and multilateral programs and initiatives have established eligibility 
criteria that aim to address environmental integrity risks. With regard to the use of 
offset credits from already implemented projects, robust eligibility criteria are essential 
to ensure that, as a result of the incentives, new mitigation activities are implemented 
existing mitigation activities that are at risk of discontinuing GHG abatement are 
enabled to continue operation (Chapter 5). 
• Limits could mitigate environmental integrity risks but are difficult to establish in 
effective ways and involve trade-offs with other policy objectives such as achieving 
cost-effectiveness. Limits could be established in two ways (Chapter 7): Absolute limits 
generally reduce the number of units that can be transferred and thereby indirectly 
limit environmental integrity risks from unit lacking quality. They could still enable to 
lower the costs of mitigation and are relatively simple to implement (Chapter 6 and 7). 
Relative limits aim to directly address environmental integrity risks by allowing unit 
transfers only to the extent that the actual emissions of a country are below the limit. 
Relative limits could thereby specifically aim to prevent the transfer of units from 
countries with weak mitigation targets. The testing of approaches for establishing 
limits in the context of fifteen countries provides mixed results. Relative limits based 
on historical emissions data are found to have considerable shortcomings. They could 
for example hinder some countries that have ambitious targets from engaging in 
international transfers. Relative limits based on emission projections may provide a 
more valid approach, although they also face technical and political challenges. Any 
limits based on emission projections would ideally be based on an internationally 
agreed methodology which would include provisions to ensure consistency and 
comparability between countries and means to address the uncertainty of key 
variables such as economic growth (Chapter 7). 
• Exchange rates involve the risks of unintended implications for cost-effectiveness and 
environmental integrity. Depending on how exchange rates are set, aggregated 
emissions could increase or decrease. Due to information asymmetries between the 
regulated entities and policy-makers setting the exchange rate, and uncertainties about 
future developments, setting exchange rates in a manner that avoids such unintended 
consequences could prove difficult (Chapter 6). I therefore recommend not to pursue 
exchange rates. 
• Discount rates, in contrast, can ensure that both cost-effectiveness and total abatement 
are enhanced (Chapter 6). This might partially mitigate risks with regard to unit 
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quality. One of the principles of the Article 6.4 mechanism is that it should contribute 
to an “overall mitigation in global emissions”. Discount rates are one of the means to 
effectively implement this principle, but are disputed in the negotiations (Obergassel 
& Asche, 2017; Schneider, Warnecke, Day, & Kachi, 2018). 
Recommendations for international rules under the Paris Agreement and ICAO 
Eligibility criteria could be an effective tool to promote environmental integrity for both 
Article 6 and CORSIA. They could be applied with regard to satisfying requirements for 
robust accounting and ensuring unit quality. Similar to the approach taken by some non-
governmental offsetting programs, the supervisory body of the Article 6.4 mechanism 
could ensure that eligibility is limited activities that pose lower risks for unit quality. 
Under both CORSIA and the Paris Agreement, eligibility criteria could ensure – through 
vintage restrictions – that only carbon market units from newly implemented activities are 
eligible (Chapter 5). Eligibility criteria could also ensure that countries that wish to engage 
in international carbon market mechanisms formulate their future NDCs in ways that 
facilitate robust accounting for international carbon market units.  
Limits may be practically and politically challenging to pursue under the Paris Agreement. 
Technically, all approaches for setting limits tested in this thesis have some limitation and 
involve trade-offs between ensuring environmental integrity and enabling the 
participation in carbon market approaches. Politically, many countries oppose limits 
because they do not regard them to be consistent with the principles of Article 6 and fear 
that they might restrict their ability to engage in international transfers. This may be 
particularly relevant for the context of international linking of ETSs where the number of 
transfers is driven by the regulated entities. As international linking of ETSs may pose 
lower environmental integrity risks than the international transfer of credits (see 
Section 8.3), policy makers could consider exempting international linking of ETSs from 
any limits. While this increases complexity, it could help balance the policy objectives of 
promoting environmental integrity and enabling participation in international carbon 
markets (Chapter 7). 
Discount rates could be a means to enhance the environmental impact of carbon market 
mechanisms. While they are less suited to specifically address environmental integrity 
concerns, they could help enhance ambition by lowering aggregate emissions further. 
8.6 Future role of international carbon markets 
International carbon markets provide benefits and opportunities but also entail risks for 
environmental integrity. 
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The most prominent benefit is that carbon markets can reduce the cost of mitigating 
climate change and thereby enable the adoption of more ambitious climate mitigation 
targets. But there are other important benefits. Putting a price on carbon provides 
incentives to search and discover new mitigation activities that might otherwise not be 
discovered. International carbon markets can enhance technology transfer and mobilize 
financial flows to less developed countries. Many mitigation activities triggered through 
international carbon markets also have considerable co-benefits for sustainable 
development. And perhaps the greatest successes of the CDM is that it increased 
knowledge and awareness and build capacity about climate mitigation in developing 
countries, which may have paved the way for the adoption of broader climate policies in 
some countries (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012). 
A key challenge of international carbon markets is ensuring environmental integrity. If 
environmental integrity is undermined, this increases not only global emissions but also 
the costs of mitigating climate change. 
Overall, the findings from the thesis and the literature show that environmental integrity 
risks are notable. A serious threat is that environmental integrity could be undermined in 
multiple ways, and single loophole could have considerable impact and undermine 
overall integrity. The experience with the existing mechanisms and the international 
negotiations on Article 6 confirm that closing all loopholes could prove to be technically 
and politically difficult. 
This raises the question what role carbon markets should play in the future, given the risks 
and the available means to address them. As one can imagine, the answer to this question 
is not a simple “yes, let’s use them” or “no, better not”, but a rather a consideration of how 
and under what conditions they should be used. 
A first consideration for the future role of international carbon markets is which type of 
carbon market approaches are most effective in achieving their objectives. The available 
information suggests that environmental integrity risks differ considerably between the 
different types of mechanisms. Among the three possible ways of engaging in 
international carbon market mechanisms – international linking of ETSs, international 
crediting mechanisms, or direct bilateral government-to-government transfers – linking of 
ETSs may pose the lowest risks for environmental integrity. While linking can reduce 
aggregated abatement if an ETS with an ambitious cap is linked to one that is over-
allocated, this seems unlikely to happen in practice (Section 8.3). By contrast, effectively 
addressing the risks associated with crediting mechanisms – in particular ensuring 
additionality and robust baselines, avoiding perverse incentives for host countries not to 
adopt climate policies in order to sell more credits, and ‘market leakage’ – is both 
technically and politically difficult. And lastly, the experience with direct government-to-
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government transfers shows that ensuring environmental integrity was not even an 
objective in some transfers (Tuerk et al., 2013). 
Altogether, this suggests that among the three type of mechanisms, well-designed ETSs 
may be most effective in achieving environmental integrity and cost-effective GHG 
abatement. More advanced economies that have the necessary capacity should thus 
consider introducing and linking ETSs, rather than relying on crediting approaches. In this 
regard, ICAO could also consider using allowances from ETSs, rather than credits from 
crediting mechanisms, to offset emissions from international aviation in the future. 
Politically, however, it could be difficult to ensure that only ETSs with ambitious caps are 
eligible. Moreover, using only allowances from ETSs would exclude countries without an 
ETS from supplying offsets to the scheme. Lastly, careful consideration should be given to 
how any ETS price stability mechanisms interact with the use of allowances under 
CORSIA, in order to avoid that the use of allowances under CORSIA triggers more 
allowance being brought to the market. 
Where crediting mechanisms are pursued, they could focus on addressing emissions in 
countries which lack capacity for implementing broad climate policies and for which 
building capacity and mobilizing financial flows is key to overcoming barriers for a low 
carbon development. In these situations, crediting mechanisms could play a role in 
identifying untapped mitigation opportunities. To avoid environmental integrity risks, 
crediting mechanisms could also primarily be used a vehicle to disburse climate finance, 
rather than for offsetting mitigation targets (Schneider & Spalding-Fecher, 2015). 
Examples include the World Bank’s Pilot Auctioning Facility for Methane and Climate 
Change Mitigation and its Carbon Initiative for Development. Crediting mechanisms 
could also still play a role for voluntary offsetting of GHG emissions. 
The role and scope of crediting mechanisms might not only be limited due to concerns 
over environmental integrity but also because more and more countries implement broad 
climate policies. In countries with ambitious NDCs and climate policies, the potential for 
crediting may be small. Under JI, only few projects were implemented in countries with 
ambitious climate policies. The EU, for example, had to limit the eligible project types 
considerably to avoid double counting and overlap with the EU ETS and other regulations 
(Kollmuss et al., 2015). 
A second consideration for the future role of carbon markets is what governments 
arrangements and conditions best ensure environmental integrity. An important finding 
of the thesis is that the ambition and scope of NDCs is key for the incentives to ensure 
environmental integrity. Environmental integrity risks are strongly reduced if carbon 
market units are purchased from countries with ambitious and economy-wide mitigation 
targets. Given the principle of self-determination of NDCs under the Paris Agreement, it 
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could however prove difficult to limit the use of carbon market approaches to countries 
with ambitious mitigation targets. 
Outside the UNFCCC context, countries could decide to only engage in market 
approaches with other countries if these also have ambitious NDC targets. This could 
apply to all three forms of possible cooperation: linking of ETSs, purchase of credits, or 
direct bilateral government-to-government transfers. This approach could be formalized 
through political declarations or the formation of ‘carbon clubs’ (Keohane et al., 2017). 
Such declarations or clubs, however, can only address environmental integrity within 
members of the club, and rely on the willingness of club members to ensure environmental 
integrity, even when circumstances change. In the early years of the Kyoto Protocol, for 
example, several countries declared that they would not purchase hot air. In later years, 
however, some countries purchased units that originated from countries with hot air and 
that were unlikely to be backed by actual emission reductions. Any declared intentions by 
countries to uphold environmental integrity would thus need to survive the test of time, 
which may be diﬃcult in the context of changing political climates and rising carbon prices 
(Chapter 7). 
Ensuring environmental integrity through voluntary actions by countries – or a buyer-
beware approach – also requires that countries are able to identify environmental integrity 
risks in a timely manner. The EU, for example, limited the eligibility of credits from some 
industrial gas project types in its ETS but did not effectively protect its scheme from the 
large number of poor quality JI credits from Ukraine and Russia (Kollmuss et al., 2015). 
An interesting related question is what governance arrangements for carbon market 
approaches best ensure environmental integrity. Carbon market mechanisms can be 
operated by domestic, bilateral, multilateral or non-governmental organizations and 
different degrees of international oversight could be provided under the Paris Agreement. 
The findings of the thesis suggest that international oversight could help mitigate 
environmental integrity risks to some extent. The increase of waste generation rates from 
industrial gas projects to unprecedented levels, as described in Chapter 4, would not have 
been possible if internationally approved CDM methodologies had been used. The same 
holds for many other JI projects that would not have been eligible under current CDM 
rules (Kollmuss et al., 2015). On the other hand, international rules often rely on the lowest 
common denominator and only establish minimum requirements. Under the CDM, for 
example, limiting the eligibility of project types with the view to addressing additionality 
concerns was politically not possible, whereas many non-governmental carbon offsetting 
programs restricted eligibility in the first place and adapt eligibility to new circumstances. 
A third and last consideration is when carbon market approaches and when other types 
of climate policies are better suited to effectively reduce emissions. This is a complex and 
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controversially debated question which goes beyond the scope of this thesis and which 
may depend on the specific circumstances. Broadly speaking, carbon markets have proven 
to be effective if the entities exposed to the carbon price consider the incentives in their 
economic decision-making, which generally applies to large emitters in the energy and 
other industry sectors but often not to households, except if intermediaries such as energy 
service companies are involved (Schneider & Spalding-Fecher, 2015; Warnecke et al., 
2017). Carbon markets have also proven to be effective in discovering new low-cost 
mitigation opportunities which were not addressed through regulations. Under JI and the 
EU ETS, for example, N2O emissions in the chemical industry were reduced far below 
levels required by regulations (Kollmuss et al., 2015). In the long-standing debate whether 
carbon taxes or ETSs are better suited, an important advantage of ETSs is that they provide 
flexibility to auction or freely allocate allowances. In sectors that are exposed to the risk of 
carbon leakage (i.e. shifts in production due to carbon costs), free allocation allows to 
mitigate this risk while still exposing the regulated entities to the full price of carbon and 
thereby providing the full incentives to reduce emissions. 
Carbon markets can also have important shortcomings compared to other mitigation 
policies. They require significant capacity to regulate and implement them and can involve 
notable transaction costs, in particular for disperse mitigation activities. In many instances, 
simple regulations, such as bans or efficiency standards, could be much simpler to 
implement. A further shortcoming is that, without a clear price signal from an ambitious 
long-term target trajectory, entities may prioritize short-term over long-term abatement 
options, which could lead to less cost-effectives outcomes in a long-term perspective or, in 
the worst case, impede the transition to a low carbon economy and lead to a lock-in into 
higher emissions pathways. Another critique to carbon market approaches is that they 
provide only incentives to achieve a single policy-objective – mitigating climate change – 
and do not provide incentives for entities to balance this with other objectives, in particular 
for achieving other sustainable development goals and avoiding adverse social and 
environmental impacts.  
It is thus important that policy-makers do not regard carbon market approaches as the one 
and only ‘silver-bullet’ to mitigating climate change but carefully assess what policy 
instrument or mix of instruments is best suited to achieve and balance different policy 
objectives, in particular in light of the rapid transition that is necessary to achieve the goals 
of the Paris Agreement. 
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